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Abstract
Favorable and unfavorable demographic processes and their imminent
repercussions for local labor markets, regional economic development,
and the accomplishment of public duties have spurred the interest
around th world. The mobility of individuals and households, in partic-
ular in the form of migration and commuting, decisively shapes these
demographic trends at the regional and local level. Studying the causes
of mobility behavior at the microlevel, therefore, delivers hypotheses
needed for the evaluation of various policy options directed at attract-
ing new and retaining existing population shares. Knowing about the
various inﬂuences in mobility decision making also allows for a better
projection of population dynamics and migration ﬂows.
In the design of this dissertation, uncertainty is recognized as a key
component of day-to-day decision making processes and, thus, serves
as the underlying feature in the examinations. The dissertation’s aim
is to study the eﬀects of economic uncertainty on household mobility
decisions. This includes migration as well as commuting behavior in the
presence of income and transport cost uncertainty. In three thematic
areas the dissertation investigates migration behavior of individuals
and households in the context of both long-distance interregional mi-
gration and short-distance local moves. Covered aspects range from the
inﬂuence of diﬀerent levels of longevity over the implications of joint
migration intentions to the interrelated choice of residence and mode
of mobility in a urban-suburban framework.
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1
Introduction
Recent and ongoing demographic developments in many regions of the world have
actuated the interest of researchers over a wide range of disciplines. Particularly
migration, perceived as an important ‘outside’ factor of population dynamics, is
subject to a lively and growing discussion in academia but also ranging high on
political agendas and considered to an increasing extent by private businesses, too.
The earliest noteworthy contribution to the theory of migration is credited to
Ravenstein (1889), an English geographer of German origin, for his extensive sur-
vey of 24 European and North American countries and detailed comparisons of
the volume of internal migration and the characteristics of migrants, which was
published as “The Laws of Migration”. His study received large interest among
scholars of many areas of study and created intense debate at the time, partly be-
cause of the title itself. It proved not easy to defend his formulation of a consistent
‘law’ of migration and Ravenstein noted that “laws of population, and economic
laws generally, have not the rigidity of physical laws” (p. 241).
Notwithstanding the controversy it caused, his work marks the starting point in
the theoretical elaboration of the causes and consequences of migration conducted
in the subsequent century. Among the various motives for migration identiﬁed
by Ravenstein the most dominant he found to be the economic motive: “the de-
sire inherent in most men to ‘better’ themselves in material respects” (p. 286).
Lee (1966) further reﬁned the hypotheses set forth by Ravenstein and developed
a more general, and in Lee’s opinion better testable, explanation with regard to
the volume of migration, streams and counterstreams, and the characteristics of
migrants. Accordingly, migration propensity and volume depend on the obstacles
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in place that have to be surmounted by the migrant, and the more diﬃcult this
is, the lower is the expected volume of migration. On the other hand, Lee pre-
dicts that the volume and the rate of migration tend to increase over time unless
heavy restrictions exist. Likewise, if origin and destination are similar there is
only little migration between these two regions, whereas strong migration ﬂows
from origin to destination are expected if major factors in the origin region are
very negative. Another criteria in the structure of migration ﬂows is the selectivity
of the migrants, and hence the particular group of people most likely to migrate
for given conditions in the origin and the destination. Lee (1966) distinguishes
between positive selection, where persons are driven by positive (pull) factors in
the destination, and negative selection, which refers to persons who migrate due
to negative (push) factors at origin. Moreover, higher intervening obstacles in the
migration process favor positive selection and increase the quality of the migrants.
Therefore, migrants do not only diﬀer from one another in the factors causing their
decision to move but also in their personal “abilities to overcome the intervening
obstacles” (p. 56). Lee’s (1966) major contribution to the theory of human mi-
gration, as implemented in later studies both theoretical and empirical in nature,
has been the introduction of the concept of push and pull factors relevant in the
migration decision of individuals.
Several recent studies deal with the theory of positive and negative self-selection
of migrants and conceive regional income inequalities as one important source for
international as well as internal movement of labor (see, e. g. Stark 2006, Khwaja
2002a, Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, Kanbur and Rapoport 2005, Liebig and Sousa-
Poza 2004).1 Hearkening back to early ideas of Lee, Borjas (1987) argues that
migrants from countries with higher income inequality tend to be negatively se-
lected, i. e. less skilled than the average worker in both host and source countries.
Other empirical studies (e. g. Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, Liebig and Sousa-Poza
2004) argue in favor of positive selectivity, in that highly-skilled persons are more
inclined to migrate due to their higher levels of ability. Larger disparities in the in-
come distribution further attenuate this positive selectivity. Therefore, the overall
pattern of migration depends on the dominating eﬀect of either positive selectiv-
ity of highly-skilled persons or negative selectivity stemming from large income
inequality.
Migration theory diﬀers across disciplines in recognizing various social struc-
1 See also Borjas (1987) for his seminal work on the theory of self-selection of immigrants.
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tures as decisive unit. For instance, sociologists and anthropologists traditionally
consider the individual and the family as their unit of analysis, which is referred to
as the micro or “meso” level (see, e. g., Faist 2000), and theorize about the creation
or dissolution of family, ethnic, or community ties among migrants. In comparison,
demographers focus on the population in general and research in this ﬁeld is typi-
cally conducted at an aggregated level using census or survey data. Geographers,
on the other hand, direct their attention on spatial patterns of population move-
ments with a scale ranging from the micro level over the meso level to the macro
level. Yet diﬀerently, political scientists and legal scholars consider the macro
level (e. g. states) in their study of the regulation of population movements, be it
legal, illegal or refugee ﬂows. Although applied methods diﬀer largely, migration
theories across all disciplines represent an important source for the understanding
of migration behavior of individuals and groups of people and provide necessary
hypotheses.
Economists focus on labor market and other economic impacts of migration in
the sending and receiving region by considering the following prominent factors:
income distribution and inequality, dual and segmented labor markets, and the po-
litical implications of emigrant remittances (Brettell and Holliﬁeld 2008, p. 11). In
neoclassical macroeconomic theory, for instance, regional wage diﬀerences, which
arise from regional variations in the supply of and demand for labor, are regarded
as a primary reason for migration. In long-run equilibrium, labor as a factor of pro-
duction accordingly disperses in space by moving from regions with a low marginal
productivity of labor and low wages to high-productivity and high-wage regions,
and by doing so equalizes demand and supply across regions. In the process wages
converge to a common level over all regions and any movement of labor ceases once
all wage diﬀerentials have diminished. The neoclassical microeconomic theory of
migration approaches the explanation of migration on the basis of rational choice
(Sjaastad 1962, Adams 1993, Borjas 1994). In this respect, rational agents decide
to migrate based on individual cost-beneﬁt calculus of moving to alternative loca-
tions. People migrate to the location at which they are most productive and their
discounted expected future net returns are maximized. Likewise, diﬀerences in the
return on human capital between regions lead to the movement of high-skilled work-
ers from human capital-rich to human capital-poor regions in their desire to seek
a higher rate of return on their skills. The rational choice approach of explaining
migration views wage or employment opportunity diﬀerentials between origin and
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destination (countries, regions, communities) as well as costs associated with the
move (e. g. traveling, job search, learning a new language, and psychological costs
of cutting old ties and forging new ones) as main determinants for long-distance
residential relocation (Massey et al. 1993, p. 434). The probability of employment
at the destination can accordingly be raised through a higher endowment with indi-
vidual human capital, that in consequence increases expected earnings and reduces
migration costs (more eﬃcient search process of the highly skilled). This, in eﬀect,
leads to higher net beneﬁts from relocation and stimulates migration. Analog to
neoclassical macroeconomic theory, no migration takes place between regions in
the absence of diﬀerences in expected net beneﬁts.
As with most areas of decision making, migration decisions are typically bound
to an environment of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge about future outcomes
resulting from the decisions taken. Economic migration theory, therefore, began
early to incorporate some measure of risk or uncertainty2 into the analysis of mi-
gration decisions (e. g. Harris and Todaro 1970, David 1974, Stark and Levhari
1982, Burda 1995). In noting that “neither the denseness of the fog of ignorance in
which decisions must be made, nor the dimensions of the hazards which that fog
is presumed to obscure, need be treated as if they lay entirely beyond men’s con-
trol”, David (1974, p. 22) formulates a search theoretic model of optimal migration
decisions explaining an individual’s rational response to the presence of risk.
Based on methods inspired from ﬁnancial economics, several studies concentrate
on the theoretical explanation of the timing and speed of migration under uncer-
tainty by utilizing real options theory (Burda 1995, Khwaja 2002a, Anam et al.
2008, Moretto and Vergalli 2008). The well-established real options analysis (ROA),
tracing back to work by Dixit and Pyndik (Dixit 1989, Dixit and Pindyck 1994), is
based on control theory and describes optimal decision behavior in the presence of
uncertainty. Generally, it describes the choice of a risk-neutral individual between
two possible states with the objective to maximize the expected (discounted) fu-
ture payoﬀs from the particular strategy net of any costs. Switching between both
states involves (partly) irreversible costs. Uncertainty in models based on this ap-
proach arises from an underlying price or cost dispersion process peculiar to the
respective state. The central feature of this approach is the implementation of the
2Knight (1921) provides the ﬁrst systematic distinction between both terms in classifying dif-
ferent types of probability situations. In this regard, “risk” refers to the measurable probabilities
of a set of classiﬁable instances, while “true uncertainty” results from unmeasurable probabilities
due to a lack of classiﬁable instances.
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so-called option value of waiting to migrate at present or postponing the decision.
The possibility to change the state or to wait further induces an option whose value
is determined by the value that the individual attaches to waiting one further pe-
riod in the current state. The underlying real options analysis thereby also allows
for a better consideration of the involved opportunity costs of immediate migration
that arise from the existence of uncertainty. The main conclusion derived from this
analysis is that a positive net present value of the migration endeavor is not a suf-
ﬁcient requirement for the decision to migrate. Burda (1995) was ﬁrst in applying
the real options approach to the study of individual migration decision making in
an attempt to explain restrained migration from East to West Germany despite
persistent signiﬁcant wage diﬀerentials between the two regions. Other researchers
followed in applying the real options analysis to the study of migration behavior
(e. g. Khwaja 2002b).
The new economics of migration (Stark and Bloom 1985) challenges the strong
focus on isolated individual agents in neoclassical microeconomic theory and is,
instead, concerned with family or group decision making with the aim to maxi-
mize expected overall net payoﬀ or utility3 and to minimize risks. Along this line,
Schultz (1982, p. 101) describes risk as “a dominating element in the migration
decision” and argues that both “risk of pecuniary failure” as well as “uncertainty
of how fundamental changes in the migrant’s mode of life and opportunities will
change his values and family attachments” give rise to the extended family to be
“the primary source of funds used in migration.” From a portfolio point of view,
income uncertainty in the family can accordingly be reduced by spatially dispers-
ing members of the family or group and, thereby, diversifying individual incomes
in order to optimize the risk proﬁle of the pooled income (e. g. Stark 1978, Stark
and Levhari 1982, Anam et al. 2008). A growing number of studies has advanced
on this reasoning, for example by explaining family risk diversiﬁcation through
transnational movement or the migration decision in a coordinated mass of indi-
viduals (e. g. Anam et al. 2008, Moretto and Vergalli 2008). Accordingly, contrary
to the view on isolated individuals, Moretto and Vergalli (2008) argue that the
optimal decision of an individual may, instead, consist of waiting to migrate in
a coordinated mass of individuals that could eventually lead to an abrupt rise in
the migration ﬂow. The higher the chance of integration for immigrant groups,
3Massey et al. (1993, p. 438) points out that income is not a homogeneous good and therefore
questions the assumption of a constant income eﬀect on utility, which makes an equal treatment
of the two measures (income and utility) diﬃcult.
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the larger the expected size of the diaspora and the smaller the wage diﬀerential
necessary to trigger migration of the group. In the context of family or group deci-
sion making a net present value larger zero is, therefore, neither a suﬃcient nor a
necessary condition for migration, as the optimal portfolio solution could result in
a negative outcome for some members of the family or group while others realize
a gain from migration.
The dissertation at hand investigates the complex interrelations of individual
and household mobility decision making under uncertainty in a theoretical model
and represents aspects from three thematic areas. In the process it follows Dixit
(1989), Burda (1995), and other scholars mentioned above in applying the real op-
tions theory to the study of mobility decisions. The work is divided into three main
chapters, each considering a distinct set of research questions within a well-deﬁned
scope. The ﬁrst two chapters deal with the inﬂuence of regional wage diﬀerential
uncertainty on individual and household migration decisions and, thereby, focus
on residential relocation for employment and income reasons, typically related to
long distance moves. The third contribution, in contrast, turns to the investigation
of individual mobility decisions at the regional and local level with the particular
application to the urban and suburban context. While the ﬁrst two parts employ
an income maximizing objective with regard to the obtainable regional wage dif-
ferential, in the latter part the relocation decision is driven by diﬀerences in the
cost for housing in the two locations and uncertain commuting costs relevant for
living in the suburban location. Thus, the objective changes to that of a cost mini-
mizing strategy and the decision whether to bear commuting costs in an uncertain
environment.
The particular structure of the dissertation is described in the following. The
investigation in the ﬁrst contribution is set within the context of current demo-
graphic developments apparent in many countries of the world. Better health care
systems not only have helped to reduce infant mortality but also, and in partic-
ular, to increase the life prospects of the elderly. The resulting improvement of
the level of longevity and its consequences on the demographic composition of
the population and the workforce have spurred interest in a variety of ﬁelds. Es-
pecially permanent mobility in the form of migration, i. e. residential relocation
with the purpose of permanently changing the spatial center of a person’s life, can
strengthen or weaken existing demographic trends. Because migration is regarded
as a decision with long-term implications, this decisions tends to be inﬂuenced by
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the underlying planning horizon of the person in his or her assessment of the costs
and beneﬁts of the migration endeavor. Since this expected planning horizon as
the base for evaluating life-time earnings is, in essence, aﬀected by the individual’s
level of longevity, so is the propensity to migrate aﬀected by longevity. Chapter 2,
therefore, studies the relationship between longevity and the decision to migrate
under the inﬂuence of uncertain regional wage diﬀerences. Conventional wisdom
predicts that an extended planning horizon (higher level of longevity) has a pos-
itive impact on the propensity to migrate. Initial moving costs are easier oﬀset
by a positive regional wage gain if the horizon under consideration widens. This
traditional monotonic relationship is challenged in this chapter, which urges for a
more thorough examination of the eﬀect of longevity on migration in the context
of uncertainty. It presents a theoretical reasoning for a non-monotonic relationship
between longevity and migration propensity that explicitly takes into account the
magnitude of uncertainty prevailing about the future development of the obtainable
regional wage diﬀerential. Findings suggest that uncertainty has a large negative
impact on the individual migration decision, particularly at high levels of longevity
(long planning horizon). This is, in eﬀect, the range showing the highest propen-
sity to migrate according to traditional net present value calculus. Predictions
derived on the basis of the conventional approach and the real options approach
are contrasted both analytically as well as by means of numerical simulation.
Besides looking at the fundamental but often simpliﬁed matter of individual de-
cision making, migration is most often a process that involves a number of people.
For that reason, in Chapter 3 the focus on individual agents is abandoned and in-
stead the investigation turns to the migration decision of a dual-income household.
Aforementioned existing studies on family or group decision making mostly con-
sider the reduction of income risk through diversifying the total income base of the
family by national or transnational movement of individual members of the group.
The analyses are primarily conducted in the rural-urban context (e. g. Stark 2006)
and for international migration (e. g. Anam et al. 2008). Studies in these categories,
thus, typically regard the separation of the family or household as a viable means
of dealing with economic uncertainty. Mincer (1978) and Long (1974), among oth-
ers, put less emphasis on family separation but contributed to the understanding
of the inﬂuence of marital status and women’s labor force participation on family
migration decisions. In his theoretical assessment, Mincer (1978) thereby focused
on the eﬀect of gains and risks in the two spouses’ incomes on their individual
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decision power within the family and its ramiﬁcations for family decision making.
However, Mincer applies a relatively static risk measure in his analysis and intro-
duces simplifying restrictions in the speciﬁcation of the individual risk measures
of both partners. Building on Burda (1995), the second contribution in this dis-
sertation, therefore, attempts to formulate a more ﬂexible model that is capable
of explaining household decision making with regard to the joint migration of two
income-earners. Again, the notion of uncertainty is captured by assuming that
the regional wage diﬀerentials of both partners are uncertain in their future evolu-
tion. The presented ﬁndings indicate that the decision of the household whether
to migrate or not is taken only on the basis of the expected wage diﬀerentials of
the individual family members. In other words, decision power of the individuals
solely stems from the partners’ relative shares in the anticipated household income
gain and not from their shares in total household income. The presented model
disentangles the general procrastination eﬀect of wage gain uncertainty found by
Burda (1995) for individual migrants into a richer set of explanatory factors in the
case of two income earners in the household. In doing so, it allows for a more com-
prehensive analysis of household migration decision making with respect to the
partners’ individual expected wage gains, their corresponding uncertainties, the
speciﬁc interdependence of both wage proﬁles, and the expected future increase or
decrease of the respective wage diﬀerentials.
Often, the decision on residential relocation is linked to further changes in the
mobility behavior of a person. At the regional level where short and medium
distance moves dominate, there typically exists a close connection between the de-
cisions on temporary mobility in the form of commuting and permanent mobility
represented by migration. The growing complexity of commuting behavior and the
diverse cost structure (e. g. vehicle running costs, value of travel time, etc.) create
an environment of increased uncertainty for the individual. As introduced above,
the third contribution, presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, addresses the
interrelated choice of the two distinct modes of mobility, commuting and migra-
tion, within the general context of an urban/suburban framework. It highlights
the importance of considering uncertainty about future commuting costs in the
simultaneous decision on residence and mode of mobility, given the assumption
of a ﬁxed workplace in the urban center. It is found that uncertainty about the
evolution of commuting costs increases the number of residentially immobile in-
dividuals in both urban and suburban areas. As a consequence, persons living
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outside the urban area continue to bear the required commuting costs despite an
apparent net present value beneﬁt from relocating to the center. Opportunity costs
resulting from the random development of commuting costs in the future increase
the overall costs of migration and, therefore, discourage residential relocation in
that situation. This also means that increasing commuting costs—if at the same
time accompanied by higher variance levels—are not a suﬃcient requirement for
relocation, other things being equal.
The overall aim of this research project is to advance on existing theoretical
work in the ﬁeld of migration and to formulate a general theoretical model frame-
work to describe individual and household decision behavior regarding migration
and commuting under uncertainty. For this, particular attention is given to the
concept of risk-neutrality as a characteristic of the individual or household under
investigation. That is to say, that the person is in principle indiﬀerent between
accepting a sure outcome of a given size and an expected outcome of identical size
whose actual realization however is risky in nature. Nevertheless, it is shown that
uncertainty ﬁnds its way into the optimality calculus, which governs the migration
decision of a risk-neutral entity. It is understood that mobility decisions are based
on a variety of factors of which economic reasons are only one, yet still the most
dominating factor.4 Other reasons for migration include, but are not limited to,
love, marriage, social stress or pressure, the family (tied mover), as well as forced
relocation due to political objectives. A similarly wide range of determining fac-
tors is found for commuting decisions, though with a stronger focus on housing and
transportation issues. In spite of the narrow speciﬁcation of the models presented
in this dissertation, they allow to gain a deeper understanding of the structural
mechanisms behind mobility decisions, particularly in the presence of uncertainty
about regional wage gains or commuting costs.
4As noted above, already Ravenstein (1889) identiﬁed economic factors as the primary reason
for migration.
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2
Longevity and the Option
Value of Migration
2.1 Introduction
Life expectancies worldwide have been improving signiﬁcantly over the last decades1
and, according to Wilmoth (2000), demographic evidence predicts no sign of ap-
proaching a ﬁxed limit imposed by biology or other factors. This development is
about to continue and life expectancies at birth in developed countries are pre-
dicted to be 85 to 87 years by the middle of the 21st century. Despite the overall
improvement, however, Edwards (2010) ﬁnds that world inequality in the length
of adult life, in particular, has remained stagnant. As a consequence, the absolute
level of between-country inequality has risen over time, especially among developed
countries. It is argued that this varying pattern of improvements of longevity inﬂu-
ences individual decision behavior, in that long-term decisions are to a large part
aﬀected by the expected planning horizon of the individual.
One such endeavor with long-term implications is residential mobility, i. e. the
permanent relocation of one’s residence. Existing theoretical and empirical studies,
highlighting the interaction between demographics and the decision to migrate, pri-
marily build on the assumption of a monotonic positive relation between younger
1As per data of the World Bank (2011), life expectancies at birth vary considerably across
countries, but show in almost all cases a strong increase since the 1960s. Industrialized countries
like Japan, Germany, and the United States, starting from levels of just below 70, were able
to increase life expectancy at birth to levels of 79–83 years of age by 2009. Developing coun-
tries exhibited an even stronger improvement over the same time span, though beginning from
relatively low levels.
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age and a higher propensity to migrate. This conclusion is mainly derived from
the simple human capital theory of migration (Sjaastad 1962), which in the stan-
dard case weighs costs against beneﬁts of relocation on present value terms. If
expected gains from migration, stemming from regional wage diﬀerentials, exceed
the involved costs, migration is triggered. The argument goes that a longer ex-
pected planning horizon helps the individual to recover initial costs and, therefore,
encourages migration particularly at younger ages.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis, which are typically based on grouped data
with age cohorts of ﬁve years, for the most part achieve to conﬁrm higher migration
rates for younger age groups. A few studies, however, also provide some evidence
of lower migration rates for younger age classes, as opposed to the standard view.
Lewis (1977), for instance, in his empirical analysis of U.S. intercounty migration
rates refers to ﬁve cases in which migration rates increased as the age class increased.
Likewise, migration ﬂows between U.S. counties and BEA Economic Areas2, studied
by Plane and Heins (2003), indicate that the highest migration propensities are
observed for people in their mid-twenties, though not for the youngest age group
of people in their late teens and early twenties which showed lower mobility rates.
According to experience, entrants would be supposed to migrate relatively more
frequent in the early stage of their career compared to professionals. This context,
however, makes apparent the common issue of these studies, in that age or the age
group is typically strongly correlated with the life-cycle stage of an individual and
migration propensities are largely driven by and diﬀer across life-cycle stages. If
following an individual through life by applying a panel method, the age increases
and the remaining planning horizon of the individual correspondingly reduces. For
this scenario the simple human capital theory predicts a diminishing propensity
to migrate as the age increases. However, a change along the ‘age-scale’ of an
individual also implies a change in the underlying circumstances for migration as he
passes through diﬀerent stages in his life cycle. In eﬀect, a separation of planning
horizon (age) and life-cycle eﬀects in empirical analyses of migration decisions
is intricate. To provide a better testable framework, the deﬁnition of longevity
applied in the analysis of this chapter is to be understood as a ceteris paribus level
of longevity based on health status, but independent of age or life-cycle stage. A
change in the level of longevity in the process of the investigation, therefore, relates
2 Established by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, economic areas deﬁne relevant regional
markets and their surrounding metropolitain areas.
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to an extension of the person’s available planning horizon. The eﬀect of changing
longevity on migration at a ﬁxed life-cycle stage (age) is accordingly of primary
interest in this theoretical analysis. In a more general regard, the setup of the
model is suitable for comparing migration behavior of countries or societies that
vary by their aggregated level of longevity but else are identical. This is in principle
also the case for predicting migration behavior within a given society at diﬀerent
points in time that relate to varying levels of longevity. It is, however, likely that
other circumstances underlying the migration decision change just as well over time
and in this way violate the assumptions required for a valid comparison.
The anticipated negative monotonic relationship between age and migration
propensities in the simple human capital model builds on the hypothesis of a rather
deterministic scenario in which the expected wage diﬀerential is eﬀectively assumed
to prevail unchanged in the future once migration took place and in which possi-
ble future changes are not taken into account in the initial migration decision. In
reality the individual is well aware of potential deviations of the regional wage
diﬀerential from its level at the time of migration, but does typically not know a
priori the outcomes of future wage setting processes with certainty. Since uncer-
tainty about a future outcome increases with the time span, permanent migration
decisions—especially at high levels of longevity with a long planning horizon—are
presumably aﬀected negatively by wage uncertainty.
Along these lines, the subsequent analysis attempts to answer how changing
levels of longevity inﬂuence the individual decision to migrate in the presence of
regional wage gain uncertainty. Further questions to be addressed by the proposed
theoretical model include: (i) How is the speciﬁc inﬂuence of wage gain uncertainty
on the propensity to migrate characterized? (ii) What is the connection between
longevity and uncertainty and does the traditional assumption of a monotonic
relationship between longevity and migration remain valid? (iii) How is the optimal
migration decision with respect to longevity characterized under uncertainty? The
focus is on the extension of the Burda-Hunt framework (see page 17) with the
consideration of longevity in migration decision making under uncertainty.
The micro-economic analysis of the eﬀect of longevity on optimal migration
decisions under uncertainty is divided into two main parts. The ﬁrst part in Sec-
tion 2.3 prepares for the later investigation by developing the issue within the
benchmark speciﬁcation of the traditional net present value (NPV) formulation
used in the simple human capital explanation of migration. It is shown that for a
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risk-neutral individual the optimality conditions governing his migration decision
are qualitatively equivalent if derived both within a ﬁnite horizon speciﬁcation and
an inﬁnite horizon speciﬁcation, utilizing a general survival distribution function to
resemble the limited planning horizon of an individual. Moreover, the inﬁnite hori-
zon assumption remains the basis for the further analysis in the second part. Here,
Section 2.4 translates the benchmark model into the real options analysis (ROA)
to allow for the investigation and better incorporation of future wage gain uncer-
tainty in the decision problem. This basic real options model is further extended
in Section 2.5 by taking into account an anticipated positive or negative drift in
the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential. The generalizability of the derived
single-agent based results is addressed in short in Section 2.6 before this chapter
ends with some concluding remarks. To begin with, the next section gives a brief
overview of existing and related studies to the topic of migration and longevity.
2.2 Literature Review
The microeconomic relationship between individual migration decisions under un-
certainty and diﬀerent levels of longevity is not very well established in the lit-
erature. Existing studies primarily focused on the inﬂuence of age on migration
behavior and is in turn closely linked to the analysis of diﬀerent life-cycle stages
of an individual. For the purpose of this analysis, the study of longevity needs to
be delineated from the analysis of age as a determinant in individual migration
decision-making. The reason is that age is not only a proxy for the individual’s
remaining life span and planning horizon, but encompasses also other factors rele-
vant for shaping the circumstances underlying the decision. Longevity, on the other
hand, is a more isolated concept for describing the expected remaining planning
horizon of an individual without interfering with his life-cycle stages.
Regarding the implications of age, several empirical studies indicate a higher
propensity to migrate for younger age groups and present the conclusion of a posi-
tive inﬂuence of a longer remaining life span on the decision to migrate (e. g. Pessino
1991, Kennan and Walker 2011). The underlying assumption is typically that of a
strict monotonic relationship between age group and migration rate. The theoreti-
cal explanation for this observation follows the human capital theory of migration
formulated by Sjaastad (1962), which is based on traditional NPV analysis. Ac-
cordingly, migration is carried out at any point over an individual’s life cycle if on
14
2. LONGEVITY AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MIGRATION
present value terms gains outweigh the involved costs. A positive net gain leads to
prompt migration to take advantage of the higher income in the destination region.
The relevant time horizon over which the migration ‘investment’ has to amortize is
typically the individual’s remaining work life span. With increasing age, this plan-
ning horizon narrows and less time remains for a higher income stream to oﬀset the
initial moving costs. Based on this view, Sjaastad concludes that particularly the
young with their long remaining life span have a higher probability of migration.
Kennan and Walker (2011), however, indicate that the simple human capital
model may not fully explain the relationship between age and migration as found
in their data on migration behavior of young white men in the U.S. in the late 1970s.
Besides the individual planning horizon and amortization aspects, the authors also
argue in favor of considering the eﬀect of age on the cost of migration. This is
supported by earlier work of Polachek and Horvath (1977), who indicate that costs
of migration are likely to increase with age over an individual’s life cycle, thereby
diminishing potential net gains and lowering the propensity to migrate. A further
reasoning for a link between age and costs gives Schwartz (1976, p. 705) by stating
that the “switching cost of a job-seeking individual increases with age at a rate
which increases with education.” As a result, this line of argument sees decreasing
net gains with higher age as the main cause of correspondingly lower migration
propensities, taking a diﬀerent approach as compared to the reduced amortization
possibility due to a shorter time horizon but ﬁxed costs of moving. The standard
model can further be extended to derive arguments on the incidence of successive
migration steps, as done by Polachek and Horvath (1977). The authors remark that
in the Sjaastad model residential remigration occurs as long as marginal gains from
migration outweigh costs. It, therefore, predicts greater remigration at younger
ages with the periods between migration steps steadily increasing over lifetime.
Besides the often found monotonic relationship, a number of empirical studies
provide evidence for a less unambiguous relationship between age and the propen-
sity to migrate. As mentioned in the introduction, (Lewis 1977, p. 52) studied
between-county migration rates in the U.S. for the period 1965–1970. Although
aggregated in nature3, data for each of the observed 20 states sampled for age
classes 20–24 through 60–64 years describe ﬁve cases (though only three per cent
of all cases) where the rate of migration increased as the age class increased. Based
3The rate of migration for a given cohort is deﬁned according to U.S. Census of Population
concepts as the number of persons changing residence in the speciﬁed time span in relation to
the total population in that cohort.
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on U.S. interstate ﬂows between 1980 and 1985, Greenwood (1997) ﬁnds that “mi-
gration propensities are highest for the 25–29-year-old group and decline steadily
thereafter” (p. 655). Yet, with one exception, the younger age group of 18–24-
year-olds shows a lower migration propensity across all educational levels. A non-
monotonic pattern for age group and migration rates is also found by Plane and
Heins (2003) in their study of aggregated U.S. county-to-county migration ﬂow
data from the 1990 census for extended metropolitan regions. The highest migra-
tion propensities were similarly observed for people in their mid-twenties, but lower
mobility rates again for people in their late teens and early twenties. These high-
lighted studies have their focus on identifying key mobility stages in the life-course
of individuals. Conclusions about individual behavior inferred from such empirical
analyses have to be drawn with caution since the applied level of aggregation over
space (county, state, etc.) and age group (typically ﬁve or ten years) can only allow
for a limited approximation of micro-level, individual migration decision behavior.
Independent of age and life cycle, one reason for a non-monotonic relation of
planning horizon to the propensity to migrate could be uncertainty about potential
future gains from migration. A higher level of longevity extends the remaining
planning horizon of the individual and adds further uncertainty about outcomes
in the distant future.
At this point, the notion of lifetime earnings and wage diﬀerentials used in this
analysis demands some explanation. Wage diﬀerentials play a predominant role
during an individual’s working life, for which uncertainty about future wage out-
comes is self-evident. This means, the incidence of uncertainty about the regional
wage diﬀerential is at ﬁrst closely related to the work life span over which wages
are earned. This time span tends to increase in many countries due to personal as
well as political necessities for a higher eﬀective age of retirement.4
Additionally, in the extended consideration income uncertainty is likely to pre-
vail beyond the age of retirement. As Hillebrand (2008) points out, unfavorable
demographic developments, particularly in developed countries, call for reform of
4 Lower fertility and reduced mortality at higher ages, such as in Germany for instance, are
expected to cause a remarkable decrease of the labor force over the next decades accompanied
by skill shortages in many business areas. In conjunction with a worsening age dependency
ratio that exercises stress on the pension system and requires increasing private provisions for
retirement, this has lead to a rise in the age of retirement due to political objectives as well as
personal economic constraints. According to a study by Tesch-Römer et al. (2010) based on the
“Deutsches Alterssurvey” for Germany, the age of retirement has already been increasing by 12
months during the years 2002–2008. A similar picture emerges with regard to the development
of work life spans in other industrialized countries.
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the existing pay-as-you-go pension systems to prevent a one-sided unsustainable
shifting of the demographic burden onto the shoulders of the contributors. The
suggested increase of the share of private savings in the overall funding of retire-
ment will foster capital accumulation and help to ease this burden. Nevertheless,
opponents of such a reform claim that these private savings eventually increase the
exposure of pension payments to capital market ﬂuctuations in the long run. In
addition to uncertainty stemming from the capital market, wage gain uncertainty
during work life also translates into uncertainty about future retirement beneﬁts,
because contributions to the retirement fund in the form of private savings are
usually based on current incomes. Also contributions to a pay-as-you-go pension
system are based on current income and vary over time. As a result the potential
level of future pension incomes (private and state beneﬁts) is linked to incomes
earned by the individual during his work life.
In a diﬀerent context, Hillebrand and Wenzelburger (2006) studied the inﬂuence
of multiperiod planning horizons on individual decision-making regarding optimal
ﬁnancial investments. The authors ﬁnd that the length of the planning horizon
aﬀects the individual’s evaluation of risk and investment behavior. In particular,
they show that investors with identical planning horizon also decide on holding
portfolios with equal proportions of risky assets. That there may indeed be a nega-
tive impact of income uncertainty on migration behavior, especially at young ages,
is adumbrated by Burda and Hunt (2001) in their empirical analysis of East-West-
German migration ﬂows after reuniﬁcation. They ﬁnd evidence for a deterring
eﬀect of labor market uncertainty in the home region on the propensity to outmi-
grate, especially for young persons (aged 18–24). Uncertainty is usually regarded
as a push factor that leads to higher outmigration, but there are also chances for
higher potential future wage gains in the home region due to labor market uncer-
tainty, reducing the desire to leave and contradicting the push eﬀect. Although
insigniﬁcant in their study, the result stands in contrast to the ﬁndings for older age
groups. Both authors take this as a conﬁrmation of their proposed “option-value
of waiting” theory, according to which higher economic uncertainty leads to the
procrastination of migration decisions. In a later study, Hunt (2006) conﬁrms that
although the young seem very sensitive to wages at the origin, as a determinant
for regional wage diﬀerences, they are relatively insensitive to unemployment, i. e.
labor market uncertainty, in the source region.
For the subsequent analysis I suspect that individuals with a longer planning
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horizon are more swayed by uncertain future prospects in their migration endeavor
than are persons with a shorter horizon. This is the starting point for the formu-
lation of a model that describes the optimal migration decision of an individual
given his expectation on the uncertain regional wage diﬀerential and his level of
longevity.
2.3 Benchmark Speciﬁcation
The ﬁrst part of the analysis builds on the human capital theory of migration by
Sjaastad (1962), who prepared the ground for later migration studies in postulat-
ing a general individual decision model of migration. Accordingly, migration is
understood as an investment in human capital and the individual maximizes the
expected rate of return on this human capital by choosing the optimal location
that allows him to make best use of his skills and raises his productivity. Also, the
potential migrant will decide to relocate as soon as the present value of expected
future wage gains exceeds initial costs related with the move.
All subsequent calculations are conducted in a continuous time framework and
throughout the analysis I further assume the regional wage diﬀerential, w, to be-
have according to a stochastic process in the form of a Brownian motion. In its
simplest form neglecting a time trend it is characterized by
dw =  dz; (2.1)
where  is the instantaneous standard deviation of a periodical change in the
wage diﬀerential and dz is an increment of the standard Wiener process with
dz = (t)
p
dt and (t)  N(0; 1). In other words, the random periodical steps of
the stochastic process (2.1) are normally distributed around mean zero and scaled
by factor 
p
dt, which is increasing with time t. The following conditions apply:5
E[dz] = 0; E[(dz)2] = V[dz] = dt;
E[dw] = 0; V[dw] = 2 dt: (2.2)
The next two subsections derive the migration decision problem under ﬁnite and
inﬁnite planning horizon assumptions.
5 Terms E[] and V[] denote the expectations and the variance operator, respectively.
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2.3.1 Finite Horizon
In the simple continuous-time human capital migration model with a ﬁnite planning
horizon the individual’s objective is to maximize his return from migration over
his planning horizon starting at time 0 and ending at T . For this, he determines
the expected present value of all future wage gains that he anticipates for a given
move, which is formally represented by6Z T
0
E[w(t)] e rt dt = w
r

1  e rT

; (2.3)
where r denotes the risk-free discount rate. The longer the time span over which
the individual expects gains from migration, the higher is the resulting valuation
of the project. The corresponding rate at which the present value increases for an
additional period is we rT . This positive eﬀect, however, diminishes if T increases
further, so any additional period of wage income is valued less the more distant
its realization lays in the future. Underlying this result is the assumption that the
wage diﬀerential in the event of migration can be obtained over the full expected
planning horizon. Based on (2.3), actual migration requires that
w
r

1  e rT

> M; (2.4)
where M stands for the upfront ﬁxed costs of moving that the individual has to
pay in the event of migration. Hence, as soon as the present value of expected
future wage diﬀerentials exceeds the initial costs, migration takes place. The so-
called Marshallian trigger (w), describing the optimality condition for a positive
migration decision, can be derived as
w > w  rM
1  e rT : (2.5)
It represents the level of the wage diﬀerential that the potential migrant demands
in the case of migration—his reservation wage diﬀerential. This threshold ensures a
positive net present value of the migration project in that initial costs for the move
are actually oﬀset by the gains expected to accrue during the planning horizon
T . As can be inferred from (2.5), the reservation wage diﬀerential is an increasing
function of one-time moving costs, M , but ambiguous with regard to changes in
6 Further details about individual calculation steps can be found in Appendix A.1.
19
2. LONGEVITY AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MIGRATION
the discount rate, r. In contrast, extending the planning horizon, T , reduces this
threshold:
@w
@T
=   rMe
 rT
(1  e rT )2 < 0: (2.6)
In eﬀect, the lower reservation wage diﬀerential that results from higher T en-
courages migration, for the migration costs weigh less in comparison to the higher
present value of the gains from migration. This result reﬂects the often assumed
monotonic relationship between the remaining time span—as the measure of age—and
the propensity to migrate. Since it is typically implied that the young have a longer
remaining time horizon as compared to the old, as a result they are also more in-
clined to migrate.
2.3.2 Inﬁnite Horizon
Transferring the migration decision problem into an inﬁnite horizon framework
requires an assumption about the survival probability of the individual in order to
resemble some form of limited horizon. This means that although acting under an
inﬁnite time horizon the survival probability introduces an expectation about still
being alive in the next period or dead before reaching that period. The longevity
speciﬁcation is taken from Sheshinski (2009), and longevity is accordingly deﬁned
as the integral of the peculiar survival distribution function (SDF) over the inﬁnite
horizon:
() =
Z 1
0
S(t; ) dt , (2.7)
where S(t; ) is the SDF with time t and an exogenous time-invariant parameter ,
that represents factors negatively aﬀecting the individual’s longevity. This param-
eter  is also understood as the individual’s constant rate of disease and measures
the probability of a fatal incidence in the current period. In other words, S(t; )
denotes the probability of being alive at time t given the particular rate of disease .
In combination with the inﬁnite horizon assumption a commonly proposed expres-
sion for the survival distribution function is e t. Based on parameter , longevity
is deﬁned as the inverse of the rate of disease,  = 1

.7 Hence, a lower rate of
disease increases expected longevity and, therefore, the time horizon over which
7 See equation (A.4) in the appendix.
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the individual evaluates his migration endeavor.8 By the preceding discussion, the
SDF and the longevity measure possess the following characteristics:
@S(t; )
@
< 0 ;
@S(t; )
@t
< 0 ;
@()
@
< 0: (2.8)
The representative agent maximizes his total return from migration in accordance
to the conditions in (2.2), governing the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential,
and the deﬁnition of longevity (2.7), given his mortality parameter . The present
value of all future annuity beneﬁts from migration is given by the following integral9Z 1
0
E[w(t)] e rt S(t; ) dt = w

r +
1
()
 1
; (2.9)
where w again denotes the expected perpetuity of the wage gain between destina-
tion and origin region, r is the discount rate and () is the longevity measure.
This shows clearly how longevity enters into the evaluation of the migration deci-
sion problem under the assumption of an inﬁnite horizon: a positive rate of disease,
deﬁning the expected level of longevity, augments the eﬀective discount rate. This
means, the individual considers imminent time more valuable if faced with a posi-
tive rate of disease, i. e. a limited expected longevity. Improved longevity, therefore,
acts through attaching a higher value to those gains that are expected to incur in
the remote future. As a result, the higher the expected level of longevity the higher
is the present value of future wage gains.10 In order to be compensated for costs
initially required to take advantage of the wage diﬀerential, the individual only
accepts job opportunities that exceed his reservation wage. Analog to the ﬁnite
horizon case, the resulting migration problem allows to derive the corresponding
optimality condition for the threshold wage diﬀerential as
w > w 

r +
1
()

M: (2.10)
8The term longevity is used throughout this study to refer to the concept of a limited planning
horizon of the individual resulting from his probability of death. The applied deﬁnition of
longevity in this analysis is analog to the Blanchard (1985) deﬁnition of an individual’s eﬀective
horizon. The author speciﬁes the so-called index of the eﬀective horizon as the inverse of the
individual’s mortality, which I refer to as the rate of disease.
9A detailed derivation is given in Appendix A.2.
10The ﬁrst derivative of (2.9) with respect to longevity,  , has a positive mathematical sign and
is given by: w

r + 1()
 2
() 2 > 0.
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Condition (2.10) describes the threshold wage gain necessary for a positive migra-
tion decision subject to the potential migrant’s level of longevity  , discount rate r,
and costs of moving M . Any expected wage gain greater than w yields a positive
net present value and triggers migration. Higher costs of relocating and a higher
risk-free discount rate will deter the migration decision by increasing the reserva-
tion wage gain. In contrast, higher longevity (and with it a lower rate of disease
due to  0() < 0) unambiguously reduces the required wage diﬀerential and, in
eﬀect, raises the likelihood of actual migration. Formally, the ﬁrst order condition
of w with respect to  is given by
@w
@
=  M
 2
< 0: (2.11)
In summary, this persistent negative eﬀect of  on the migration threshold indicates
lower propensities to migrate for short planning horizons and higher propensities
to migrate for extended planning horizons. It can be seen that results from the
ﬁnite horizon (2.5) and inﬁnite horizon approach (2.10) are qualitatively equiva-
lent in that in both cases an extended planning horizon (T ) and a higher level
of longevity (), respectively, inﬂuence the valuation and threshold in a similar
fashion. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the discussed results. Both approaches
illustrate and support the monotonic positive relationship between longevity and
the propensity to migrate by lowering the hurdles for migration through an expan-
sion of the underlying planning horizon.
Table 2.1
Comparison of migration valuation and threshold wage
diﬀerential under ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon assumption; net
present value case
Finite horizon Inﬁnite Horizon
Net present
value
w
r

1  e rT

 M w
r + 1()
 M
Threshold w

1  e rT
 1
rM

r +
1
()

M
Despite the applied uncertainty measure  (positive and ﬁnite), its existence
does not translate into the obtained optimality conditions for risk-neutral individ-
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uals.11 Based on the assumption of a normal distribution with zero mean and unit
variance rate for the stochastic parameter  in (2.1), taking expectations about the
increment of the Wiener process, dz, yields zero. Since the uncertainty parameter
, representing the instantaneous standard deviation of changes in w, is multi-
plicatively connected to the term dz, it vanishes from the analysis when taking
expectations in the classical NPV approach. The individual, therefore, eﬀectively
restrains his migration assessment to the ﬁrst moment of the probability distri-
bution describing w, i. e. its mean. Information contained in the second central
moment, namely the variance of the distribution, is not used in the evaluation. In
eﬀect, this resembles a now-or-never migration decision problem and the regional
wage diﬀerential is treated as if it would remain unchanged for the remainder of
the planning horizon once migration took place. The result is, that the derived
optimality conditions (2.5) and (2.10) are independent of the exposure to wage
diﬀerential uncertainty.
The next section attends to this shortcoming of the traditional NPV approach by
transferring the migration decision problem into a real options framework. Given
the possibility of waiting, this allows to better utilize information that is inherent
in the stochastic process describing dw.
2.4 Real Options Approach
As seen above, diﬀerent levels of wage gain uncertainty have no eﬀect on the
optimal decision in the NPV analysis. The NPV approach simply neglects the
opportunity costs of acting immediately when there exists the possibility to post-
pone the migration decision to a future point in time.12 This attaches a positive
value to waiting in an uncertain environment and requires an appropriate compen-
sation in the decision rule. Accordingly, an uncertain evolution of the regional
wage diﬀerential can bring a beneﬁt to waiting another period and to migrate next
period only if uncertainty resolves into a favorable outcome in the wage diﬀerential.
If left uncontrolled for, however, the obtained result will be strictly independent
11The focus of the analysis is on risk-neutral decision makers as the benchmark. Transferring
the problem into utility theory would allow to discuss the eﬀect of uncertainty on the migration
decision, for instance, under risk aversion. However, as will be seen in the next section, the main
strength of the presented model is that the observable procrastination of the migration decision
resulting from uncertainty can be explained even under risk neutrality of the decision maker
without the need to apply a particular measure of risk assessment on the part of the individual.
12 It is important to note that by deferring the residential relocation decision the individual
retains the chance to migrate in the future, in contrast to a now-or-never decision.
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of the underlying level of uncertainty in the expected wage diﬀerential and, as
a consequence, will underrate the “true” reservation wage gain demanded by the
individual.
To study the eﬀect of uncertainty about the regional wage diﬀerential on the
migration decision, this section applies the real options approach to the aforemen-
tioned decision problem. By explicitly recognizing the possibility of waiting, real
options theory allows for an improved valuation of the migration project for the
situation that the individual remains waiting and has not yet migrated. This situa-
tion is subsequently referred to as the “waiting state.” The ability of the individual
to tailor his action to the contingencies of a wage diﬀerential increase or decrease,
especially to refrain from migration if the wage diﬀerential narrows, gives value to
the extra freedom to wait (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 98).13 In the NPV analysis
this state is characterized by a negative NPV of the migration project for which no
migration takes place. Consequently, any valuation greater zero leads to actual mi-
gration. But, variation in the wage diﬀerential raises the likelihood that, seen from
the point of view of the initial period, in a future period the value of the strategy
of not migrating exceeds the value of migrating. Following Bernanke (1983), this
outcome would be recognized as “bad news” by the individual.14 If this happens
and migration was carried out in the initial period, the individual will “regret” his
original decision, since the better strategy would have been to wait. The possibil-
ity of the arrival of bad news in subsequent periods creates opportunity costs for
the individual of migrating immediately. For this reason, the additional risk of a
seemingly optimal decision today proving to be not optimal from a later point of
view needs to be taken into account in the decision rule. Especially the eﬀect of
increasing longevity and the involved extension of an individual’s remaining life
span on the magnitude of this possible regret is object of investigation in this sec-
tion. The following analysis shows that under uncertainty it is advantageous for
the migrant to accept an initial wage gain only if it exceeds the reservation wage
gain described in condition (2.10) by a positive amount. This section presents a
13 In reference to Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 98), waiting allows for a separate optimization in
each of the contingencies of a wage gain increase or decrease, whereas immediate action must be
based on only the average of the two. With the assumption of a convex value function (introduced
below), Jensen’s Inequality sets forth that the average of the separate maxima of future states
is greater than the maximum of the corresponding averages.
14 This mode of action of the postponement possibility under uncertainty was ﬁrst brought
forward by Bernanke (1983) with postulating the “bad news principle of irreversible investments”
(p. 91).
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theoretical proof of this hypothesis and introduces the option value of waiting as
an optimal decision measure. In the following, the modiﬁed decision rule and its
dependence on diﬀerent levels of longevity is discussed.
2.4.1 Optimal Migration Decision
In line with the terminology of the simple human capital explanation, migration is
understood as an investment into human capital. Carried over to the real options
approach, the possible migration project is treated as an “asset”, denoted by V (w),
that is being held by the potential migrant. The asset’s valuation captures the
capitalized return from following optimal strategies in the future and has to fulﬁll
the following return equilibrium condition15
E[dV ] =

r +
1


V (w) dt: (2.12)
It states that the asset’s instantaneous capital gain is expected to equal the eﬀective
rate of discount (the sum of the risk-free interest rate and the longevity measure)
for holding an amount equivalent to the value of V (w) over the same period. A
priori, the functional form of V is not known, but information contained in the Ito
process (equation 2.1) describing changes in the wage diﬀerential, w, also allow to
approximate the diﬀusion process governing the evolution of V , which depends on
w. By further assuming that V is continuously diﬀerentiable in w, applying Ito’s
Lemma provides the second-order Taylor expansion for E[dV ] about w.16 When
substituting this so-expanded expression for E[dV ] back into (2.12), dividing by
dt and rearranging, the return equilibrium condition can be formulated as the
stochastic partial diﬀerential equation
1
2
2
@2V
@w2
 

r +
1


V (w) = 0; (2.13)
15The value function concept requires the rigurous assumption of ﬁrst-order stochastic dom-
inance of the underlying stochastic process. I am very grateful to Prof. Avinash K. Dixit for
pointing out in an email to me that standard Brownian motion (BM) has this positive persistence
property in the same way as the geometric Brownian motion. “Since the incremental steps of
the BM are independent, any actual current realization shifts the whole distribution of random
future realizations horizontally to the right or left as the case may be.” This leads to positive
persistence of uncertainty.
16The detailed steps of derivation are presented in Appendix B.1.
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that needs to be satisﬁed by the value function. A valid functional form of V (w)
for the homogeneous part in (2.13) is Aew, where  = 1

q
2
 
r + 1


> 0 and A
is a parameter to be determined.17 In order to specify parameter A and to solve
for the optimality condition in this process, three boundary conditions need to be
applied. The ﬁrst condition establishes the lower boundary on the value of V . At
w =  1 the valuation of the migration project has an absorbing barrier such that
the “asset” loses its value. This means that for a suﬃciently negative regional wage
diﬀerential the probability of future wage diﬀerentials turning positive again tends
towards zero and the individual would consider not to migrate anymore. Formally,
this lower boundary is stated as
V ( 1) = 0: (2.14)
Two further conditions required for the solution of the optimal migration problem
are known as the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, respectively. The
former demands that the discounted value of future annuity wage gains that the
migrant receives when exercising the “option to migrate” must equal the value of
this option minus the accrued migration costs. By exercising the option he loses
the chance to do so later but receives the current value of the migration project
in return. The smooth-pasting condition relates to the assumption of continuous
diﬀerentiability of the value function and describes the requirement that valuations
from further waiting and actual migration meet tangentially in the optimal migra-
tion threshold w. In other words, the valuation experiences a smooth transition
when going from a wage diﬀerence just below the threshold to a value just above
it, and so switching from the waiting state to actual migration. This is represented
by
V (w) =
w
r + 1

 M; and (2.15)
V 0(w) =
1
r + 1

: (2.16)
17 This functional form, adopted from Burda (1995), applies particularly to the concept of
standard Brownian motion. Parameter  is the positive root from the quadratic equation Q =
2   22
 
r + 1

= 0, which is derived through substituting V (w) for the general solution Aew
in (2.13).
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Expressions (2.15) and (2.16) now allow to obtain the full speciﬁcation of the value
function V (w). In comparison to the NPV analysis in the previous section, the
value function describing the peculiar value attached to the migration project, as
derived within the real options framework, is distinguished between whether the
individual remains in the “wait and see” state or actually undertakes migration.
The valuation in case of migration is identical to that of the traditional NPV ap-
proach, since it simply represents what the migrant receives in return for changing
his residence and accepting the new wage oﬀer. As long as the potential migrant
is waiting to migrate, however, the valuation is not simply the negative present
value but is instead replaced by an alternative valuation capturing the possibility
to migrate and the associated “option to wait”. Consequently, the two particular
valuations are given by the following functions
V (w) =
8>>>><>>>>:
q
2
 
r + 1

3 e  1 while waiting (w < w), (2.17a)
w
r + 1

 M in case of migration (w > w), (2.17b)
where for clarity of illustration  = w M  r + 1


. The point in time, at which
it becomes optimal for the individual to switch from waiting to actual migration,
is characterized by the equalization of both valuations in (2.17). This, at the same
time, means that the option value of waiting, denoted by F (w) (see page 32), is
reduced to zero in case of migration, as is discussed more thoroughly below. Based
on the aforementioned, this allows to derive the optimal condition for migration as
w > w   r + 1


M +
q
2
 
r + 1

 : (2.18)
Accordingly, the individual migrates as soon as the actual wage gain, w, exceeds
the threshold or reservation wage gain, w. It can be shown that the previously
discussed present value condition (2.10) is a special case in the real options model:
not accounting for uncertainty by setting  = 0 gives the solution from the conven-
tional human capital theory of migration. In other words, assessed from the point
of view of the real options explanation the result of the NPV analysis with assumed
uncertainty is synonymous to the assumption of no uncertainty in the real options
framework.
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In addition to the ﬁrst term on the RHS, already known from condition (2.10),
the above expression is augmented by a second term, which involves the diﬀusion
parameter  and is, therefore, strictly positive. It capitalizes possible unfavorable
future outcomes in the wage diﬀerential—as seen from the current period—incurred
in the course of the remaining planning horizon of the individual. Higher uncer-
tainty about future wage diﬀerentials raises this value and thereby translates into
an extra cost factor or mark-up on the initial reservation wage diﬀerential de-
manded by the potential migrant. This eﬀect of unfavorable future outcomes on
the migration threshold is directly linked to the “bad news” principle brought for-
ward by Bernanke (1983) and is based on the speciﬁc properties of the Wiener
process assumed for the diﬀusion process that governs periodical changes of the
wage diﬀerential (see equation 2.1). In particular, this implies that if the random
increments are normally distributed, the variance of the process grows linearly with
the underlying time horizon or the level of longevity, respectively.18 The bad news
principle in the current context states that the willingness to migrate depends only
on the average expected severity of bad news about the valuation of the potential
migration project, that arrive over future periods. Positive developments, on the
contrary, do not aﬀect the optimal migration threshold. Together with the rein-
forcing eﬀect of higher longevity and its implications for the eﬀect of wage gain
uncertainty, the consideration of unfavorable realizations in periodical changes of
w is represented by the second term on the RHS in (2.18). From this evaluation
follows that, given a positive and ﬁnite variance of changes in the regional wage
diﬀerential, the threshold for an optimal migration decision derived through the
real options approach is always higher than the threshold derived from the conven-
tional net present value approach of the simple human capital explanation (w > w
for  > 0).
The analysis in Section 2.3 has already shown that one-time costs of moving
(M) are easier to bear if the individual can spread them over a longer time horizon.
The ﬁrst term on the RHS in (2.18) thus becomes smaller for higher levels of
longevity,  . However, extending longevity has a second eﬀect with regard to wage
diﬀerential uncertainty, as depicted by the second term. The risk-neutral potential
18 For an illustration in the discrete time case, consider a Wiener process z(t) whose change z
for a time interval t is given by z = "t
p
t, which is equal to z(s+ T )  z(s) =Pni=1 "ipt
and where n = T/t. Provided that the "i’s are independent of each other, the Central Limit
Theorem can be applied to their sum. As a deduction, if z is normally distributed with zero
mean, its variance is given by nt = T and, thus, “the variance of the change in a Wiener
process grows linearly with the time horizon” (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 64).
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migrant gives greater consideration to uncertainty if he expects exposure over a
longer time horizon – the more distant in the future the outcomes materialize the
more uncertain they are considered by the individual. As regards longevity, its
overall eﬀect on the threshold is therefore ambiguous. To further scrutinize these
two eﬀects, the ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) of w with respect to moving costs M ,
uncertainty , and longevity  are derived:
@w
@M
= r +
1

> 0; (2.19)
@w
@
=
1q
2
 
r + 1

 > 0; (2.20)
@w
@
=
q
23 4
 
r + 1

3   M 2 ? 0: (2.21)
The ﬁrst two conditions resemble the statements given above about the increasing
eﬀects of moving costs and wage gain uncertainty on the migration threshold w.
The sign of the third FOC with respect to the level of longevity, on the other hand,
is indeterminate because the actual direction of the overall eﬀect is controlled by
the reaction on the values  and M . As can be shown with the FOC, both idiosyn-
cratic eﬀects together produce a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between
the demanded reservation wage gain and the level of longevity, since an altered
planning horizon changes the magnitude and weighing of these single eﬀects in the
optimal migration decision. Setting (2.21) equal to zero allows to obtain the level
of longevity at which eﬀects of moving costs and wage gain variation balance out,
and that minimizes this said threshold for a given -M pair:
  =
241
2


M
 2
3
  r
35 1 : (2.22)
The unique value   divides the range of valid levels of longevity into two co-
domains. For levels below   the threshold function has a negative slope as deﬁned
by @w
@
. Moreover, the slope becomes increasingly linear in moving costsM for very
low levels of longevity: the threshold in the lower range of longevity is primarily
determined by the moving cost component in (2.21). Hence, increasing the level of
longevity gradually up to   over this lower range reduces the threshold level, w.
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The extending planning horizon brings about a better amortization of the initial
costs of migration and the propensity to migrate is raised as a result thereof.
In contrast to this migration encouraging eﬀect over the negative slope of w, a
further improvement of longevity at longevity levels above   increases the thresh-
old level again. This time, the uncertainty component in condition (2.21) is the
driving force for this discouraging eﬀect. With an extending planning horizon the
opportunity costs stemming from uncertainty about future wage gains eventually
outweigh the improved amortization possibility of moving costs over the same time
span. This means that, despite the better cost structure, the individual is held of
from migrating at higher levels of longevity, for uncertainty about the future con-
sumes the potential beneﬁts.
The position of   itself within the total range of longevity depends on the
ratio of wage gain uncertainty to one-time moving costs, which can likewise be
understood as a normalization of the standard deviation of changes in the regional
wage diﬀerential by the ﬁxed costs of moving. The higher this normalized wage
gain variation is, the lower is the threshold value  . Consequently, the larger
is the co-domain over which an improvement of longevity leads to an ampliﬁed
threshold wage diﬀerential and induces a further postponement of actual migration.
In other words, it is not the particular magnitudes of uncertainty or moving costs
separately that determine the two co-domains of  and thereby the net eﬀect of
a change in longevity on the migration threshold w. Instead, the combined ratio
of expected wage gain uncertainty and one-time moving costs inﬂuences the ﬁnal
eﬀect of extended longevity on the individual migration decision.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the importance of longevity in the determination of the
reservation wage gain under diﬀerent uncertainty scenarios. The central parameter
constellation in the numerical simulations of this analysis is set as follows: one-time
moving costs of four (M = 4), an instantaneous standard deviation of periodical
changes in the regional wage diﬀerential of one eighth of ﬁxed costs of moving
( = 0:5), and a risk-free discount rate of zero (r = 0) for ease of exposition.
Values   denote the most optimal level of longevity for varying combinations
of wage gain uncertainty and one-time moving costs. With increasing wage gain
uncertainty the minimum of the curve moves to lower levels of longevity, leading
to an expansion of the ascending base of w with respect to  (the upper co-
domain of ). Likewise this range declines with a reduction in the ratio of wage
gain variation to one-time moving costs. As a result, the amplifying eﬀect of
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Figure 2.1 Threshold wage diﬀerential w as a function of longevity  with
varying levels of wage diﬀerential uncertainty  and corresponding
values of  (M = 4, r = 0, no trend)
increased wage gain uncertainty on the threshold wage diﬀerential becomes more
prominent at high levels of longevity. The higher the initial costs of moving are,
the less inﬂuential becomes uncertainty about the evolution of the wage diﬀerential
in the assessment of the possible migration endeavor of the individual. These
ﬁndings indicate that a rational and risk-neutral migrant is aware of both eﬀects and
evaluates the normalized wage diﬀerential uncertainty, i. e. a composite measure
of uncertainty and moving costs, in judging the advantageousness of his migration
decision.
2.4.2 Option Value of Waiting
The eﬀect of diﬀerent levels of longevity on the individual’s decision to migrate
under wage gain uncertainty can be further elaborated on the basis of the value
that the potential migrant attaches to keeping the option to move in the future.
The central feature of the real options approach is that it provides a sophisticated
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foundation for evaluating the migration possibility and, in particular, the corre-
sponding condition under which waiting is optimal for the individual, and in that
allows to distinguish between immediate migration and further waiting. The conve-
nience of this approach comes through applying diﬀerent valuations for the waiting
state and the migration state, respectively. The waiting region (as a co-domain
of w) not only extends over the negative range of wage diﬀerentials, where the
outcome is identical to the standard NPV approach, i. e. no migration takes place,
but also over a range of positive values of w, where there is still procrastination of
migration. The reason for this behavior is that according to the real options expla-
nation—in contrast to the NPV analysis—the individual assigns a value to waiting
even at positive NPV levels. This is due to the existing likelihood of unfavorably
small or negative wage diﬀerentials in future periods resulting from the uncertainty
about wage diﬀerential development. Inasmuch the project’s value, represented by
the distinct value functions, is greater in the waiting state than in the event of
migration (see both cases in (2.17)), it is worthwhile for the potential migrant to
wait an additional period instead of moving immediately. The diﬀerence between
these two valuations is called the option value of waiting to migrate and is formally
deﬁned by
F (w) =
q
2
 
r + 1

3 e  1   wr + 1

+M: (2.23)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS is simply the value function, V (w), in (2.17a) speciﬁed
for the waiting region w < w. The second term represents the value function from
the NPV analysis depicted in Table 2.1, which applies to both the waiting and
the migration region of w. In (2.23) this stands speciﬁcally for the waiting region
as F (w) is only evaluated for the waiting state. If both project assessments are
equal in value, the option value of waiting, F (w), becomes zero. Waiting no longer
possesses a value for the individual and, therefore, triggers immediate migration.
This means, a given particular level of wage gain uncertainty requires the current
wage diﬀerential to be raised to such a level, that the NPV increases and reaches
equality with V (w) as in (2.17a) again. Put diﬀerently, a higher current wage
diﬀerential can compensate the individual for the existing degree of variation and
still allow migration to take place. On the other hand, the individual prefers to
wait in order to observe further resolution of uncertainty in the next period in case
the current wage gain remains insuﬃciently low.
To illustrate the inﬂuence of the involved parameters on the option value of
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waiting, comparative statics are presented for changes in moving costs (M), the
wage gain (w), and wage gain uncertainty () on F (w):19
@F
@M
= 1  e  1 > 0; (2.24)
@F
@w
=
e  1   1
r + 1

< 0; (2.25)
@F
@
=
1   r
2

r + 1

3 e  1 > 0; (2.26)
The ﬁrst condition (2.24) states that in the waiting region (i. e. values of w for
which w < w holds), higher costs of relocating increase the value of waiting and
restrain the individual from migrating. Condition (2.25) describes the presumed
negative eﬀect of a higher current regional wage diﬀerential, w, on the option value
of waiting. The more pronounced the wage gain is that the individual can obtain
by moving, the weaker is the incentive to wait another period. An increase in w
eventually leads to w > w and triggers migration. As I discussed above, a variation
in the wage diﬀerential behaves similar to moving costs in regard to its eﬀect on
the threshold w. According to condition (2.26), uncertainty about the evolution
of the wage diﬀerential, captured by , shows an increasing eﬀect on the option
value attached to waiting. This is consistent with results from Section 2.4.1, where
higher uncertainty lead to an increase in the required threshold wage diﬀerential,
w. The reason are the opportunity costs from immediate migration resulting from
the additional freedom to wait. Therefore, the inhibiting inﬂuence of uncertainty
on migration can be reconﬁrmed in the speciﬁc analysis of the option value of
waiting.
All three aforementioned ﬁrst order conditions yield a clear mathematical sign
for the respective parameter’s impact on the option value of waiting. Turning to
the investigation of changes in the level of longevity and its inﬂuence on the value
attached to waiting, however, delivers an ambiguous eﬀect:
@F
@
=

3   + 2M r + 1

  1 e  1
2 2

r + 1

2   w
 2

r + 1

2 ? 0: (2.27)
19Note, that the given deﬁnition of the option value is only valid in the waiting region, that is
in turn deﬁned by  < 1 or M >

w   /
q
2
 
r + 1

/
 
r + 1

, respectively.
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Figure 2.2 Option value of waiting F (w) as a function of longevity  with
varying levels of wage diﬀerential uncertainty  (M = 4; w = 1, no
trend)
Despite its apparent complexity, expression (2.27) consists primarily of two oppos-
ing components. The ﬁrst one comes as a result of the derivation of the value
function V (w) with respect to  in the waiting region, which represents the op-
portunity costs from immediate migration. According to its positive mathematical
sign, an increase in longevity involves a build-up of these opportunity costs. It,
thereby, captures the possible “regret” for the individual that the wage diﬀerential
uncertainty brings about. Variance increases with a growing planning horizon and
leads to a higher likelihood of future wage diﬀerentials reaching levels that would
have been too low for a favorable migration decision in retrospective.
The second component shows a negative sign and, thus, reduces the option value
of waiting with an increase in the level of longevity. As is seen in (2.23) and (2.25)
above, a positive regional wage gain alone already acts as a discount on the option
value of waiting. With the introduced assumption that the wage gain is obtained
over the full planning horizon, an extension of the very same through a higher
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level of longevity allows to beneﬁt from the wage diﬀerential additionally over this
extended time span. The increment in the discounted value of a given annuity
wage gain resulting from the increase in longevity is captured by that second term
in (2.27).
Because of the highly non-linear nature of this expression, Figure 2.2 illustrates
the eﬀect of a change in longevity on the option value of waiting to migrate, F (w),
based on numerical simulation. It depicts ﬁve exemplary levels of wage gain un-
certainty to highlight its decisive impact on the peculiar outcome of the wage
diﬀerential threshold. As a further note, the discontinued curve for  = 0:1 is plot-
ted only over the corresponding range of  which is valid given the inherent nature
of the waiting region and its attached valuation, V (w). For values of  for which
the option value is not valid, i. e. condition (2.18) no longer meets the necessary re-
quirement to remain in the waiting state, no option value can be assigned. Besides
these aspects, the diagram reﬂects the previously given statements about the eﬀect
of longevity on the option value of waiting. Under wage diﬀerential uncertainty,
an extending planning horizon, ceteris paribus, leads to a considerable increase in
the value of waiting and, in the process, to a procrastination of actual migration.
It can be seen that the magnitude of the inﬂuence of the variation parameter 
on the respective option value of waiting is notably determined by the underlying
level of longevity. The reason for the observable U-shaped curve progression is
found in the opposing eﬀects in (2.27) stemming from the distinct valuations of
the migration project in the waiting region accordingly deﬁned by V (w) and the
NPV approach, respectively. At lower levels of longevity and an associated shorter
planning horizon, the individual attaches less value to waiting (lower F (w)) in the
case of rising longevity. The mechanism responsible for this eﬀect is the same as
discussed for the optimal threshold w: increasing the level of longevity over its
lower range encourages the individual to migrate as he seeks to realize the bene-
ﬁt of a longer planning horizon for the amortization of initial moving costs. Yet,
by exceeding   a further improvement of longevity ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect
of wage diﬀerential uncertainty and raises the option value of waiting. At long
planning horizons the individual is discouraged from migration due to the cumula-
tive opportunity costs of immediate migration. He values waiting higher the more
distant the uncertain future outcomes of the regional wage diﬀerential are.
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2.5 Extension: Time Trend
So far in the analysis of the migration decision problem with diﬀerent levels of
longevity, the individual has been faced with a regional wage diﬀerential whose
periodical changes were assumed to depend only on the random increments of a
simple Brownian motion. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding
of the presented migration problem, additional considerations regarding the char-
acteristics of the wage diﬀerential can be made. For instance, one could ask for
the importance of an expected time trend in the development of the wage diﬀer-
ential for the overall advantageousness of a possible migration endeavor. Such a
trend seems plausible in cases in which the wage in either the source or destination
region is presumed to follow a speciﬁc growth path. By way of example, after
German uniﬁcation in 1990 wages in the East of Germany were signiﬁcantly lower
than their counterparts in the West and, thus, it was expected that this wage gap
would narrow quickly, all the more for the catching-up process gained momentum
in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Hence, potential inner-German migrants from the
East were anticipating a negative trend in the evolution of the regional East–West
wage diﬀerential. While East-to-West migration rates peaked in the early 1990s,
the migration balance stagnated in later years despite persistently lower average
incomes in the East of only 75 per cent of the level in the West.20 In addition
to uncertainty about future wage and employment prospects in the East and the
West, individuals were reluctant to migrate also due to higher expected future
eastern wages. However, it can be observed that migration rates intensiﬁed again
in the late 1990s and early 2000s as it became clear that the convergence process
lagged behind general anticipations. In 2009, average incomes in the East were
still 20 per cent below incomes in the West of Germany and outmigration from the
East to the West continues on a considerable scale. As this example shows, the
expected time trend, therefore, may well aﬀect the individual migration decision.
Subsequently, it shall be investigated how a positive, respectively negative, drift
in the wage diﬀerential inﬂuences the above outlined migration decision problem
of a risk-neutral individual under varying levels of longevity.
To incorporate this aspect into the existing model, I assume the wage diﬀerential
20Data on inner-German migration is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2009), whereas aver-
age income data refer to the eﬀective gross wage and salary incomes from the national accounting
of the Länder published by Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (2010); ﬁgures exclude
Berlin in each case.
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to behave according to the following augmented Brownian motion process
dw =  dt+  dz; (2.28)
where parameter  additionally describes the instantaneous expected periodical
change (or drift) in w, and  is the instantaneous standard deviation of the change
in the regional wage diﬀerential already known from (2.1). A positive drift would
increase the regional wage diﬀerential by an absolute value in each period while a
negative drift would reduce the regional wage diﬀerential accordingly.
It is important to note at this point, that the deﬁnition of the drift rate applied in
this context is diﬀerent to the often used convergence speciﬁcation in other studies.
Since the stochastic process is not deﬁned as a proportional but rather a standard
Brownian motion, its periodical changes depicted by (2.28) are of absolute value in
consequence. A supposed negative drift, therefore, will reduce an initially positive
wage diﬀerential insofar as at some point in time the diﬀerential turns negative
and the drift produces a growing negative regional wage diﬀerential thereafter.
As a result, a negative drift under the speciﬁcation of (2.28) does not refer to
a convergence process according to which the wage diﬀerential reaches zero in
its limit but, instead, a closing of the wage gap is observed only over a conﬁned
time span beyond which the regional wage diﬀerential changes from positive to
negative and continuous to depart from zero. Notwithstanding this limitation of
the analysis, I believe that the applied speciﬁcation of the drift rate is a valid
approximation for a dynamic development of regional wage diﬀerences similar to
processes observable in many regions. As the German example shows, more than
20 years after reuniﬁcation full convergence is still far from achieved. Moreover,
opposite economic development in selected regions in the two parts of Germany
may even result in an initially positive West-East wage diﬀerential to turn negative.
For the reason that longevity aﬀects the planning horizon of the potential mi-
grant it is expected that a negative drift rate, in particular, exerts signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the requirement for an optimal migration decision.
2.5.1 Net Present Value Analysis
Concentrating ﬁrst on the conventional NPV representation introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, the individual accepts only job opportunities in the destination region
that exceed his reservation wage, w. Based on (2.10), the extended formulation of
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the wage diﬀerential threshold triggering migration becomes21
w 

r +
1


M   /

r +
1


: (2.29)
An expected positive drift rate of the regional wage diﬀerential ( > 0) conse-
quently stimulates migration by reducing the required reservation wage gain. This
means that the migrant’s anticipation of a higher future wage diﬀerential allows
him to accept a lower reservation wage gain as compared to the NPV case without
the consideration of a drift rate. The migrant beneﬁts even more so from a positive
drift rate as the level of longevity,  , is further extended. The relevance of initial
moving costs in the decision to migrate diminishes with a longer planning horizon
and this eﬀect is additionally ampliﬁed by an expected positive drift in the wage
diﬀerential. In eﬀect, the conventional monotonic positive relationship between
longevity and the propensity to migrate is valid all the more.
A negative drift rate ( < 0), on the other hand, renders the migration endeavor
increasingly unfavorable for the potential migrant. Depending on the magnitude
of the drift, there is a chance that within a given planning horizon (the speciﬁed
level of longevity) the initially positive wage diﬀerential turns negative and causes
‘regret’ for the migrant. Thus, there is an interrelated eﬀect of both a negative
drift of the regional wage gain and longevity in that higher levels of longevity
aggravate the corresponding disadvantageous impact of the negative drift rate on
the migration decision. The decisive factor for the actual impact of a negative drift
rate on the threshold wage gain is the ratio of the individual’s planning horizon,
stemming from the given level of longevity, to the expected time span of a positive
wage diﬀerential before turning negative, which is controlled by the size of the drift.
If longevity refers to a planning horizon that is longer than the expected time span
of a positive wage diﬀerential, the individual is more reluctant to migrate. Likewise,
with a level of longevity that yields a shorter planning horizon compared to the
time span of a positive realization of the wage diﬀerential, the potential migrant
can beneﬁt less from the wage gain and is more hesitant towards migration. This
means, only if both time spans are equivalent in their expected lengths is the
individual most ready and willing to migrate.
21Note that by taking the drift rate of the wage diﬀerential into account the net present value
of the migration project augments to w
 
r + 1
 1
+ 
 
r + 1
 2  M . Please refer to Table 2.1
for a comparison to the basic speciﬁcation without drift.
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These ﬁndings can be assessed in more detail on the basis of the ﬁrst derivative
of w (2.29) with respect to longevity,  :
@w
@
=  M
 2
  
 2

r +
1

 2
? 0: (2.30)
This ﬁrst derivative is strictly negative in the case of a positive drift in the wage
diﬀerential ( > 0) or if the drift is ignored ( = 0). In both instances, improved
longevity (i. e. a reduced rate of disease) clearly lowers the optimal threshold wage
diﬀerential, w, and encourages migration. If, however, the wage diﬀerential ex-
hibits a negative drift, longevity no longer shows this unambiguous eﬀect on the
threshold. This illustrates the dependency of the simple human capital theory of
migration on the underlying assumptions for deriving the standard prediction of a
pure monotonic relationship between planning horizon and propensity to migrate.
In eﬀect, it suﬃces to allow for a negative drift rate of the regional wage diﬀerential
to obtain an indeterminate outcome for a change in the level of longevity. It is
apparent, that in the simple human capital explanation the introduction of a drift
rate in the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential, and in particular a negative
drift rate, gives rise to a case of non-monotonicity in the relationship between the
threshold wage gain, w, and the level of longevity, (). Similar to condition (2.22)
in the analysis in Section 2.4, it is now possible to derive a threshold minimizing
level of longevity also for the standard NPV analysis. In the case of  < 0, the ﬁrst
derivative (2.30) is rearranged in terms of  to obtain the point  , which divides
the range of  into two co-domains:
@w
@

<0
? 0 for  ?
"r

M
  r
# 1
=  : (2.31)
If the level of longevity is less than  , then a marginal improvement of longevity
lowers the threshold wage diﬀerential, w, and encourages migration. The opposite
holds for values of  larger than  . Therefore, a change in longevity aﬀects the
optimal threshold level diﬀerently depending on the direction and the particular
magnitude of the drift of the regional wage diﬀerential. In expression (2.22) of the
real options analysis without drift, the threshold minimizing value   is primarily
determined by the ratio of uncertainty about future wage diﬀerentials to one-time
moving costs. In a similar fashion, condition (2.31) reveals that  is essentially
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Figure 2.3 Threshold wage diﬀerential w as a function of longevity  and
comparison of inﬂuence of various drift rates (M = 4,  = 0:5,
r = 0)
controlled by the wage diﬀerential drift rate – again normalized by moving costs.
Moving costs play an important role as a standardizing measure for both wage
diﬀerential uncertainty and its drift rate in the two respective models.
The numerical illustration of the ﬁndings discussed for the NPV analysis, show-
casing a comparison of wage diﬀerential processes with no drift, a negative drift,
and a positive drift, is presented in Figure 2.3. In addition to the central parameter
constellation in Section 2.4.1, for the further analysis a positive drift rate of  = 0:1
and a negative rate of  =  0:1 is assumed, respectively. It can be seen that for a
negative expected periodical change of the regional wage diﬀerential the curve now
depicts a non-monotonic progression with the corresponding threshold minimizing
level of longevity,  . According to the parameter settings, this level of longevity
turns out to be 6.3 periods in the NPV case. The associated reservation wage gain,
w, takes a value of 1.3, which, despite the unfavorable eﬀect of a negative drift,
is still signiﬁcantly below the size of initial moving costs, M . Yet, improvements
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in longevity beyond  will increasingly raise the threshold and lead to stronger
procrastination of the migration decision. If the regional wage diﬀerential exhibits
a positive or no drift the relationship between longevity and the propensity to
migrate clearly remains monotonically positive by further lowering the required
migration threshold. Consequently, in these two cases no minimum  can be ob-
tained. Instead, in the case of  = 0 the corner solution is denoted by w having its
limit at zero with the level of longevity correspondingly approaching inﬁnity at the
same time. Thus, it reproduces the basic assumption from the simple human capi-
tal theory of migration regarding the continuously positive eﬀect of an extending
planning horizon on the migration decision. Particular the result deserves atten-
tion under a positive expected drift of the regional wage diﬀerential. It produces
a substantial discount on the threshold wage diﬀerential and stimulates migration
accordingly vigorously. Furthermore, as can be learned from the illustration of the
threshold function in Figure 2.3, the potential migrant is increasingly willing to
accept even an initially negative regional wage gain in the case of migration. The
reason for this is the outlook of a widening regional wage diﬀerential over future
periods, which helps to meet the requirement of a positive net present value of the
migration project for the full planning horizon, as deﬁned by the level of longevity.
Hence, except in the case of a negative drift rate with its non-monotonic charac-
teristic of w, improving levels of longevity promote migration overall. However, it
is not realistic to assume that the positive drift, i. e. the expectation of a widening
future wage diﬀerential, comes without uncertainty. For instance in the incidence
of “bad news” the expected positive drift may prove to be too low for an optimal
migration. Therefore, real options analysis is again more useful in providing the
necessary tools for an improved assessment of the migration possibility.
2.5.2 Real Options Analysis
The observed non-monotonic relationship appears anew in the real options formu-
lation of the migration problem if the drift rate is adapted to the model presented
in Section 2.4. The valuation in the waiting and the migration state, respectively,
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is now given by the augmented value function22
V (w) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 1
r + 1

e  1 if w < w, (2.32a)
w
r + 1

+
 
r + 1

2  M if w > w, (2.32b)
where for the case of an assumed drift rate, unlike previously stated,  = w  

 
r+ 1


M +/
 
r+ 1


. There is also a modiﬁcation of parameter  itself, which
is now given by the more complex expression  = 1
2
q
2 + 22
 
r + 1

  
2
> 0 as
opposed to the basic analysis in Section 2.4.1.23 It can be seen that the net present
value of migration (2.32b) is positively inﬂuenced by an increase of the level of
longevity because of a higher present value of both the perpetuity wage gain, w,
and its expected periodical change, . As discussed above for the NPV case, this is
only true as long as the drift rate is positive. A negative drift rate lowers the overall
valuation in the migration state, and this is even more pronounced at higher levels
of longevity. The explanation for this is the extension of the time span for which
a negative wage diﬀerential is expected to occur relative to the overall planning
horizon deﬁned by the level of longevity. Moving costs, M , show the presumed
negative eﬀect on the value of the migration project.
The valuation in the waiting state, on the other hand, becomes more com-
plex with the addition of a drift rate. Nonetheless, one can obtain the optimality
condition for migration based on the two valuations in (2.32) by equating both
expressions in the point w, which marks the state of indiﬀerence for the potential
migrant between immediate migration and further waiting. This reservation wage
diﬀerential is accordingly deﬁned by
w   1   
r + 1

+

r +
1


M: (2.33)
A current regional wage gain exceeding this threshold level triggers immediate
migration of the risk-neutral individual. Two opposing eﬀects of higher longevity
on the threshold seem instantly visible: the inﬂuence of initial moving costs M is
repelled while a positive drift rate  increasingly lowers the required reservation
22 Further derivation steps are available in the subsection Extension with Drift of Appendix B.3.
23 The fundamental quadratic from which parameter  is derived as the positive root is accord-
ingly extended to Q = 2 + 22    22
 
r + 1

= 0 (see Appendix B.3).
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Figure 2.4 Threshold wage diﬀerential w as a function of longevity  and
comparison of inﬂuence of various drift rates (M = 4,  = 0:5,
r = 0)
wage gain. However, because  is present in parameter  too, the overall eﬀect of
longevity on w is not easily deducible from (2.33). For this reason, and to allow
for a thorough investigation of the eﬀect of longevity on the migration threshold
under heterogeneous drift rate scenarios, a numerical analysis is conducted in the
following.
Using the same numerical parameter settings from Section 2.4.1 (M = 4;  =
0:5; r = 0), the evaluation for  2 [1; 25] speciﬁcally covers the range of longevity
for which the property of non-monotonicity in the relationship between the level
of longevity and the migration threshold becomes relevant. The incidence of a
positive and negative drift rate in the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential is
again exemplarily covered by a value of 0:1, respectively. As a contrasting case
the analysis also considers a drift rate of zero that refers to the standard problem
described in Section 2.4.1.
Results of the simulation are plotted in Figure 2.4. The no-drift case (solid line)
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resembles the outcomes already depicted in Figure 2.1 for  = 0:5 as the chosen
level of wage gain uncertainty. Accordingly, uncertainty shows a dominant impact
on the wage diﬀerential threshold, which stays notably above zero over the full
range of longevity as opposed to the corresponding zero limit of the NPV threshold.
Moreover, non-monotonicity is introduced to the relationship between longevity
and the threshold. The now existent minimum in the curve is speciﬁed by   = 8
at a wage diﬀerential threshold of w = 1:5. This means, at this level of uncertainty
and with the given parameter values the potential migrant can expect his up-front
moving costs of M = 4 to amortize within eight periods ( ) if he accepts a wage
diﬀerential not less then 1½. Any wage gain below this level, c.p., would yield a
negative expected net present value for the migration project and were refused by
the individual. On all three curves, departing from this threshold minimizing level
of longevity to either side increases the reservation wage diﬀerential and reduces the
propensity to migrate. At longevity levels below   the same initial moving costs
would need to be compensated by rapidly increasing wage diﬀerentials the shorter
the planning horizon becomes. Likewise, an increase in the level of longevity over
this lower range encourages migration. In the upper range of longevity (right of
 ), however, a further improvement of longevity hinders migration through raising
the threshold wage diﬀerential again signiﬁcantly. In addition to this previously
discussed result, introducing a negative or positive expected wage diﬀerential drift
rate in the real options analysis changes the picture partly in reference to the
results obtained in the NPV case illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Taking a positive drift rate of the regional wage gain as a basis, the analysis
produces a relationship between longevity and threshold wage diﬀerential that is
very contrastive to the NPV explanation in the same case. Instead of a mono-
tonically falling curve which even allows for a negative reservation wage gain in
the event of optimal migration, the required threshold now remains larger zero
over the full range of longevity considered in the investigation. Furthermore, the
monotonicity is replaced by a non-monotonic curve progression, which shows a
minimum of about one at   = 19:7 periods. This level of longevity is signiﬁcantly
higher than the comparable values in the case of a zero drift rate and a negative
drift rate, respectively. This means that the range of longevity up to  , for which
an increasing level of longevity has a reducing eﬀect on the threshold, is drasti-
cally extended. However, for very high levels of longevity beyond  , a further
improvement raises the threshold again and discourages migration. The reason for
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this unfavorable outcome, as compared to the NPV result under a positive drift
rate, are the substantial opportunity costs created by the uncertainty surrounding
the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential. A long planning horizon, therefore,
not only eases the burden of bearing one-time moving costs but also raises the
individual’s exposure to an uncertain future. As a result, the risk-neutral migrant
demands a suﬃciently positive reservation wage gain in case of migration despite
an expected positive future wage diﬀerential growth rate ( > 0). The conclusion
is that an additional improvement of longevity at already high levels no longer
helps to encourage migration in the presence of uncertainty.
A negative drift rate, on the other hand, leads to a similar relationship between
longevity and the migration threshold as in the NPV approach. However, the non-
monotonicity is much more pronounced due to the existence of wage diﬀerential
uncertainty. In the circumstances of a negative drift rate, the corresponding thresh-
old minimizing level of longevity,  , under the given parameter settings turns out
to be about 14% below that in the NPV case (), while the associated threshold
wage diﬀerential, w, exceeds the derived value in the NPV analysis by about 46%.
The negative drift rate shortens the range of longevity signiﬁcantly over which an
increase in longevity has a positive eﬀect on the propensity to migrate. Simulta-
neously, the range over which longevity exerts negative inﬂuence on the decision
to migrate is largest under a negative expected drift rate of the regional wage
diﬀerential. Under these circumstances, an increasing level of longevity therefore
discourages the migration decision over most part of the longevity range.
With regard to the parameter constellation given above and as deducted from
the numerical simulation carried out, Table 2.2 provides a summary of comparative
statics results for the threshold wage diﬀerential with respect to longevity (), wage
diﬀerential uncertainty (), wage diﬀerential drift rate (), and one-time costs of
moving (M).
2.6 Discussion
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the inﬂuence of uncertainty on individual
decision making regarding the residential relocation as a means of maximizing life-
time earnings. The model and the derived results have been interpreted in terms
of an individual potential migrant without the attempt to generalize upon it. In
contrast to other existing studies that consider age-varying mortality rates (e. g.
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Table 2.2
Comparative statics regarding the eﬀects of longevity, uncertainty, drift rate, and
moving costs on the wage diﬀerential threshold; real options approach
Longevity () Uncertainty () Drift rate () Moving costs (M)
ﬁrst
derivative
@w
@

?
? 0 @w

@
> 0
@w
@
< 0
@w
@M
> 0
second
derivative
@2w
@2

?
7 0 @
2w
@2
> 0
@2w
@2
> 0
@2w
@M2
= 0
Faruqee 2003, Sheshinski 2009), the current analysis applies a speciﬁcation of the
rate of disease  that is independent of age and therefore constant over the life
cycle of the individual. Put diﬀerently, every period anew the individual faces the
same probability of death. This particular speciﬁcation traces back to the “perpet-
ual youth model” proposed by Blanchard (1985) in the context of an overlapping
generations framework. It speciﬁcally allows for a more general ‘societal’ view on
the relation of longevity and migration, and the contrasting assessment of alter-
native societal longevity settings. Deviating from Blanchard’s general equilibrium
explanation covering multiple generations, for clearness of illustration I constrain
subsequent considerations to a single generation or cohort, composed of people with
constant and identical rate of disease . From the law of large numbers it follows
that if the cohort is large enough then  is also the rate at which the cohort size
becomes smaller over time. It was noted by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 116)
that “although each person is uncertain about the time of his or her death, the size
of a cohort declines deterministically through time.” Based on the applied speciﬁ-
cation of longevity as the inverse of the exogenous rate of disease, the individual
in the previously discussed model can be treated as the representative agent of a
society composed of persons with constant and identical , which is accordingly
characterized by a common level of longevity. In terms of exposition, this measure
of longevity can be set to arbitrary levels in order to study the eﬀect of changes in
longevity on the overall propensity to migrate under a given level of uncertainty
about regional wage diﬀerentials in the society. Yet, this general analysis can only
be conducted on the restrictive basis of common assumptions regarding the aver-
age cost of migration, expected uncertainty about future regional wage diﬀerentials,
and the already explained aggregated measure of longevity within the society.
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Accordingly, given above preconditions the model predicts an extension of over-
all residential mobility under wage gain uncertainty in response to an improvement
in the common level of longevity. This should particularly be true if the society
under consideration is characterized by a rather high rate of disease, as is often
found in less developed countries for instance. In this situation, the total health
status in society is poor and longevity may remain in its lower range ( <  )
deﬁned in Section 2.4 (see (2.22) for the deﬁnition of  ).
On the contrary, a society with a generally low rate of disease, and a correspond-
ing high level of longevity, is expected to show a decline in residential mobility
on the whole as a result of further improvements in longevity. The existence of
uncertainty about the evolution of regional wage diﬀerentials discourages overall
migration in a society with a particularly long average planning horizon. For in-
stance well developed countries, such as most industrial countries, that have an
advanced health system in place and experience low mortality rates would fall in
this said category of societies.
Likewise, a comparative analysis of two otherwise identical ‘one-generation’ soci-
eties can be conducted on the basis of above stated requirements. A so-constructed
society characterized by a relatively higher level of longevity is, according to the
model, expected to show less overall migration activity than compared to a society
with a lower level of aggregate longevity. The formulation ‘otherwise comparable’,
in this respect, refers to both societies sharing a given expected standard devia-
tion of changes in their regional wage diﬀerentials as well as very similar moving
cost speciﬁcities that hold for the representative migrants in both societies. Due
to the non-monotonic relationship observed between longevity and the propensity
to migrate, the stated result is only valid for societies with an aggregated level of
longevity above  .
The opposite is found if looking at two societies whose peculiar levels of longevity
are positioned in the lower range of longevity ( <  ). In this case the society
with the relatively higher level of longevity is expected to exhibit more residential
mobility. Better longevity perspectives on average help to encourage migration by
reducing the required threshold wage diﬀerential w.
It is understood that this limited comparative analysis is a mere approximation
of a possible reality. In particular, there will be a whole host of additional inﬂuences
determining the overall migration propensity within a society, therefore making
it unlikely to ﬁnd two identical societies and resemble the artiﬁcial construction
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above. Nonetheless, it provides an idealistic view on the interrelation of longevity
and migration in a society and allows for a simpliﬁed comparison of diﬀerent cases.
A more detailed investigation, possibly within a general equilibrium framework, is
left for further research in this ﬁeld.
Further extensions not considered in this analysis could cover the topic of endoge-
nous longevity, i. e. the eﬀect of migration itself on the expected level of longevity
of the individual. Migrating from Africa to Europe, for instance, would likely alter
the underlying level of longevity that the migrant can expect, due to diﬀerent qual-
ities in health care services. In this way, analog to the human capital explanation,
migration could be seen as a decision to actively invest into better health care in-
frastructure and a lower rate of disease. The mere prospects of such improvements
could possibly increase the propensity to migrate in those regions.
Another aspect of potential interest is the applied method of discounting future
annuity beneﬁts. For clearness of illustration, in this analysis I followed standard
procedures by assuming a time-invariant and exogenous rate of discount. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue in favor of nonconstant time-preference rates, in
which case “individuals are highly impatient about consuming between today and
tomorrow but are much more patient about choices advanced further in the future,
for example, between 365 and 366 days from now. Hence, rates of time preference
would be very high in the short run but much lower in the long run, as viewed
from today’s perspective” (p. 122). Similarly, the assumption of a constant rate of
disease could be relaxed and made endogenous to the age of the individual. Faruqee
(2003) applies such a speciﬁcation in his analytical framework of an overlapping
agents model with age-speciﬁc mortality rates, thereby implying that impatience
is linked to age. This form of hyperbolic discounting is most suitable for the
assumption that the individual lacks foresight and self-control to better anticipate
and react to expected future developments. Both highlighted approaches, however,
come with the burden of a considerable additional complexity in the theoretical
model.
Translated to the investigation conducted in this chapter, the individual may
consider todays and tomorrows regional wage diﬀerential more important than the
wage gain obtainable in the distant future. This is even more the case for the
expectation of a time trend in the evolution of the regional wage diﬀerential. The
trend itself is hardly predictable in a plausible way over a very long time span
and should therefore be of less importance in the migration decision. That this
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might be true, is supported by the analysis in Section 2.5.2. If considering wage
gain uncertainty through the real options approach, the inﬂuence of an expected
drift rate is reduced at very high levels of longevity, which is most pronounced in
the case of a positive drift: uncertainty increasingly outweighs the beneﬁts of an
expected higher regional wage diﬀerential in the far future. As a consequence, the
predictions speciﬁcally regarding the eﬀect of a time trend in the wage diﬀerential
on the migration decision, proposed in above model, appear to be superior to the
simple human capital explanation of Section 2.5.1.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Migration studies traditionally presume a monotonic negative relationship between
age and an individual’s propensity to migrate, and likewise a positive inﬂuence of
remaining life span on the migration decision. In other words, young people are
more likely to change residence in order to utilize higher incomes than are older
persons facing the same earnings and cost structure. The theoretical explanation
for this behavior stems from the simple human capital theory of migration, accord-
ing to which the propensity to migrate of a risk-neutral individual increases with a
longer underlying planning horizon and, hence, with a higher level of longevity. In
this theory, the prime reason for individual migration is seen in the maximization
of lifetime earnings through capitalizing higher incomes in regions other than the
origin by means of migration. A longer planning horizon, therefore, allows the
up-front costs associated with the residential move to be spread over more periods
by simultaneously beneﬁting from higher income in the destination region over the
same time span. This leads to a greater net present value of the possible migration
project and stimulates migration.
A central assumption for this conclusion in the net present value analysis, how-
ever, is that by forming expectations about the future evolution of uncertain re-
gional wage diﬀerentials the individual eﬀectively restrains his migration assess-
ment to the ﬁrst moment of the probability distribution, i. e. its mean, describing
w. Information contained in the second central moment, namely the variance of the
distribution, is not used in the evaluation. In eﬀect, this resembles a now-or-never
migration decision problem and the regional wage diﬀerential is treated as if it
would remain unchanged for the remainder of the planning horizon once migration
took place. In other words, expectations about future wage gain development are
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held with subjective certainty by the individual. The existence of uncertainty and
its inherent opportunity costs of immediate action do not enter into his migration
decision.
Relaxing this deterministic assumption by speciﬁcally considering uncertainty
about future wage diﬀerential changes and introducing the possibility of waiting en-
riches the standard model of individual migration decision making and challenges
the monotonic relationship between longevity and the propensity to migrate. In
particular, the analysis presented in this chapter applies the real options framework
to derive the necessary condition for an optimal migration decision in the presence
of uncertainty about future outcomes of the regional wage diﬀerential. The results
obtained are contrasted to the NPV approach of the simple human capital theory
of migration. One major ﬁnding, in line with previous studies applying the real
options approach to individual decision making, is that uncertainty causes signiﬁ-
cant opportunity costs with regard to immediate migration that act as mark-up on
overall costs. Thus, accounting for wage diﬀerential uncertainty leads to a higher
threshold wage gain and thereby discourages migration. Another central result
is the inferable theoretical reasoning for a non-monotonic relation between indi-
vidual longevity and the migration decision, in contrast to the NPV case. This
means that there exist two co-domains over the full range of longevity with distinct
implications for the eﬀect of improved longevity on the required threshold wage
diﬀerential. More precisely, the lower range of longevity is characterized by a re-
ducing eﬀect of improved longevity on the wage diﬀerential threshold and, to that
eﬀect, increases the likelihood of actual migration. For this range, the outcome
is qualitatively equivalent to the NPV analysis in the simple human capital the-
ory. However, continued improvement of the level of longevity raises the threshold
wage diﬀerential again and leads to further procrastination of the migration deci-
sion. The reason for this discouraging eﬀect are extensively growing opportunity
costs of immediate migration at high levels of longevity, that is, for a long plan-
ning horizon. Uncertainty about future outcomes of the regional wage diﬀerential
magniﬁes especially over the long-run, in that the variance of the wage diﬀerential
increases with the considered planning horizon and is particularly large for uncer-
tain wage diﬀerential outcomes in the distant future. The range of longevity over
which a further improvement in the level of longevity has a positive inﬂuence on
the decision to migrate is, in consequence, signiﬁcantly shortened compared to the
NPV prediction.
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Introducing a time trend in the development of the regional wage diﬀerential
shows a strong impact on the mode of action of longevity with regard to the op-
timal migration threshold. While an expected positive trend lowers the threshold
wage diﬀerential substantially for increasing levels of longevity in the NPV analy-
sis—even to negative levels—the same expected trend produces a non-monotonic
relationship in the real options framework. Moreover, the reservation wage dif-
ferential for optimal migration is now bound to levels larger zero for any level of
longevity. Thus, the simple human capital explanation predicts a constant pro-
motive inﬂuence of higher longevity on the propensity to migrate, whereas the
real options approach predicts a deteriorating eﬀect explicitly in the upper range
of longevity – as a matter of fact the most advantageous as seen from the NPV
examination. Under the assumption of a negative drift rate in the evolution of
the regional wage gain, on the other hand, higher levels of longevity lead to an
ambiguous, non-monotonic inﬂuence on the threshold wage diﬀerential in both
approaches, with increasingly higher reservation wage diﬀerentials the longer the
planning horizon becomes. In this case, uncertainty considered in the real options
approach simply acts through scaling the outcome from the NPV analysis. As a
result, conventional wisdom predicting a monotonic relationship between longevity
and the propensity to migrate only holds for the assumption of a deterministic and
invariant wage gain from migration. In contrast, the consideration of uncertainty
about future outcomes in the wage diﬀerential, and hence a possible later deviation
from its level at the time of migration, negates the monotonicity assumption and
instead argues in favor of a diﬀerentiated view on the actual beneﬁt of improved
longevity for the decision to migrate. Particularly individuals enjoying a high level
of longevity are expected to be inﬂuenced the most in their migration endeavor by
regional wage gain uncertainty. This may help to explain why young people are
not automatically more likely to migrate, as it is also suggested by some empirical
studies.
It is shown that the model is suitable for comparative societal analyses on re-
strictive preconditions. In order to deduce conclusions on a societal level, strict
assumptions have to be made regarding a constant rate of disease for all persons
in society, the average cost of residential mobility, and the mean variance of re-
gional wage diﬀerentials. Keeping this in mind, improving the level of longevity
in a less developed society with comparatively high mortality—i. e. a low level of
longevity—is expected to increase overall residential mobility. In contrast, devel-
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oped societies characterized by rather low mortality rates and a consequently high
level of aggregate longevity are predicted to experience reduced migration activity
as result of a further improvement in longevity, if the prevailing uncertainty about
regional wage diﬀerentials is noticeable enough.
The theoretical considerations presented in the model and the derived conclu-
sions are important indications for the study of longevity and its consequences in
the context of demographic change. The presence of economic uncertainty, here
regional wage gain uncertainty in particular, is proved to inﬂuence long-term migra-
tion decision making, having the objective to obtain higher—yet uncertain—wages.
Especially for high levels of longevity, ﬁndings present unexpected predictions that
diﬀer considerably from the simple human capital theory of migration. This work
could provide a basis for further research in the ﬁeld of migration or demography.
Appendix
A Present Value Speciﬁcation
A.1 Finite Horizon
From the current period the expected wage diﬀerential at a future point t is in
continuous time given by the integral of its expected periodical changes over that
time span
w(0) +
Z t
0
E[dw(s)] ds: (A.1)
From this follows that the expected present value of future wage gains under ﬁnite
horizon is accordingly represented by
Z T
0
E

w(t)

e rt dt =
Z T
0
"
w(0) +
Z T
0
E[dw(s)] ds
#
e rt dt (A.2)
Since E[dw] = 0 was speciﬁed in (2.2), expression (A.2) simpliﬁes toZ T
0
E[w(t)]e rt dt =
Z T
0
we rt dt;
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=

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e rt
T
0
;
=
w
r

1  e rT

; (A.3)
where w denotes the initial regional wage diﬀerential as observed in the current
period, that is, the period of migration.
A.2 Inﬁnite Horizon
As is known from the text on page 20, the survival distribution function is rep-
resented by the expression e t. Substituting this for S(t; ) in (2.7) yields the
functional form of longevity
() =
Z 1
0
e t dt;
=

 1

e t
1
0
=
1

: (A.4)
Using (A.4), expression (2.9) from the text can be further dissected into the single
steps leading to the ﬁnal net present value representation. Hence, it follows thatZ 1
0
E[w(t)]e rt S(t; ) dt =
Z 1
0
E[w(t)]e rt e t dt;
=
Z 1
0
E[w(t)]e (r+)t dt;
=
Z 1
0

w(0) +
Z 1
0
E[dw(s)] ds

e (r+)t dt;
=
Z 1
0
we (r+)t dt;
=

  w
r + 
e (r+)t
1
0
;
=
w
r + 
: (A.5)
Given the deﬁnition of longevity in (2.7), this can be transfered to the net present
value expression illustrated in the text
w

r +
1
()
 1
: (A.6)
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B Real Options Speciﬁc Calculations
B.1 Partial Differential Equation, Taylor Series
The return equilibrium condition (2.12) assures the eﬃcient valuation of the possi-
ble migration project. In order to derive a valid representation of the still unknown
V (w), Ito’s Lemma is applied to utilize information inherent in the stochastic pro-
cess of w, described by dw in (2.1). It is assumed that function V (w) is at least
twice diﬀerentiable in w, so the total diﬀerential of this function, dV , can be
obtained. The accordant Taylor expansion of dV about w is given by24
dV = @V
@w
dw + 1
2
@2V
@w2
(dw)2 + 1
6
@3V
@w3
(dw)3 + : : : (B.1)
The diﬀerentiation of V with respect to time t is assumed zero, since in continuous
time all periods become identical and time exercises no inﬂuence on the value
function. If substituting equation (2.1) for the term dw in above expression, it is
apparent that some terms in dw include dt raised to a power higher than 1, and
so will go to zero faster in the limit than dt (i. e. making dt inﬁnitesimally small).
Hence, all terms of higher order are omitted, which gives the diﬀerential dV as
dV = @V
@w
dz + 1
2
2
@2V
@w2
dt: (B.2)
Noting that E[dz] = 0 (condition 2.2), taking expectations yields
E[dV ] = 1
2
2
@2V
@w2
dt; (B.3)
which is substituted back into the return equilibrium condition (2.12). Divided
by dt, and rearranged this oﬀers the stochastic partial diﬀerential equation (2.13)
from the text on page 26:
1
2
2
@2V
@w2
   r + 1


V = 0: (B.4)
24 See e. g. Whittaker and Watson (1996, p. 93) or Braun (1993, p. 97) for a detailed exposition
of the Taylor Theorem, named after Dr Brooks Taylor for his seminal work on the calculus of
ﬁnite diﬀerences published in Methodus Incrementorum Directa et Inversa (1715).
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B.2 Fundamental Quadratic, Full Solution
As speciﬁed in the text, the general functional form of V (w) is Aew. Applying
this in expression (2.13) and dividing by V (w) yields the following fundamental
quadratic equation
Q = 1
2
22    r + 1


= 0; (B.5)
whose two roots are derived as
1 =
q
2
 
r + 1


/ > 0; (B.6a)
2 =  
q
2
 
r + 1


/ < 0: (B.6b)
The general solution to the homogeneous part of the second order stochastic partial
diﬀerential equation (2.13), therefore, consists of a linear combination of the form
V (w) = A1e
1w + A2e
2w; (B.7)
that has to comply to the required boundary conditions stated in the text. In
particular, condition (2.14) demands that parameter A2 takes a value of zero, since
otherwise a regional wage diﬀerential, w, that tends to zero would lead to an
extremely large positive value of the second term on the RHS of (B.7), given the
negative mathematical sign of parameter 2, and thereby contradict the necessary
absorbing barrier. As a consequence, the general solution to the homogeneous part
of the partial diﬀerential equation is reduced to
V (w) = A1e
1w = Aew; (B.8)
where subsequently subscripts are omitted for reasons of readability. The full
solution to (2.13) at w = w is, thus, given by the functional form
V (w) = Ae
w
q
2(r+ 1 )/; (B.9)
for which the constant A is further resolved through the help of the required bound-
ary conditions (2.15) and (2.16) to 1
(r+ 1 )
e w
 . This solution transfers to the
represented valuation of V (w) in (2.17).
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B.3 Extension with Drift
Analog to the illustration in the base case without drift, periodical diﬀerences in
the evolution of the value function, V (w), can be approximated by information
immanent in the stochastic process describing dw. Building on (B.1) above and
(2.28) in the text, the second order Taylor expansion of dV with drift is accordingly
given by
dV =@V
@w
( dt+  dz) + 1
2
@2V
@w2
( dt+  dz)2
=
@V
@w
( dt+  dz) + 1
2
@2V
@w2
 
2(dt)2 + 2 dt dz + 2(dz)2

: (B.10)
Again, the value function is independent of time t due to the continuous time
representation. Taking expectations and noting that (dt)(dz) is of order (dt) 32 and
(dz)2 of order dt, the expected change in the value of V (w) is denoted by
E[dV ] = @V
@w
dt+ 1
2
2
@2V
@w2
dt; (B.11)
which is expression (B.3) augmented by the drift parameter. Substituting E[dV ]
in (2.12) with the expression above, dividing by dt, and rearranging yields
1
2
2
@2V
@w2
+ 
@V
@w
   r + 1


V = 0; (B.12)
that has to be fulﬁlled by the accordant functional form of V (w). This is derived
in a similar fashion to before by substituting the general form Aew into (B.12) to
obtain the modiﬁed fundamental quadratic equation
Q = 1
2
22 +     r + 1


= 0; (B.13)
with the corresponding positive and negative roots
1 =
1
2
q
2 + 22
 
r + 1

   > 0; (B.14a)
2 =   12
q
2 + 22
 
r + 1


+  < 0: (B.14b)
The requirement of A2 = 0 as explained for (B.7) above applies here all the same.
The boundary conditions (value-matching and smooth-pasting condition) in the
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case of a wage diﬀerential with expected drift are given by
V (w) =
 
w +

r + 1

!
/
 
r + 1

 M; (B.15)
V 0(w) =
1
r + 1

: (B.16)
Hence, the particular solution for the homogeneous part of (B.12)—as before this
is Aew—together with the stated boundary conditions provides the full solution
to the partial diﬀerential equation (B.12) as
V (w) = Ae
w
q
2+22(r+ 1 ) 

/2
; (B.17)
which corresponds to case (2.32a) in the text in page 42.
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3
Joint Migration under
Uncertainty: The Case of a
Dual-Income Household
3.1 Introduction
Migration plays an important role in the demographic development of countries
and regions. It can help alleviate prevailing pressures on local labor markets and
social systems that arise from stagnating or shrinking populations. Various policy
ﬁelds involved in these transitions rely on reasonable population projections that
take migration ﬂows into account. In order to better understand the causes and
eﬀects of migration, researchers must study the determining factors relevant for
the decision to migrate. Besides the widely studied macro-economic consequences
of migration, studying the process of reaching an optimal decision in individual
or family migration is, therefore, of paramount importance. A large strand of
literature investigates the factors that inﬂuence the migration decision from various
disciplinary perspectives. Economists, in particular, are interested in the impact
of economic factors, e. g. regional income diﬀerentials, on this decision. Particular
attention is also given to the peculiarities of joint decision making of couples or
within groups of people where non-monetary factors play an additional role in
the migration process; these considerations are, for instance, dealt with in game
theoretical applications.
Many areas of decision making are typically bound to an environment of uncer-
tainty and imperfect knowledge about future outcomes resulting from the decisions
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taken. In this regard, studies of economic theory started to incorporate income un-
certainty into their analysis of migration decisions. First analyses have focused
on individual decision making under uncertainty but were eventually extended to
the equally relevant aspects of family and group decisions. Based on methods
inspired from ﬁnancial economics, several studies concentrate on the theoretical
understanding of the timing of migration decisions under uncertainty (Burda 1995,
Khwaja 2002a, Anam et al. 2008, Moretto and Vergalli 2008). Their central feature
is the implementation of the so-called option value of waiting that an individual
possesses in his decision whether to migrate at present or not. The initial treat-
ment of a single agent, however, largely ignores aspects speciﬁc to the decision
making of a group of people. To this approach, Anam et al. (2008) perpetuate
the growing interest in the study of family migration decisions by investigating the
beneﬁts of spatial diversiﬁcation of family members as a means of reducing overall
income risk of the family. Yet, this neglects the explicit modeling of a joint family
migration, which is of higher relevance in the consideration of domestic moves of
couples. While diversiﬁcation is a reasonable objective, the desire of two partners
to stay together when migrating is equally justiﬁed.
The purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to ﬁll this gap and to develop
further the theory of decision making of a dual-income household with respect to
joint migration in the context of income uncertainty. Due to the character of a
joint movement of the household, the model helps explaining internal migration
within countries or larger communities of states like the EU where restrictions on
relocation are rather negligible. In contrast to internal migration, international
migration is more heavily driven by immigration policy and other regulations that
diﬀer considerably between countries. Often these measures represent constraints
for both partners to move jointly and, thus, make this kind of migration less
common in the international context. Anam et al. (2008) take this up partly by
allowing for independent migration of family members across borders, therefore
causing the separation of the family.
The present chapter is structured as follows. In the next section I provide an
overview of existing migration studies with a perspective on family decision making
and uncertainty aspects. After that, Section 3.3 introduces the joint migration
decision problem on the basis of real options analysis, particularly for the case of
two individual wage proﬁles. By means of the model, a solution is derived with
regard to the impact of wage diﬀerential uncertainty on the joint migration of both
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partners. The discussion in Section 3.4 sets the presented results in the context of
existing theories and explanatory approaches of family migration under uncertainty.
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter with some ﬁnal remarks on the ﬁndings.
3.2 Literature Review
The importance of the family in the decision making of individuals has become the
object of interest in a considerable number of studies during the last decades, as
the family shapes motivations and values and is seen as the most stable and pre-
dominant institutional arrangement in an individual’s life (Stark 1984, p. 252).1
Harbison (1981) views the family as the structural and functional context of indi-
vidual decision making in which the “family unit can prioritize its needs over the
individual’s in many instances” (p. 226). Migration, by representing a major and
usually long-term decision on permanent relocation of one or more members of a
family, marks an essential application of this idea. As a consequence, several stud-
ies highlight the family as the crucial decision unit in the migration process instead
of just the single individual (e. g. Mincer 1978, Stark 1978, Stark and Levhari 1982,
Massey et al. 1993, Anam et al. 2008).
The distinction between individual decision making, on the one hand, and house-
hold or family decision making, on the other hand, forms the diﬀerence between
neoclassical microeconomic migration theory and the new economics of migration
(Massey et al. 1993). Early, Mincer (1978) studied family migration decisions of
married couples and the inﬂuence of the spouses’ income levels and risks on the
allocation of decision power in the family. He also gave predictions for the eﬀect
of income risk on the family’s decision to migrate. Several authors, among them
Stark and Levhari (1982), Massey et al. (1993), Khwaja (2002a) and Anam et al.
(2008), highlight the absence of private insurance markets or relevant governmental
programs for controlling family income risk as the fundamental incentive for the
eﬀort to diversify risk. Massey et al. (1993) argue, that households may not only
have a strong desire to diversify risk through the migration of individual family
members but also to increase absolute as well as relative household income. In this
way, migration—even in the absence of positive regional wage diﬀerentials—can
reduce relative deprivation of the household vis-á-vis a local reference group.
1Among others, Becker (1991) for instance contributed to the study of family decision making
by analyzing the process of inner-family decision making with a primary focus on the concept
of altruism as the explanatory framework.
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The main concern of existing family migration studies has been to explain rural-
to-urban migration in less developed and developing countries, but was later ex-
tended to the analysis of international migration ﬂows, too. Anam et al. (2008), for
example, provide theoretical motivation for a risk-reducing eﬀect of transnational
migration on overall family income. Accordingly, the spatial dispersion of family
members is a result of both an option and a portfolio motive. For their analysis
of the timing of migration decisions, the authors adopt the concept of real options
(a risk modelling method from investment theory) and provide empirical evidence
based on Canadian immigration data. Immigrants, when faced with uncertainty in
their migration endeavor, ﬁnd it worthwhile to wait some time before taking their
ﬁnal decision on staying in the destination country. This allows them to beneﬁt
from new information that help to further reduce uncertainty. By acting this way,
the migrants attach a positive value to the option to wait as compared to an im-
mediate decision. As in this recent study, the delaying feature of uncertainty and
its option character is now well recognized in the new literature on migration that
utilizes the real options approach for examining migration decision problems. The
ﬁrst fusion of real options theory with migration decisions was presented by Burda
(1995; 1993) in his study of inner-German migration in the early and mid-1990s.2
The consideration of the option value of waiting marks an important stage in
the development of migration theory. It extends previous analyzes on the diver-
sifying eﬀect of domestic and transnational migration within the family context
and adds aspects of the timing and speed of the migration process. Diversiﬁca-
tion is strongly linked to the concept of optimal portfolio choice within the family
as a strategy to reduce the family’s exposure to overall income risk by optimally
allocating the family members’ individual labor assets in geographically dispersed
and structurally diﬀerent markets. Several studies assess this connection theoret-
ically, among them e. g. Connell et al. (1976), Stark and Levhari (1982), Ghatak
et al. (1996), Anam et al. (2008), Moretto and Vergalli (2008). With a particular
interest in large families, Connell et al. (1976) identify the role of rural-to-urban
(“townward”) migration of family members as a means to reduce the family’s de-
pendency on risky income in the rural sector and to diversify the portfolio of human
capital. This view is underpinned by Stark and Levhari (1982) who demonstrate
how risk can be controlled through placing the best-suited member in the urban
2 For the applied theoretical concept the authors draw from the theory of irreversible invest-
ment under uncertainty essentially advanced in the seminal works of Dixit (1989) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
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production sector which is statistically independent from the rural agricultural sec-
tor. Income shocks in one of the two sectors are then attenuated by countervailing
developments in the other. From this, both authors conclude that risk aversion
of the family constitutes an important cause of rural-to-urban migration. Along
these lines, Ghatak et al. (1996) argue that the new portfolio investment theory
approach allows to explain the behavior of families who pool the single members’
incomes in order to form an insurance against unforeseen negative events in the
peculiar income streams and to smooth the family consumption growth path.
The second aspect relates to the eﬀect of uncertainty on the timing of the mi-
gration decision. Like Stark and Levhari (1982) and Ghatak et al. (1996), most
existing migration studies analyze migration decisions theoretically on the basic
assumption of risk-averse family members. Accordingly, uncertainty about income
and employment in the destination region creates disutility for the individual and,
in the event, raises the required utility gain from migration—the diﬀerence be-
tween the expected mean income in the new area and his current income—above
the disutility generated by the uncertainty involved. Uncertainty, thus, eﬀectively
raises the hurdle for migration due to the risk-avers behavior of the individual.
Ghatak et al. indeed show that for a given probability of obtaining employment in
the urban center the family migration rate (i. e. the number of mobile family mem-
bers) is lower under risk aversion than predicted by the conventional Harris-Todaro
(HT) model (Harris and Todaro 1970), in which individuals are risk-neutral. In the
HT model the opportunity cost of migration is given by the sum of the foregone
current wage income and the periodical time value of required one-time moving
costs. From these considerations follows that migration is carried out as soon as
the urban-rural diﬀerence in expected earnings exceeds the cost of migration to be
borne by the migrant. As a result, by the HT model the individual would already
migrate at a reduced income diﬀerential, neglecting any potential disutility from
uncertainty.
However, the aforementioned concept of the option value of waiting to migrate
within the real options approach is capable of demonstrating the deferring eﬀect of
income uncertainty on the decision to migrate in the case of risk-neutral individuals
of the HT-type. This, for instance, allows to explain the low rural-to-urban mi-
gration in China observed by Xu (1992). When considering income uncertainty in
the migration decision, a positive wage diﬀerential is not a suﬃcient condition for
migration anymore. Instead, the potential negative consequences of future income
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variation are included as additional opportunity cost of migration in the decision.
Migration studies that highlight the impact of wage uncertainty on the timing
and speed of migration in a real options framework include, among others, Burda
(1995), Burda and Hunt (2001), Khwaja (2002b), Anam et al. (2008), Moretto and
Vergalli (2008). While Burda (1995) and Burda and Hunt (2001) in their analyses
focus on inner-German migration as the object of research, most other studies in-
vestigate international migration of families or groups of persons. In their model
based on real options theory, Moretto and Vergalli (2008) make explicit the rela-
tion of income and employment uncertainty to observed jumps in migration ﬂows.
Successful integration, and thus the resolution of uncertainty, is positively linked
to the size of the diaspora in the receiving country. Therefore, depending on their
behavioral idiosyncrasies individuals tend to wait before migrating in larger groups
at once. With respect to family migration, Anam et al. (2008) present a model
which incorporates both the option value of waiting and the portfolio motive to
explain the spatial dispersion of family members in international migration. Hence,
the authors purposely see migration as the result and means of risk reduction and
the separation of the family as the tolerable outcome of the decision-making pro-
cess. Most established migration theories, e. g. Stark (1978), Stark and Levhari
(1982), Harbison (1981) and Ghatak et al. (1996), take the same stance in that
they consider risk reduction as the primary objective of the family and migration
as a result thereof. It is, at the same time, not income maximization that drives
the desire to diversify spatially. In fact, according to the theory it can be optimal
to send family members to regions with expected mean income below their cur-
rent income situation if the associated uncertainty is lower too, that way reducing
overall uncertainty of family income. In summary, these models describe the joint
decision of the family with regard to individual migration.
Although highlighting the family as modal decision unit, these studies largely
fail to explain family decision making with the objective of a joint migration of
all involved members. In terms of argument, migration is not necessarily seen as
a result of an allocative process determining the spatial spreading of family mem-
bers as approached in the aforementioned studies. Instead the expected individual
incomes and uncertainties form the basis on which the family derives its decision
on the a priori intended migration endeavor. Thus, it is not the question of risk
reduction that is in the center of interest but rather the optimal reconcilability of
individual income proﬁle characteristics towards a positive decision on mutual mi-
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gration. Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to clarify the inﬂuence
of peculiar income levels and uncertainties on the joint migration of a dual-income
household. For this, I consider the household on the basis of perfect equality and
personal traits of strict altruistic behavior in which both partners strive for the
maximization of their joint income. As pointed out by Mincer (1978), a joint fam-
ily migration is much more diﬃcult to carry out because of the weighting of the
individual gains and losses of the involved family members. Marital status3 and
labor force participation of the wife is shown to be deterrent factors in family migra-
tion (Long 1974, Mincer 1978). Residential mobility of families, therefore, tends to
be signiﬁcantly lower in comparison to individual migration because of the compro-
mises that have to be reached by all members of the household. Recent empirical
studies support this line of reasoning (e. g. Carlsson et al. 2009, Jaeger et al. 2010).
In their analysis of family decision making in households in rural China, Carlsson
et al. (2009) ﬁnd that women’s inﬂuence on a couple’s joint decision (typically
dominated by the man) is signiﬁcantly increased when the woman contributes rel-
atively more to the household income, when she lives in a high-income household,
and when her education is higher than that of her husband. With speciﬁc focus on
migration, Jaeger et al. (2010) study the relationship of risk attitudes and migra-
tion on basis of a newly available data set from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP). According to the authors and in line with Mincer, the sample indicates
that individuals who are married are indeed less likely to migrate. Advancing on
these hypotheses, the following model provides additional insights into household
migration decision making with particular attention payed to the role of individual
wage gain uncertainties in the joint migration of a dual-income household.
3.3 The Model
The aim of this chapter is to expand existing migration theories that primarily
give attention to both individual decisions and spatial diversiﬁcation in family
decisions. The derived model focuses on a dual-income household with joint mi-
gration intention and allows to reproduce results found in previous studies in a
more comprehensive manner, while opening the discussion for new aspects. The
3 “Marital status” refers to the assumption of common decisions in a family, which are often seen
dominated by the head of the household. Typically, the subordinated position of the dominated
partner results in her or him being ‘tied’ to the decision of the dominating person. This concept
illustrates the diﬀerence to households with their members taking individual decisions free of
those of others.
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“household” is understood as a modern egalitarian family arrangement in which
both partners are employed (full time) and share economic decision making with
an altruistic objective.4 This can involve married couples as well as unmarried
partners. The overarching prerequisite, however, is the presumed situation of a
joint decision of both individuals on mutually migrating.
Important questions addressed in this analysis are (i) How does uncertainty
over individual wage proﬁles of two earners aﬀect their joint decision to migrate?
(ii) When is it optimal to migrate considering the costs of migration in relation to
returns from a wage gain of the two earners? (iii) To which extent do the correlated
variations of the two wage proﬁles inhibit migration in face of positive regional wage
diﬀerentials? (iv) How is the trade-oﬀ between the eﬀect of the wage gain and the
eﬀect of wage gain uncertainty on the migration decision characterized?
In order to answer these questions, a model is introduced that incorporates the
migration decision of a dual-income household facing uncertainty over the indi-
vidual wage proﬁles of the partners. The solution to the model parameters for
an optimal household migration decision is presented and compared to Burda’s
(1995) benchmark model of a single individual. Burda was the ﬁrst who developed
a model of individual migration decision making by utilizing the well-established
“real options approach” from investment theory.5 The two main features of this
model are the irreversibility of the migration “investment” (sunk cost) and the
possibility to delay the migration project without forfeiting the chance to do so
in the future. In the context of family migration under uncertainty, the option to
migrate allows the partners to defer immediate migration and to wait for new infor-
mation to arrive. The revised decision rule thereby incorporates this delay option
and represents an extension to the standard net present value case. Analogous to
investment theory, migration generates (partly) irreversible, one-time, ﬁxed costs
of moving and future returns in the form of wage diﬀerentials between origin and
4 The egalitarian breadwinner model is the most liberal form of family arrangement, for both
partners are employed full time. This represents an advancement of the modernized breadwinner
model, where both partners are working but diﬀer by full- and part-time employment. Accord-
ing to Wirth and Schutter (2011), data from the AID:A project (“Aufwachsen in Deutschland:
Alltagswelten”)—a survey by the Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V.—exemplarily report 29 per cent
of covered households as living in an egalitarian living arrangement, while households with only
one partner working account for 25 per cent of all households in the sample. Of particular inter-
est is that 44 per cent of young women with the age of 25 to 33 years are already living in an
egalitarian arrangement, indicating an important trend in society.
5 The development of this concept gained tremendously from contributions by Avinash Dixit
and Robert Pindyck in the early 1990s (e. g. Dixit 1989; 1992, Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
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destination. Migration costs can include physical expenditures, e. g. transportation
costs, as well as psychological costs due to leaving familiar surroundings and estab-
lishing new ties at the destination. As information evolves over time, deferring the
migration decision can increase the information available to the family and help
resolve uncertainty. Hence, it creates opportunity costs of making an immediate
commitment and foregoing the option to wait. The conventional net present value
rule, as used in models of the HT-type or by the human capital theory of migration,
ignores these additional costs arising from the possibility to postpone the migration
decision and is, therefore, rendered ineﬀective.6
Without loss of generality and for mathematical simplicity, the joint decision
of a dual-income household is modeled in continuous time with an inﬁnite hori-
zon. In the general representation, the household income gain from migration for
i family members is wf =
P
iwi, the sum of the individual members’ wage gains.
For the dual-income household this means that wf = w1 + w2 denotes the total
wage gain from migration. The weights attached to the individual decision power
of both spouses determining household migration rests solely in the monetary size
of their single wage gains. Hence, the model does not account for other sources
of decision power, such as gender roles often found at the focus of other studies,
but rather conﬁnes to the monetary components as decisive sources. According to
the Mincer model, the household undertakes migration not only for positive wage
gains of both spouses, but also in case that only one partner realizes a positive
outcome while the other has a negative outcome – provided that in both situations
the overall gains from migration for the household are positive. If one partner’s
contribution to overall income gain is larger than the other’s then his optimality
calculus dominates the latter one. Therefore, it is not the individuals’ shares in
total income that allocates decision power in the migration project, instead it is the
shares in the expected income gain. Mincer (1978), however, uses a rather ‘naive’
extrapolation of the mean and variance of the ﬁrst spouse’s wage gain by a factor
k to derive the second spouse’s income parameters.7 Analog to Chapter 2, though
with a focus on a dual-income household, I deﬁne independent wage characteristics
6 In Harris and Todaro (1970) and Sjaastad (1962) the decision rule states that one should
undertake migration as soon as the present value of the gains from migration (i. e. expected
future wage improvements) is larger than the costs of migration.
7 It has to be mentioned that Mincer includes returns as well as costs of migration in his measure
of the gains from migration. Therefore, mean and variance of both spouses’ gains do also apply
to the costs involved. In the current model, the uncertainty in the wage gains is strictly separated
from the costs of migration.
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of both partners by following Burda (1995), in that the two partners’ individual
regional wage diﬀerentials are each correspondingly identiﬁed by a standard Brow-
nian motion process with drift parameter  and standard deviation  per unit of
time8
dwi = i dt+ i dzi; (3.1)
where dzi are increments of the standardWiener process dzi(t) = "i(t)
p
dt, in which
the stochastic term "i(t) has zero mean and variance of one ("i(t) N(0; 1)). The
conditions E[dzi] = 0, E[dwi] = i dt, V[dwi] = 2i dt, and E[dz1 dz2] = 12 dt apply
accordingly, with 12 depicting the coeﬃcient of correlation of the two random
variables dz1 and dz2.
As can be inferred from the simple net present value rule, a risk neutral agent
decides to migrate when the discounted future returns from migration exceed the
initial costs. This Marshallian criterion (wf ) is given by9
wf > wf  rM   f/r; (3.2)
with r denoting the risk-free discount rate, M the total up-front ﬁxed costs of
migration for the family, and f = 1 + 2 represents the expected trend in the
overall household income gain. One important aspect of this approach is that
it represents a one-time assessment of the migration opportunity and, in eﬀect,
resembles a now-or-never decision on migration. Although the family decides each
period anew on the basis of the current wf , the migration decision rule does not
account for anticipated changes of wf during waiting.
If, in contrast, procrastination is possible and considered, the migration prob-
lem is solved by ﬁnding the positive threshold wage gap wf at which the family
wage gain outweighs the associated moving costs and opportunity costs of imme-
diate migration resulting from uncertainty about the regional wage diﬀerences. In
applying the real options approach, the subsequent analysis looks for critical values
of the family wage diﬀerential wf (t) for various t forming a curve that divides the
(wf ; t) space into two regions. Waiting will be optimal for values of wf (t) below the
curve (also called continuation region) whereas migration will be optimal for values
8 This is chosen over a geometric Brownian motion to allow for the wage gap to turn negative.
The drift rate is assumed negative to represent a shrinking wage diﬀerential.
9 The present discounted value of expected future wage diﬀerentials is R1
0
E[wf;t]e
 rt dt.
But E[wf;t] = wf;0 +
R t
0
E[dwf;s] ds = wf;0 + f t, so
R1
0
E[wf;t]e
 rt dt =

wf;0 + f/r

/r. See
also Appendix A for detailed calculation steps.
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above this curve (also called stopping region). The next steps will guide through
the procedure which solves for the equation that describes this curve wf = wf (t).
Similar to the previous chapter and the single individual treatment, the possible
migration project is seen as an “asset” that is held by the family and deﬁned
by the value function V (wf ) = V (w1; w2). With increasing wage diﬀerentials of
both spouses this migration project becomes more valuable, therefore the function
V (wf ) is positively linked to the individual wage diﬀerentials, w1 and w2. Arbitrage
implies that the expected capital gain from holding this asset must be equal to the
risk-free return over the period dt, so10
E[dV ] = rV dt: (3.3)
In other words, the asset V held by the family pays no ‘dividend’ while in the
waiting state, thus its value is determined solely by the value of its own expected
future periodical changes discounted at the risk-free rate r. Since the functional
form of V is not known a priori, but per assumption the function is at least once
continuously diﬀerentiable in t and twice in wi, Ito’s Lemma can be applied to ob-
tain the required diﬀerentiated expression for V . This approach utilizes the known
information inherent in the speciﬁed stochastic process describing the evolution of
the wage diﬀerentials, (3.1). This, in turn, allows to derive the corresponding rep-
resentation for changes in the value function V , which depends on the two spouses’
wage diﬀerentials. Accordingly, the second-order two-dimensional Taylor series
expansion around the two variables w1 and w2 yields the following partial diﬀeren-
tial equation that expresses the expected periodical capital gain from holding the
asset11
dV = 1
2
 
@2V
@w21
(dw1)2 + 2
@2V
@w1w2
(dw1 dw2) +
@2V
@w22
(dw2)2
!
+
+
@V
@w1
dw1 +
@V
@w2
dw2 +
@V
@t
dt:
(3.4)
This condition can be further substantiated by substituting dw1;2 for (3.1) and
taking expectations. In a next step, the whole expression is divided by dt and
10Note, a detailed exposition of the calculation steps of the model are presented in Appendix B.
11The term “second-order” refers to the fact that some terms in dwi include dt raised to a power
higher than 1, which can be omitted because they will go to zero faster than dt in the limit. A
Taylor series is called “two-dimensional” if it is a real function in two variables, in the current
case the two wage diﬀerentials w1 and w2.
69
3. JOINT HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
rearranged, which yields the condition12
1
2
 
21
@2V
@w21
+ 22
@2V
@w22
!
+ 1
@V
@w1
+ 2
@V
@w2
+ 1212
@2V
@w1@w2
  rV = 0: (3.5)
The correct functional form of the value function V (wf ) has to satisfy this con-
dition and implies the requirement that V is a convex function of the wi’s (i. e.,
@2V /@w2i > 0). As this represents the diﬀerentiated version of the antiderivative
V that is not known currently, one has to make an educated guess regarding a
suitable form. Because of the second-order nature of the partial diﬀerential equa-
tion (3.5), a viable solution involves a linear combination of a general solution of
V . For this part, I follow Burda (1995) by specifying ewf as the general solution,
which allows to formalize the functional form as follows
V (wf ) = Ae
1wf +Be2wf ; (3.6)
where exponents 1 and 2 denote the roots of the quadratic equation that is
obtained by replacing V in (3.5) with its functional form in (3.6),13
1 > 0 ; 2 < 0: (3.7)
In order to further resolve for the two unknown constants A and B as well as to
derive the wage diﬀerential which triggers migration, wf , some limiting conditions
need to be applied. The ﬁrst requirement states that the value function becomes
worthless for a suﬃciently large and negative family wage diﬀerential
V (wf   1) = 0: (3.8)
With this, the prospect of the family wage diﬀerential to reach positive levels in
the future is extremely limited and leads to the fact that the migration project
no longer possesses a value for the family.14 Condition (3.8) immediately helps to
reduce the general solution (3.6) to a single argument of the linear combination.
With the precondition that for increasingly negative wf ’s the value of V has to
12Under the inﬁnite horizon assumption the value of the option to migrate becomes independent
of time, so @V@t = 0 holds.13 Please refer to Appendix B for further details on the derivation of both roots.
14 If wf is zero or moderately negative the project still has value because uncertainty provides
the possibility for the wage diﬀerential to turn positive again in the next period.
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go to zero, the second term involving the negative root 2 violates this regulation
as it would become an ever increasing positive term. Therefore, it directly follows
that B = 0 and the value function of the migration project in the waiting region
(wf < wf ) is simpliﬁed to
V (wf ) = Ae
1wf ; (3.9)
which is positive as long as A > 0 and where 1 =  f2f +
1
2f

2f + 2r
2
f
 1
2 (see
expression B.5 in Appendix B). It represents the value of the entire migration
possibility, deﬁned as the sum of the value of migration if undertook immediately
in the current period plus the option value of waiting.
Additionally, two more boundary conditions provide the necessary continuity
requirement of the function V around wf = wf , which directly builds on the
previously made assumption stating that the value function is continuously dif-
ferentiable in its arguments. These are called value-matching and smooth-pasting
condition, respectively, and are given by
V (wf ) =

wf +
1 + 2
r

/r  M; (3.10)
@V (wf )
@wf

wf=w

f
=
1
r
: (3.11)
In the stopping region, i. e. the area in (wf ; t) space above the curve wf = wf (t),
the household decides to move and realizes the net present value of the migration
project. Consequently, at the optimal wage diﬀerential threshold the household
swaps the possibility to migrate, valued by the function V , for the payoﬀ from ac-
tual migration. The value-matching condition (3.10) represents exactly this equal-
ization at wf = wf :
V (wf ) = Ae
1wf !=

wf +
f
r

/r  M: (3.12)
However, the boundary V is itself an unknown. Because of this, the region in
(wf ; t) space over which the partial diﬀerential equation (3.5) is valid is endogenous.
The function V is therefore referred to as a “free boundary” that separates the
continuation and stopping regions.15 To solve the equation and ﬁnd the region
of validity the smooth-pasting condition (3.11) is applied, which equates the ﬁrst
15 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 108ﬀ.)
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derivatives of V (wf ) and the migration payoﬀ valuation with respect to wf at wf :
V 0(wf ) = A1e
1wf !=
1
r
: (3.13)
This expression is now rearranged for parameter A and inserted back into the value
function (3.9), which in a next step is equated with the net payoﬀ from migration
(the RHS of the value-matching condition 3.12). Finally, solving for the demanded
threshold wf yields the optimal migration condition for the dual-income household
wf = 
 1
1  
f
r
+ rM: (3.14)
Analyzing this expression shows that the trigger wage diﬀerential is an increasing
function of the ﬁxed costs of migration, M , whereas it is decreasing in parame-
ter 1. Implications of the discount rate r and the expected trend rate f (i. e.
1 and 2), however, are ambiguous since both parameters are present in 1 as
well. More information are available by further disassembling 1, as provided in
Appendix B, which comprises of the partners’ individual wage gain uncertainties
and drift parameters. Comparative statics reveal that the variability of future
wage diﬀerentials, 1 and 2, has a signiﬁcantly increasing eﬀect on the household
threshold wage diﬀerential, wf . Moreover, the correlation of the two stochastic
wage diﬀerentials, 12, plays an important role in aﬀecting and possibly aggravat-
ing the already existing deterrent eﬀect of 1 and 2 on the joint migration of the
household.
As a result, the migration project of the dual-income household takes one of
the following two valuations depending on the speciﬁc location of wf in the (wf ; t)
space:
V (wf ) =
8>><>>:
(r1)
 1e1

wf+(1+2)/r rM

 1 if wf < wf , (3.15a)
wf +
1 + 2
r

/r  M if wf > wf . (3.15b)
Provided that waiting has value, the option to migrate is not exercised and the mi-
gration decision is deferred to the next period. This is the case as long as valuation
(3.15a) is larger than the net present valuation (3.15b), whose diﬀerence denotes
the value of the option to wait. At the threshold wf this diﬀerence becomes zero
and migration is triggered as waiting has no value to the household anymore. Un-
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+∆σf
V (wf )
NPVA
B
C
D
wf w∗f−M + µf
r2
wf
V (wf ), NPVDistance denotes the
option value of waiting
Figure 3.1 Net present value and option value of migration as well as option
value of waiting as a function of the household wage diﬀerential
(wf ); Illustration adapted from Burda (1995), modiﬁed and
augmented by author
certainty over the family wage diﬀerential, however, increases this value of waiting
and leads to a further postponement of joint migration.
Based on the exposition of Burda (1995), the results are diagrammatically sum-
marized in Figure 3.1. BwD gives the valuation of the migration project without
waiting. When w < w, the valuation is zero and no migration takes place. The
entire value of the option to migrate is represented by ACD, while the value of
waiting is the diﬀerence of the two curves illustrated by the wide arrow. The value
of waiting (the distance between AC and BwC) rises from its limit of zero at  1
to its maximum at w = w, after which it declines, reaching zero again at w = w.
The graph also illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in household wage gain uncer-
tainty, f , on the valuation of the migration possibility in the waiting state, V (wf ),
represented by the dashed gray line. Higher uncertainty shifts the curve upwards
and extents the waiting region to wage diﬀerential values beyond wf . This conse-
quently raises the value of waiting at any given regional wage diﬀerential, wf , over
the range [ 1; wf ].
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3.4 Discussion of Results
The above analysis shows that taking individual wage characteristics of two earners
into account enriches the basic model of a single agent and helps to better under-
stand family migration decisions. The joint signiﬁcance of income diﬀerentials of
both partners is an important feature of the presented model.
Migration costs and overall income uncertainty of the family have a deterring
eﬀect on the joint decision to migrate. While this corresponds to the results for
individual decision-makers presented by Burda (1995), the additional value of the
model rests in the composition of the family’s income gain and variance. The
result accordingly demonstrates that both the expected individual income gains as
well as the correlation between their variations play an important role in aﬀecting
the migration decision. This supports earlier ﬁndings by Mincer (1978) and Long
(1974) on the inﬂuence of marital status and women’s labor force participation on
family decisions: The family is faced with a more complex decision process as it has
to ascertain the optimal outcome for more than one income-earner. One conclusion
of paramount importance is that the decision to migrate is made only on basis of the
expected income/wage diﬀerentials of the involved family members. This means,
the decision power of both partners is determined solely by their individual shares
in the expected overall change of household earnings. Moreover, the particular
direction of the two partners’ wage diﬀerentials, i. e. whether they personally realize
a gain or loss in income, is not relevant for assigning decision power, but instead
it is only the absolute value of the expected individual wage changes that counts.
For this reason, the presented model and its solution corresponds to the egalitarian
household type referred to in the beginning of Section 3.3, in which both partners
seek to maximize their joint income on altruistic grounds. Conversely, the level of
the current personal incomes of both partners does not play a role in this respect,
besides to the extent that the expected income change may increase with a higher
current level of income.
In addition to these aspects, the derived solution for the optimal household
wage gain required for a joint migration also includes information about wage gain
uncertainties available to the dual-income couple in the current period. Overall,
uncertainty about the evolution of the household wage gain shows the same feature
of increasing the threshold wf required for a positive family migration decision as
found by Burda for individuals. Yet, in contrast to the single individual case,
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Figure 3.2 Inﬂuence of the ratio of individual wage gain uncertainties on the
household migration threshold, wf , under diﬀerent correlation
scenarios
within the dual-income household the combination of the single wage diﬀerential
uncertainties adds to the set of information used in the joint decision on migration.
It is not just the simple summation of the individual uncertainties that leads
to more information. In fact, the precise relation of the variations of the expected
single wage diﬀerentials forms an essential source for determining the overall wage
diﬀerential uncertainty, which in turn has a direct eﬀect on the migration threshold
wf .
Due to the non-linear character of expressions (3.14) and (3.15) of the above
analysis, I revert to a short numerical exercise to investigate the impact of diﬀer-
ent parameter constellations on the migration threshold of the household. The
parameters underlying the numerical simulation take values of M = 1, r = 0:1,
1 = 2 = 0. Moreover, the sum of the two individual uncertainty measures is
held at a constant value of 1 + 2 = 1. Keeping this ’naively’ added up variation
measure for the household wage diﬀerential unchanged for diﬀerent ratios of the
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partners’ individual wage gain uncertainties, allows for a clearer, isolated exami-
nation of the consequence of contrasting correlations between the variations of the
two individual wage proﬁles for the household reservation wage gain. The result
of the simulation is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
If individual wage diﬀerentials are perfectly positively correlated (12 = 1),
i. e. both wage diﬀerentials show a strong linear co-movement in their variability,
than the impact of individual wage uncertainties on the overall income variance
of the household is highest. As a result, the mark-up on the migration threshold
stemming from uncertainty reaches its maximum for the given individual wage
proﬁles of both earners and the value attached to waiting is thereby signiﬁcantly
increased. It is apparent that under perfect positive correlation a changing ratio
of the single uncertainty measures loses its inﬂuence on the threshold, as depicted
by the upper straight curve in the diagram. This scenario is likely to be observed
if both partners work in a very similar sector or even the same company and,
therefore, face almost identical future job prospects and wage cycles. In this case,
because of the close linkage of parallel evolving wage diﬀerentials, the household
members will demand a higher overall wage diﬀerential to account for uncertainty
in their migration endeavor and to insure against unfavorable developments in their
combined and single wage diﬀerentials after migration.
On the other hand, if wage diﬀerentials are perfectly negatively correlated
(12 =  1), the wage diﬀerentials of both earners show a strong linear counter
movement in their variability. In the special case of identical single wage gain
uncertainties (1 = 2), this leads to a full neutralization of the two uncertainty
measures and, in consequence, to a complete elimination of overall uncertainty.
The household’s migration decision is considerably encouraged in such a situation,
for the threshold wage diﬀerential, wf , is notably reduced as presented by the
lower curve in Figure 3.2 at a ratio of individual uncertainties of one. The diﬀer-
ence between the household reservation wage gains from the contrasting cases of
perfect positive and negative correlation, respectively, takes a remarkable value of
about 2.2. Hence, while demanding a household wage gain of more than two times
the moving costs under perfect positive correlation, the household faces only little
hurdles for migration with a wage diﬀerential threshold of only one tenth of initial
moving costs as attainable under perfect negative correlation. The reason for this
excellent outcome is the high degree of risk diversiﬁcation in the income streams
of the household, which stands in contrast to the low degree of diversiﬁcation un-
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der positive correlation. Hence, partners whose job environments are characterized
by opposite ﬂuctuations would beneﬁt most with respect to their joint migration
intention.
Increasing inequality between individual wage gain uncertainties, however, leads
to a rising inﬂuence of the wage characteristics of only one partner and, hence,
a dominating eﬀect of his or her wage gain uncertainty in the joint household
migration decision. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of a negative correlation of the individual
wage gain variations is increasingly reduced under these circumstances and the
required reservation wage diﬀerential of the household correspondingly raised.
Besides the two extreme cases of perfect positive and negative correlation, vari-
ations in the individual wage gains can also be subject to any possible correlation
within this range. One further situation that is to receive attention here is the
case of completely independent wage proﬁles. This is speciﬁcally characterized by
a coeﬃcient of correlation of zero in the discussed model and refers to the fact
that the wage diﬀerentials of both partners exhibit no observable sign of a linear
relation in their variations. This were, for example, the case when the two earners
worked in very unrelated economic areas with independent business cycles, or their
job-related personal characteristics relevant for the wage setting process do not
show any systematic connection.
The given illustration of various cases demonstrates the inﬂuential role that
the individual wage diﬀerentials and their uncertainties exercise on the reservation
wage diﬀerential of the dual-income household. In particular, the interrelation of
uncertainties about the single wage diﬀerentials involved in the decision problem
enrich the analysis of a joint migration. The opportunity costs resulting from
uncertainty become considerably inﬂuenced by the way in which the individual
wage diﬀerential uncertainties interact. The simulation in Figure 3.2 shows that the
sensitivity of the threshold wage diﬀerential to a change in the ratio of individual
wage gain uncertainties is most pronounced for perfectly negatively correlated wage
proﬁles of both partners. Whereas with perfectly positively correlated wage proﬁles
the threshold becomes insensitive to a change in the relative size of individual wage
gain uncertainties.
In an earlier work on family migration decisions, Mincer (1978) uses a rather
static measure of uncertainty. The applied coeﬃcient of variation is based on the
examination of the bivariate distribution of the single net gain of one earner that
is extrapolated to the second income-earner’s net gain; whereby both the future
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returns and costs are drawn from this distribution. In comparison, the option value
model at hand captures the evolution of future steps in the wage diﬀerential(s) more
explicitly by utilizing a peculiar stochastic process for each partner’s expected wage
diﬀerential. Uncertainty, thus, is solely inherent in future wages and not in the costs
of migration. As a consequence, the real options approach deﬁnes more accurately
the source of uncertainty in the migration endeavor and, therefore, also resembles
reality more accurately than is attainable with Mincer’s approach. In addition,
the current model diﬀers in its deﬁnition of the required threshold value: while
in traditional NPV-based migration theories (e. g. used by Sjaastad 1962, Harris
and Todaro 1970, Mincer 1978, Stark and Levhari 1982) relocation is triggered as
soon as the expected net income gain from migration exceeds zero (which refers
to wf > 0 in the above model), in the real options framework migration under
uncertainty is carried out only if the expected net gain additionally exceeds the
opportunity costs of immediate action. These opportunity costs depend on the
underlying uncertainty and take a value larger zero if the variances of the individual
wage diﬀerentials of the two earners are positive and ﬁnite. As a result, migration
is actually deterred despite the household’s expectation of a positive net gain from
relocating as long as the expected total wage diﬀerential remains short of these
opportunity costs (that is the range of wf between wf and wf in Figure 3.1). This,
at the same time, means that actual migration refers to exercising the option to
migrate and giving up the possibility to do so in a later period. At the point where
the household’s expected wage diﬀerential (wf ) exceeds the opportunity costs of
immediate action, the option value of waiting has no value anymore and migration
is triggered.
Unlike many theoretical and empirical studies on migration (e. g. Connell et al.
1976, Stark and Levhari 1982, Ghatak et al. 1996, Carlsson et al. 2009, Jaeger
et al. 2010) that assume individuals to be risk-averse in their behaviour, the model
introduced in the previous section builds on the central assumption of risk-neutral
individuals. This marks a signiﬁcant distinction in the interpretation of results
that are derived on basis of the two approaches. The former explains the hesita-
tion observable in individual migration as the result of risk avoidance on the side
of the potential migrant. From the utility perspective, risk (i. e. probability of
unemployment, expected mean income, etc.) is seen as causing disutility for the
individual, which he wishes to minimize. In the event, the migrant will move to
the location that reduces his risk exposure the most. The latter approach used in
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this analysis, in contrast, interprets the possible procrastination in the migration
process as the consequence of weighing the available chances and the required costs
of migration under optimal timing. Thus, the risk-neutral individual considers un-
certainty as potential beneﬁt as well as potential cost in his rational decision on
migration. He seeks to ﬁnd the optimum between taking the expected beneﬁt im-
mediately and incurring the irreversible costs of moving and to forgo the potential
beneﬁt, thereby avoiding potential costs from uncertainty and saving migration
costs in order to await further resolution of the volatility in the wage diﬀerential.
In this respect it is shown that already in the case of risk neutrality of rational
individuals there is an inhibiting eﬀect of uncertainty present in the migration be-
havior of the household. A speciﬁc risk-averse treatment is not necessary for this
result to emerge, but would further aggravate this outcome.
Another aspect evident when evaluating optimality condition (3.14) is the rele-
vance of the expected time trend (1, 2) in both wage diﬀerentials in determining
the migration threshold. As intuitively anticipated, the expectation of a negative
development of the combined wage gain ( f ) exhibits an increasing eﬀect on the
demanded reservation wage diﬀerential of the dual-income household. Suppose the
household wage income in the destination region is higher than in the home region,
then with a development of the combined wage diﬀerential that is more and more
in favor of the current situation, the household ﬁnds it less beneﬁcial to move to
the destination region. The partners were instead inclined to wait for the better
relative wage situation to realize in their home region and to abandon their option
to migrate. On the contrary, an expected positive trend in the household wage
diﬀerential (+f ) causes the two earners to urge for migration sooner in pursu-
ing their objective to maximize the household’s income. Waiting in this situation
would not be optimal as it involves rising opportunity costs that render staying in
the current situation more expensive than actual migration to the other region.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The increasing interest in family and group interactions and their inﬂuence on
migration decision making asks for new approaches to understand the manifold
aspects that govern these decisions. This chapter’s aim is to provide a compre-
hensive analysis and present a theoretical model for the migration decision of a
dual-income household in which both partners are faced with uncertain individual
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wage gains from migration. I especially assess the situation of a joint migration of
the couple and the associated optimality conditions. To achieve this, the chapter
makes use of the real options approach, which allows for an adequate consideration
of the opportunity costs of immediate migration arising from the uncertain evolu-
tion of regional wage diﬀerentials. Although this leads to increased complexity of
the analysis as compared to the conventional net present value approach, the gains
in interpretability of the obtained results and the versatility of the model as such,
justify the additional strain. The derived solution conﬁrms that higher uncertainty
about the evolution of the expected total regional wage diﬀerential—analogous to
previous studies—in fact inhibits household migration. The household accordingly
insures itself against bad outcomes in future periods by demanding a higher reser-
vation wage gain in the event of migration.
Furthermore, the model demonstrates clearly the important consideration of the
concurrence of the household members’ single wage proﬁles. The characteristics
of the individual regional wage diﬀerentials in case of migration decisively control
the outcome of the joint migration endeavor. Both income-earners’ objective is
to maximize their overall household income, which involves optimally agreeing
upon their potential personal gains and losses from migration. Another central
ﬁnding is that the power in the migration decision assigned to the income-earners
is determined by their contribution to the expected household income gain, not by
their particular shares in the absolute level of household income. In general and
according to the model, only the possible (marginal) improvement of the household
income is relevant in the joint decision to migrate.
The negative eﬀect stemming from wage gain uncertainty is emphasized through
the implications of a positive correlation of the variations in the two earners’ in-
dividual incomes. Thus, despite the prospect of a positive net income gain from
migration the household were inclined to stay because of excessive opportunity
costs from immediate migration due to income uncertainty. On the other hand,
negative correlation can eﬀectively eliminate wage gain uncertainty for the house-
hold under certain conditions. This considerably encourages the joint migration
by reducing the migration threshold to very low levels compared to initial moving
costs. Independent individual wage gain variations, however, lower the household
reservation wage gain only moderately and are, therefore, less stimulating for mi-
gration than negatively correlated wage proﬁles of both partners.
In summary, the model enhances existing studies on family and group migration
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behavior and allows for a comprehensive set of explanations in the analysis of dual-
income household migration decision making, in particular for the joint movement
of the partners.
Appendix
A Present Discounted Value of Expected Future Wage Differ-
entials
The present discounted value of expected future household wage diﬀerentials is
deﬁned as Z 1
0
E[wf;t]e
 rt dt =

wf;0 + f/r

/r: (A.1)
To see this, we ﬁrst decompose the expression on the LHS and solve for the ex-
pected future wage diﬀerential at time t, E[wf;t]. For the dual-earner household
this expectation value consists of the weighted private wage gains of both partners.
Due to the additive character of the expectations expression the subsequent analy-
sis focuses on a general presentation for the individual cases. The private expected
future wage diﬀerential at time t is the sum of the wage diﬀerential, wi, at time 0
and the integral over future changes of the wage diﬀerential up to time t, thus
E[wi;t] = wi;0 +
Z t
0
E[dwi;s] ds; (A.2)
with i = 1; 2 denoting the individual wage proﬁles of both partners. By knowing
that E[dwi] = i dt we can derive the second term on the RHS by statingZ t
0
E[dwi;s] ds =
Z t
0
(i dt) ds
=

i dt  s
t
0
= i dt  t  i dt  (0) and with dt = 1
= it:
Substituting this into (A.2) it follows that the expected wage diﬀerential at time t
in (A.1) is
E[wi;t] = wi;0 + it: (A.3)
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In a second step one has to solve for the improper integral on the LHS in (A.1).
Using (A.3) this can be written asZ 1
0
E[wi;t]e
 rt dt =
Z 1
0
(wi;0 + it)e
 rt dt =
Z 1
0
wi;0e
 rt dt+
Z 1
0
ite
 rt dt:
(A.4)
The solution of the ﬁrst integral on the RHS is easily given byZ 1
0
wi;0e
 rt dt =

 wi;0
r
e rt
1
0
=
wi;0
r
: (A.5)
To obtain the solution for the second integral on the RHS in (A.4) two techniques
of integration have to be applied to ﬁnd ﬁrst a less complicated antiderivative.
A.1 The Substitution Rule of Integration
To ﬁnd the solution for the integral
i
Z 1
0
te rt dt (A.6)
the variable t is substituted for the function g(x). According to the substitution
rule of integration (A.6) can be written in the following general formZ b
a
f(t) dt =
Z g(b)
g(a)
f

g(x)
  g0(x) dx: (A.7)
In the present case I use the substitutions  rt = x ) t =  x
r
, thus g(x) =  x
r
and g0(x) =  1
r
. Plugging this back into (A.6) and using (A.7) yields

Z 1
0
te rt dt = i
Z  1
r
0
 x
r
 ex 

 1
r

dx
=
i
r2
Z  1
r
0

exx

dx:
(A.8)
This expression is again diﬃcult to integrate due to the presence of the variable x.
A.2 Integration by Parts
However, it can be broken up into two multiplicative parts, one part for which it
is easy to ﬁnd the integral (f 0(x) = ex) and a second part (g(x) = x), that when
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diﬀerentiated and then multiplied by f(x), generates an expression (f(x) g0(x))
that turns out to be easy to integrate. This technique is called integration by parts
and has the general formZ a
b
g(x)f 0(x) dx = f(x)g(x) 
Z a
b
f(x)g0(x) dx: (A.9)
Applied to the expression Z  1
r
0
exx dx
gives Z  1
r
0
(x)(ex) dx = exx 
Z  1
r
0
(ex) dx = exx+ 1: (A.10)
Substituting this back into (A.8) gives

Z 1
0
te rt dt = i
r2
Z  1
r
0

exx

dx
=
i
r2

exx+ 1
 1
r
0
=
i
r2
Therefore, the ﬁnal solution to (A.4) turns out to beZ 1
0
E[wi;t]e
 rt dt = wi;0
r
+
i
r2
=

wi;0 + i/r

/r: (A.11)
The starting expression (A.1) is then derived by creating the sum of both present
discounted valuationsZ 1
0
E[wf;t]e
 rt dt = x1
Z 1
0
E[w1;t]e
 rt dt+ x2
Z 1
0
E[w2;t]e
 rt dt;
=

w1;0
r
+
1
r2

+

w2;0
r
+
2
r2

;
=

w1;0 + w2;0 + (1 + 2)/r

/r;
=

wf;0 + f/r

/r:
(A.12)
B Partial Differential Equation and Value Function
In the dual-earner household case the family income gain from migration is the sum
of the individual wage diﬀerentials wf = w1 + w2. The model, therefore, involves
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two stochastic processes that each follow a simple Brownian motion with drift.
The valuation of the option to migrate for the family can be expressed through the
value function V (wf ) which yields an expected capital gain over dt equal to
E[dV ] = 1
@V
@w1
dt+ 2
@V
@w2
dt+ 1
2
"
21
@2V
@w21
+ 22
@2V
@w22
#
dt+
+ 1212
@2V
@w1@w2
dt:
(B.1)
Arbitrage implies that the “asset” V , which yields only a capital gain, should earn
an expected return equal to the riskless return over the period dt, such that
rV (wf ) dt != E

dV (wf )

:
The return equation becomes a partial diﬀerential equation of the following form
that has to be satisﬁed by the value function V (wf ),
1
2
"
21
@2V
@w21
+ 22
@2V
@w22
#
+ 1
@V
@w1
+ 2
@V
@w2
+ 1212
@2V
@w1@w2
  rV = 0; (B.2)
where 12 is the coeﬃcient of correlation of the stochastic variables dz1 and dz2.
The solution to this equation consists of linear combinations of the form ewf =
e(w1+w2), so
V (wf ) = Ae
1wf +Be2wf = Ae1(w1+w2) +Be2(w1+w2); (B.3)
where A;B are constants to be determined and 1; 2 are solutions to the following
quadratic equation, which is derived by substituting ewf for V in (B.1):
2

1
2
21 +
1
2
22 + 1212

+ f   r = 0; (B.4)
with f = 1+2. Using the quadratic formula the following two roots are obtained
as
1 =
 (f ) +
q
21 + 212 + 
2
2 + 2r
 
21 + 
2
2 + 21212

21 + 
2
2 + 21212
> 0;
2 =
 (f ) 
q
21 + 212 + 
2
2 + 2r
 
21 + 
2
2 + 21212

21 + 
2
2 + 21212
< 0:
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From the boundary condition V (wf   1) = 0 it immediately follows that B = 0.
The constant 1 from (B.4) can also be expressed as
1 =
 f +
q
2f + 2r
2
f
2f
; (B.5)
where 2f (= 21 + 22 + 21212) denotes the total variance of the family’s income
gain.
To determine the two unknown constants, A and wf , two additional boundary
conditions, the “value-matching” and the “smooth-pasting” condition, are neces-
sary:
“value-matching”: equates the value function V with the present discounted
valuation of the migration project at wf = wf
V (wf ) = Ae
1wf !=

wf +
f
r

/r   I (net pay-oﬀ in case of migration);
“smooth-pasting”: equates derivative of V and that of the NPV valuation with
respect to wf at wf = wf
V 0(wf ) = A1e
1wf !=
1
r
) A = (r1) 1e 1wf : (B.6)
Substituting A into the value function V (wf ) and equating it to the net pay-oﬀ in
case of migration from the value-matching condition we get
V (wf ) = (r1)
 1e 1w

f e1w

f
!
=

wf +
f
r

/r  M
(r1)
 1 !=

wf +
f
r

/r  M
) wf =  11  
f
r
+ rM: (B.7)
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4
Optimal Migration Decision
under Commuting Cost
Uncertainty
4.1 Introduction
Mobility decisions of individuals and households in conjunction with their choice
of workplace and residence location are an important determinant for regional and
local population development. Migration and commuting as the two modes of mo-
bility are the second major factor for changes in population size and composition,
especially of the workforce, behind natural growth. Thus, they have a dominant
eﬀect on the demographics and the competitiveness of a region (Poot 2008). Under-
standing the complex interactions between the labor market, the housing market,
and diﬀerent forms of mobility is necessary for dealing with changing transporta-
tion needs and the evaluation of appropriate policy measures aﬀecting these ﬁelds
of action (e. g. regional development, transportation infrastructure, housing and
commuting subsidies, etc.).
The consideration of uncertainty in individual or household mobility decision
behavior is important in that it more realistically reproduces the underlying cir-
cumstances leading to a decision. In this respect, work has been done primarily
in the context of labor mobility at the national and international level. With the
appearance of suburbanization and exurbanization processes, however, it seems
reasonable to extend the analysis to the regional level. Uncertainty present in
commuting and migration interrelations has received only limited attention in the-
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oretical studies so far.
Having said this, the current chapter introduces a theoretical model that shall
shed some light on the inﬂuence of commuting cost uncertainty, in particular, on
the optimal individual decision to locate one’s residence in close proximity to the
workplace or in a more remote area.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the background
and motivation for the subsequent analysis. Section 4.3 introduces the theoretical
model speciﬁcations on basis of which ﬁrst closed-form solutions for the given
problem are derived in Section 4.4. This is followed by a detailed discussion by
help of numerical simulation. In Section 4.5 some important comparative static
results are presented before the last section concludes the chapter.
4.2 Background
Starting with the seminal work of Alonso (1964) about the monocentric city model,
urban economics early distinguished between the so-called Central Business Dis-
trict (CBD) and the surrounding residential region for the study of urban spatial
structure and the location of households and ﬁrms. Later, new settlement types
led to an enhancement of the initial dichotomy of the model. In addition to the
central city, as the administrative area of the core city, and the suburban zone
with its high proportion of out-commuting, Boskoﬀ (1970) names a third zone,
namely Exurbia. In comparison to the residential suburbs, the exurban zone con-
sists of smaller, more remote communities, typically with a growing population.
The communities are also characterized by a high share of out-commuters to the
metropolitan center. Nelson (1992) deﬁnes Exurbia more rigorously as areas with
a distance of 10–50 miles from urban centers of at least 500,000 inhabitants or
70 miles from centers with a population of more than two million. Thus, exur-
ban communities lie outside the outerbelt of a major metropolitan area but within
its commutershed. Daniels (1998) further speciﬁes these areas with a commuting
time of at least 25 minutes in one direction and a population density of less than
500 persons per square mile. The urban sprawl into suburban or exurban areas is
mainly driven by housing market considerations and the desire for a better quality
of life outside the densely populated urban center.
What is common to these settlement types is the increasing willingness of res-
idents to commute long distances, which places them in a position of growing
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dependence on individual motor car traﬃc and, thus, greater gasoline demand.
However, gasoline prices are only one of many diﬀerent types of user costs that the
individual incurs for urban automobile transportation. Kanemoto (2007) stresses
the diverse cost structure of urban transportation and distinguishes between four
main types of user cost: (1) user fees, such as tolls and fares; (2) vehicle run-
ning costs, which for example include the mentioned costs of fuel, maintenance,
and the value of vehicle wear-and-tear; (3) the value of travel time, which corre-
sponds to the involved opportunity cost of travel time; and (4) traﬃc accident
costs. While costs of the ﬁrst type usually do not vary signiﬁcantly over time,
vehicle running costs as well as the value of travel time can exhibit considerable
ﬂuctuations. Particularly, changes in gasoline prices and other monetary cost com-
ponents exert inﬂuence on the budget and, hence, the consumption possibilities
of the individual. Besides these direct costs, opportunity costs arising from the
time needed to travel the distance between residence and workplace represent an-
other relevant share in the individual’s or household’s overall mobility costs. An
important source of opportunity costs of travel time is traﬃc congestion, inherent
to modern urban transportation infrastructures. The growing complexity of com-
muting behavior through connecting more and increasingly diﬀerent activities in
a single trip—so-called trip chaining—makes commuting times diﬃcult to predict
and imposes a notable burden on the commuter. To this end, in his simulation of
traﬃc congestion reduction policies, Noland (1997) ﬁnds that travel time variance
is a driving force for the expected costs of commuting, allocating a higher weight
to it than to just the travel time.1 Against this background, it seems reasonable to
include travel time costs in the aggregation of overall commuting costs. Thereby,
the argumentation for commuting cost uncertainty as the focal point of this study,
is to be understood as a general, all-encompassing approach, which comprises of
uncertainty stemming both from monetary as well as non-monetary costs involved
in the commuting activity of the individual.
The mobility of labor has been studied in a variety of ways. For example, neo-
classical theory recognizes the spatially equilibrating eﬀects and forces of labor
migration. Diﬀerent levels of labor supply and demand across regions lead to dif-
1This study belongs to a speciﬁc strand of research, which focuses on the evaluation of public
policies targeting commuting time and traﬃc congestion. Particularly, they assess the eﬀect of
the provision of travel time information on travel time uncertainty and, thus, commuting cost
uncertainty. For more on this topic, see for instance Noland (1997) and Ettema and Timmermans
(2006).
89
4. OPTIMAL MIGRATION DECISION UNDER COMMUTING COST UNCERTAINTY
ferences in the marginal product of labor in these regions. If labor, as a factor
of production, is mobile then it will move to the region with the higher marginal
product, i. e. with the lowest labor supply relative to demand. This balances de-
mand and supply for labor in these regions and eventually equalizes the marginal
product of labor, hence real wages, across regions. Therefore, the “price” of labor
is seen as the determining factor for the spatial mobility of labor. In contrast, the
human capital theory advanced by Sjaastad (1962) views migration as an invest-
ment into an individual’s human capital in that it enables him to select the region
that provides the highest present value of future net beneﬁts, that is, the highest
return on his acquired skills. This micro-economic perspective on individual deci-
sion behavior became the primary focus of migration studies (e. g. Simpson 1980,
Vickerman 1984).
A signiﬁcant limitation of these “pure” migration studies lies in their non-
observance of spatially separated workplace and residence locations. Rather, they
implicitly assume a congruent move of residence with any labor (supply) mobil-
ity. However, due to improved infrastructure and transportation facilities, work-
place—hence labor supply—and residence often tend to diverge across regions.
This raises the demand for a more thorough appraisal of the interrelated choice
between workplace, residence, and the type of mobility connecting the two (e. g.
van der Veen and Evers 1983, Evers and van der Veen 1985, Reitsma and Ver-
goossen 1988, Zax 1994, van Ommeren et al. 1999).
Search theory, for instance, speciﬁes that the individual constantly updates his
information about potential local labor markets by investing into searching. The
task is to ﬁnd the optimal time at which to stop further searching and to accept
the given job oﬀer (e. g. Eliasson et al. 2003, van Ommeren et al. 1997). The indi-
vidual or household decision process, thereby, can involve a step-wise (sequential)
or simultaneous choice of workplace and residence2. If the prospective migrant has
imperfect information about a remote labor market, and thus is uncertain about
its potential job opportunities, he can as a ﬁrst step, change only his workplace,
leaving his residence unchanged. In this case, he connects both locations through
commuting. In a second step, if expectations about this labor market are fulﬁlled,
the individual may chose to relocate his residence to the new labor market region
too, using migration as the type of mobility. According to Vickerman (1984), an-
2 See Evers (1989) for an illustration of a possible decision tree for work location and residence
choice within a sequential and consecutive process.
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other possibility for the individual is to engage in an anticipated or speculative
move of residence in hope for a beneﬁcial workplace change later on. If, however,
in both examples labor market expectations are not fulﬁlled the individual may de-
cide not to move his workplace or residence, but rather stay with the more ﬂexible
commuting mode. This can result in an overall increase of commuting intensity
and partly increase the eﬀective rate of unemployment in that area. Regarding
the decision structure, Evers and van der Veen (1985) empirically analyzed the
determinants and interdependencies between diﬀerent types of labor mobility and
workplace and residence choice. Their ﬁndings suggest that there is no sequential-
ness but rather simultaneity in the decision whether to supply one’s labor force
outside the initial region, the choice to make a short or long distance move, and the
choice to commute or migrate. This speaks in favor of a simultaneous treatment
of these aspects in theoretical considerations.
Little is known, however, about the eﬀects of uncertainty on mobility decisions
at the regional level. The model presented in this chapter builds on the afore-
mentioned real options approach to analyze optimal individual decision behavior
under cost uncertainty within a commuting–migration framework. As observed by
Polachek and Horvath (1977) in their empirical investigation of U.S. county and
state moves for the period 1968–74, “state moves unambiguously increase earnings”
whereas “local moves generally do not entail job changes, and hence such movers
do not exhibit any signiﬁcant change in earnings” (p. 130). In the subsequent
analysis I follow along this line and presume a given workplace located in the city
center. By doing so, I disregard job search and wage diﬀerential aspects in this
study. This, in particular, allows to focus on the minimization of total costs as
the sole objective and represents a theoretical diﬀerentiation from existing studies
whose primary interest lies in the maximization of utility or net beneﬁts by the
individual or household.
4.3 The Model
In order to study the eﬀect of cost uncertainty on the commuting and migration
behavior, I consider a risk-neutral individual who chooses between two modes of
mobility—commuting and migration—for optimally connecting his workplace and
residence. The model describes the simultaneous decision of residence location and
mode choice. Relevant questions to be addresses in the analysis are (i) When is it
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optimal for the individual, who lives initially in the urban center, to move to the
suburb to beneﬁt from lower housing costs but, at the same time, bear required
commuting costs? (ii) When is it optimal for the individual, who lives initially in
the suburb, to move to the urban center to avoid commuting costs but bear higher
costs of housing? (iii) How is the interrelated choice between place of residence
and mode of mobility characterized? (iv) Which consequence does commuting cost
uncertainty exert on the spatial mobility pattern in the region?
Without loss of generality, the individual’s workplace is assumed ﬁxed and lo-
cated in region 1, denoted as the city or metropolitan center. Hence, he can only
change his place of residence.3 Region 2 comprises all other locations and is re-
ferred to as the suburban or exurban peripheral area, for which lower rental costs
compared to the city center are presumed. In the multi-period setting of the model,
the mobility decision takes place anew at the beginning of each period. Therefore,
depending on the initial state, four possible mobility-location scenarios can be dis-
tinguished at the end of each period: (a) The individual remains residing near his
workplace in region 1; (b) The individual becomes an in-commuter into region 1 as
a consequence of out-migration to region 2, which requires the individual to engage
in commuting but allows him to beneﬁt from lower rental costs; (c) The individual
remains residing in region 2 and commutes to his workplace located in region 1;
(d) The individual migrates to region 1 in order to avoid commuting expenses for
traveling between region 2 and 1.
In case (b) migration and (return) commuting can be considered as complements,
while in case (d) both mobility modes are substitutes for connecting the individ-
ual’s workplace and residence. Further, cases (a) and (c) do neither aﬀect the
migration balance (in-migration minus out-migration) nor the commuting balance
(in-commuting minus out-commuting) in either region. This stands in opposition
to a reduction of the migration balance and an increase in the commuting balance
in regions 1 and 2 in cases (b) and (d), respectively.
Subsequently, based on this elaboration of available mobility choices, the model
explicitly incorporates uncertainty about the evolution of commuting costs into the
decision problem of the individual, who is assumed to be risk neutral and inﬁnitely
lived. Unlike in the previous two chapters with their focus on wage diﬀerential
uncertainty, here, stochastics of the commuting cost development are represented
3 This is an understood limit of the complexity of the model in that it reduces the underlying
choice set for the individual. Yet, it allows the retention of the features necessary for the objective
of this chapter.
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by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) of the form4
dC
C
=  dt+  dz; (4.1)
where similar to before  is a drift parameter,  is the standard deviation of
the GBM per unit time, and dz is the increment of the standard Wiener process
dz(t) = "(t)
p
dt, with the random parameter "(t)  N(0; 1). The instantaneous
drift rate of the stochastic process dC is E[dC] = C dt and its instantaneous
variance rate is V[dC] = 2C2 dt. The latter shows clearly that for this particular
deﬁnition of uncertainty by means of a GBM the variance of the proportional
change in C increases linearly in the time span t. In general, the proposed deﬁnition
of commuting costs allows to include any cost types consistent with these properties.
This means that it not only needs to include direct monetary vehicle running costs
(e. g. fuel) but also opportunity costs of travel time as long as these costs share
similar properties regarding the aforementioned instantaneous drift rate, C dt,
and variance rate, 2C2 dt. For instance, if opportunity costs of the time traveled
depend on the individual’s personal wage and if one presumes that the variation in
his wage is connected to comparable economic ﬂuctuations that provide the basis
for the development of gasoline prices, then both types of commuting costs could
be combined to a general cost measure.
It is assumed that future costs are discounted at the positive rate r > 0 and
housing incurs costs of R1 in the city center and of R2 in the suburb. The diﬀerence
between the two, denoted by R = R1  R2, represents the mark-up or premium of
city center housing costs over suburb housing costs and is assumed to be positive,
so R > 0. Under risk-neutrality, the aim of the individual is to minimize the
expected present value of future costs peculiar to living in both locations. The
present value of the costs of living in the city center is simply R1/r, while the cost
situation in the suburb is described by the sum of housing costs and commuting
costs, hence its present value is R2/r + C/(r   ).5 According to Marshallian
theory, the individual would migrate from one location to the other as soon as
4Note, that the value of a variable described by a geometric Brownian motion can per deﬁnition
not fall below zero over the course of development. Opposite to this, a standard Brownian motion
process as used in Chapters 2 and 3 allows for negative values of the represented stochastic
variable. Since commuting costs are deﬁned to be restricted to positive values, I apply the
concept of a GBM in this context.
5The present discounted value of expected future commuting and rental costs is given byR1
0
 
R2 + E[Ct]

e rt dt = R2r + Cr  .
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the expected cost savings from migration exceed the costs of moving to the new
location. Moving from the city center to the suburb involves one-time costs ` and
for migration from the suburb to the city center , which both represent sunk
costs that are not recoverable should the individual reverse his decision in the
future. In case the individual lives initially in the city center, this necessitates that
R1/r > R2/r+C/(r  ) + ` and yields the Marshallian migration threshold with
regard to commuting costs as
TL =
r   
r
(R  r`): (4.2)
Similarly, the optimal condition for changing the individual’s residence from the
suburban location to the city center requires that R2/r + C/(r   ) > R1/r + .
This translates into the commuting cost threshold
TH =
r   
r
(R + r): (4.3)
These Marshallian trigger values TL and TH , however, do not include a measure for
the degree of uncertainty in the evolution of commuting costs and, for this reason,
are inappropriate for a comprehensive analysis of optimal migration decisions under
the given circumstances.
Real options theory, on the other hand, applied in this context attempts to
better capture the underlying uncertainty, which is the focus of this chapter, and
to transform it into the derived optimality conditions. Accordingly, a separate
valuation is established for each locational situation. The total costs of living in
the city center (no commuting costs) and following optimal strategies in the future
is denoted by V1(C), while that of living at a suburban residence is denoted by
V2(C). As before, the risk-neutral individual minimizes the expected total costs
and chooses his residence and mode of mobility accordingly. The Bellman equations
representing the cost minimizing problem can be written in the form
rV1 = R1 +
1
dt E[dV1]; (4.4)
rV2 = R2 + C +
1
dt E[dV2]; (4.5)
which, at the same time, provide the necessary no-arbitrage conditions. The obli-
gation to pay periodically can be seen as a debenture bond, with Vi(C)  V (C)
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being its respective value (i = 1; 2). The left hand side (LHS) in both expressions
is the payment per unit time a holder of the “asset” (debtor) would be willing to
aﬀord given the discount rate r. On the right hand side (RHS) the terms R1 and
R2 again denote the location speciﬁc rental costs and C the required immediate
payment of commuting costs arising from holding the particular asset. The last
term in both equations is the expected rate of change of the asset’s value over one
time period. A solution to the problem at hand requires the knowledge of the yet
unknown functional form of V1 and V2. Fortunately, this can be approximated from
changes in V over small units of time. Since both value functions are dependent
on commuting costs C, the information contained in the stochastic process (4.1)
can be utilized. Hence, by using Ito’s Lemma the second order Taylor expansion
for dV can be derived as
dV = @V
@t
dt+ @V
@C
dC + 1
2
@2V
@C2
(dC)2:
Substituting dC for (4.1) and taking expectations gives
E[dV ] = C@V
@C
dt+ 1
2
2C2
@2V
@C2
dt:
This provides the expression for E[dV1] and E[dV2] in (4.4) and (4.5). Dividing by
dt yields the second-order linear partial diﬀerential equations
1
2
2C2V 001 (C) + CV
0
1(C)  rV1 +R1 = 0 (4.6)
1
2
2C2V 002 (C) + CV
0
2(C)  rV2 +R2 + C = 0: (4.7)
The solution to (4.6) and (4.7) is given by the sum of the general solution for
the homogeneous part and a particular solution for the respective inhomogeneous
parts.6 Applying the expression AC for V (C) in (4.6) and (4.7) yields a funda-
mental quadratic equation with two roots, whose detailed description is left to
Appendix A. Based on its two solutions, the general solution for the homogeneous
part of the partial diﬀerential equation can be derived as the following linear com-
bination
V (C) = AC  +BC; (4.8)
6 See, for instance, Braun (1993, p. 127ﬀ.) or Tenenbaum and Pollard (1985, p. 241ﬀ.) for a
detailed discussion of linear diﬀerential equations and their solutions.
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where A and B are arbitrary constants and   and  are the two roots of the
fundamental quadratic. Substituting this into (4.4) and (4.5) for 1dt E[dV1] and
1
dt E[dV2] and including the particular solutions for the inhomogeneous parts yields
the value functions
V1(C) = AC
  +
R1
r
; (4.9)
V2(C) = BC
 +
R2
r
+
C
r   : (4.10)
Expressions (4.9) and (4.10) give the valuation of optimal future strategies when
starting in central-city or suburb mode, respectively. In (4.9) the last term on the
RHS represents the present value of all future rental costs when living in the city
center forever. Thus, the ﬁrst term must be the value of the option to move to the
suburb, i. e. out-migration. This cost value function includes only that term from
the general solution (4.8), which involves the negative root  . Constant B is set
to zero in this case since the term BC would otherwise violate the assumption
that the option to move to the suburb vanishes for high levels of commuting costs.
Analogously, the last two terms on the RHS in (4.10) denote the present value of
all future rental and commuting costs when living in the suburb forever. Hence,
the ﬁrst term must again be the value of the option to move to the city center. As
before, the property of the option to move to the city center requires that constant
A = 0 in this cost value function. The ﬁrst term on the RHS of both equations can
alternatively be interpreted as the potential cost savings arising from relocation.
The optimal commuting cost levels relevant for triggering the relocation of one’s
residence to the metropolitan center or the suburb are denoted by CH and CL,
respectively. At the optimal points switching from one location to the other yields
a payoﬀ that must equal the incurred up-front ﬁxed costs of moving to this location.
These moving costs are diﬀerentiated between the costs for in-migration to the
city center (to the workplace), , and the costs for out-migration to the remote
residence, `. Both include, but are not limited to, direct costs of relocating as well
as psychological costs from leaving familiar surroundings and forging new ties at the
new location. In addition, costs for out-migration, `, can further include necessary
costs for purchasing a car, while costs  capture opportunity costs of owning a
car that is no longer used to the extent as before. The so-called value-matching
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condition for the lower trigger value, CL, is given by
V1(CL) = V2(CL) + `; (4.11)
and similarly for CH
V2(CH) = V1(CH) + : (4.12)
Moreover, each value function satisﬁes the so-called smooth-pasting condition,
which ensures that the two valuations that are replaced in the event of migration
meet tangentially in the optimal points CL and CH :
V 01(CL) = V
0
2(CL); (4.13)
V 02(CH) = V
0
1(CH): (4.14)
An important aspect of both value functions can be shown with their explicit for-
mulations (4.9) and (4.10): For an economically feasible speciﬁcation, the signs of
the constants A and B must in fact be negative. This conforms to the interpreta-
tion of the terms AC  and BC given above, in that both represent the potential
cost savings from moving to the suburb and to the city center, respectively, in
comparison to the current situation. The stated value matching conditions permit
to specify the general optimality conditions for remaining in the waiting state. If
the individual lives initially close to his place of work in the city center, waiting is
optimal for him as long as
R
r
  C
r      ` < AC
   BC; (4.15)
where R = R1  R2 > 0 represents the rental cost premium of the city center over
the suburb. Evaluation of the RHS in the waiting region but close to CL yields a
value of the ﬁrst term that tends to be larger than the absolute value of the second
term due to the impact of the particular exponents. Thus, the former is dominat-
ing the latter term. As a result, the individual remains residing in the city center
despite a positive net present value from out-migration on the LHS, for in sum
AC    BC is positive. Commuting cost uncertainty, in this respect, acts as a
deterrent to the relocation decision, in which the individual moves his residence as
soon as the cost beneﬁt from relocation exceeds the sum of the opportunity costs of
migration. In comparison to conventional NPV analyses, the individual demands
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a cost beneﬁt that is not only larger than zero but larger than some positive thresh-
old value to be determined in the process. With respect to commuting costs this
means that the current level must fall short of the Marshallian threshold value,
C < CL < TL, in order to trigger out-migration to the suburb. In the case without
the possibility of future return migration back to the city center, constant B is zero
and the condition for the waiting state reduces to the requirement that the sum of
expected cost savings from migration is less than the opportunity costs of immedi-
ate migration (stemming from possible unfavorable future developments) given by
the positive value AC . Furthermore, this examination reveals the consequence
of simultaneously considering migration and return migration in the problem for-
mulation. It becomes obvious that the ﬂexibility of the future return migration
option, captured by BC, reduces the opportunity costs that the individual takes
into account for his initial migration decision. In that event, the individual is
inclined to move to the suburb already at a presumably higher commuting cost
threshold as compared to the case without return option. Likewise, it can be seen
that if the signs of both constants were not negative, the condition would allow for
a negative net present value in case of migration, which is in contradiction to the
cost minimization objective of the individual.
Analogous, when living in the suburb, waiting is perceived optimal for
C
r     
R
r
   < BC   AC : (4.16)
Accordingly, cityward migration is deferred as long as the cost savings from mi-
gration, given by the diﬀerence between ceasing commuting costs and the sum of
rental cost premia in the city plus moving costs, are less than the corresponding
opportunity costs of relocation on present value terms. Evaluating the RHS at high
levels of commuting costs but still below CH shows that the ﬁrst term outweighs the
second term. Hence, as before, the condition requires the cost beneﬁt from moving
to exceed not only zero but the positive value denoted by the sum BC AC . If
return migration were to be excluded from the consideration again, the requirement
states that the cost savings from migration must exceed the positive term BC.
Thus, the additional return possibility in future periods reduces the opportunity
costs to be overrated by the potential cost savings. More ﬂexibility in the face of
commuting cost uncertainty is, therefore, shown to encourage migration in either
way.
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Up to this point, the analysis focused only on the particular solutions (4.9) and
(4.10) to derive the general optimality conditions (4.15) and (4.16) describing both
waiting and migration behavior of the individual. Nonetheless, an explicit expres-
sion of both commuting cost thresholds, CL and CH , has not yet been derived.
Substituting (4.9) and (4.10) into conditions (4.11)–(4.14) gives the necessary set
of equations from which parameters A, B, CL, and CH are to be determined simul-
taneously. A full analytical solution of this system of equations, however, yields
complex expressions and is therefore omitted in this analysis. To still allow for
the discussion of the eﬀect of commuting cost uncertainty on the residential mo-
bility decision of individuals, the following section derives closed-form analytical
solutions for CL and CH and delivers a ﬁrst insight into the comparative static as-
pects of the involved parameters, which is further extended in Section 4.5. These
solutions provide in a next step the base for the comprehensive numerical analysis
in Section 4.4.2 regarding the properties of the thresholds CL and CH with respect
to changes in the underlying parameter constellations.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Closed-form Solution
As previously mentioned, the full solution for CL and CH from the system of
equations (4.11)–(4.14) involves highly non-linear expressions. For this reason and
in order to obtain a practicable solution for analysis some limiting conditions have
to be applied, which allow the derivation of both trigger values in closed form. This
can be achieved by considering a more limited solution, in each case. First, in the
case of the upper threshold, CH , I am interested only in the migration decision to
the city center, thereby neglecting return migration possibilities in the future. In
eﬀect, this narrows down above general solution and resembles a “once and for all”
migration decision problem. To achieve this, consider a substantial increase in the
costs of returning to the suburb, `, at a later point in time exceeding any possible
rental cost savings obtainable by moving, i. e. ` > R/r. In this case the individual
would never choose to move to the suburb, since the excessively high costs of
moving are not expected to amortize through the potential rental cost savings
in the suburb. Recursively, this enters into the initial decision problem of the
individual by cancelling out this option and leaving him with a one-way migration
possibility in his decision. Formally, the intrinsic option to relocate one’s residence
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away from the workplace again in future periods becomes valueless, which implies
that constant A goes to zero in (4.11)–(4.14). Given these simplifying assumptions
about ` and A, the application of the value-matching (4.12) and smooth-pasting
(4.14) condition, respectively, permits to derive a closed-form solution for the upper
threshold of commuting costs, CH , as the optimality condition for relocating to the
city center/near the workplace:
CH =

   1 
r   
r
 (R + r) : (4.1)
The property  > 1 for the positive root of the fundamental quadratic function
ensures an economically feasible solution, for commuting costs are presumed to
be strictly non-negative. Further, the convergence condition r >  is understood
to hold. Since parameter  depends positively on the underlying degree of com-
muting cost uncertainty, the ﬁrst fraction on the RHS is increasing in  but with
diminishing intensity. Hence, higher uncertainty ampliﬁes the upper threshold, CH .
Furthermore, a rise in the rental cost mark-up of the city center over the suburb
(R) as well as higher costs for moving to the city center () lead to a magniﬁed
threshold and, therefore, aﬀect the migration decision negatively.
Along the same lines, a closed-form solution can be obtained for the lower
threshold, CL. Similar to before, if the cost savings arising from discontinuing
commuting do not even compensate for the costs of moving to the city center, i. e.
 > C/(r ), the option to do so becomes worthless to the individual and constant
B must go to zero. In this case, the optimal trigger costs CL can be derived from
the value-matching (4.11) and smooth-pasting (4.13) conditions stated before:
CL =

 + 1
 r   
r
 (R  r`) : (4.2)
Since  has a positive sign and decreases with enlarged commuting cost uncer-
tainty, the ﬁrst fraction, per deﬁnition, is less than one and tends toward zero
with increasing . In comparison to (4.1) the lower threshold is further reduced
for higher levels of uncertainty. This generates an extended range for commuting
costs to ﬂuctuate within before actual migration is triggered. The eﬀect of the
rental cost mark-up is identical for both thresholds and, thus, simply lifts the re-
gion of inertia without changing its size. Obversely, higher costs of relocating to
the suburb () have a reducing impact on CL, requiring yet lower commuting costs
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for compensation.
The Marshallian migration triggers, TL and TH , introduced in Section 4.3, can
now provide the benchmark case with which the solutions obtained on the basis
of real options theory above are contrasted. Both approaches diverge in essence
by the additional - and -fractions found in CL and CH , that in turn include the
uncertainty parameter  as well as the drift rate  – both describing the stochastic
process of C. According to conditions (4.2) and (4.1), the threshold value CL is
exactly /(+1) times the NPV trigger value TL, while CH is /(  1) times the
upper trigger value TH . Consequently, it can easily be seen that the upper threshold
CH , obtained from the real options approach, overrates the NPV trigger value,
whereas the lower threshold CL underrates its NPV analogue. The reason is found
in the underlying uncertainty about commuting costs C. The higher the degree of
uncertainty, the larger is the additional wedge that is driven between TH and CH
and TL and CL, respectively. Thereby, the overall distance between the thresholds
CH and CL increases further. In the literature this distance is usually referred to
as the “region of inertia” or “range of inaction” and constitutes the co-domain of C
for which the status quo is maintained in both locations. Concerning the problem
at hand, this means that the decision to migrate to the suburb when commuting
costs are low is not undone if costs of commuting, up to the critical level CH ,
increase again. Likewise, the decision to move to the city center because of excessive
commuting costs is not reversed if costs fall back to a previously lower level. This
relates directly to the concept of “hysteresis” which describes the incidence of
taking permanent decisions based on short-term ﬂuctuations or “the failure of an
eﬀect to reverse itself as its underlying cause is reversed” (Dixit 1989, p. 622). This
observable procrastination eﬀect is more pronounced than the optimal migration
triggers TL and TH would predict, for their distance is only determined by the
(sunk) moving costs  and ` as opposed to the additional terms  and  (with
their arguments  and ) that drive the solution for conditions (4.2) and (4.1).
Figure 4.1 provides a comparison of the two distinct approaches and illustrates
the “wedge eﬀect”. The shaded area spanning between the Marshallian trigger
values TL and TH pictured in Figure 4.1(a) represents the region of inertia described
above. If commuting costs exceed the level TH the individual is better oﬀ by
relocating to the city center if currently living in the suburb. The same individual,
however, would not ﬁnd it optimal to reverse his decision in case the potential costs
of commuting fall back below this upper threshold. Instead, only if commuting
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Figure 4.1 Side-by-side comparison of NPV and ROA thresholds and
illustration of the corresponding region of inertia
costs reach a level less than TL it becomes beneﬁcial for the individual to move to
the suburb again. The reason for this region of inactivity are the moving costs 
and ` to be incurred by the individual.
Considering uncertainty through the application of real options theory intro-
duces the thresholds CL and CH shown in Figure 4.1(b). In addition to the costs of
relocation that are responsible for the region of inaction in 4.1(a), the underlying
degree of uncertainty about the evolution of commuting costs extends the shaded
area further. As a result, the individual who initially lives in the suburb is more
inclined to remain there and to bear commuting costs up to the level CH , instead
of TH . One could say that he seems more tolerant to higher commuting costs as
compared to the NPV treatment. Analogous, potential commuting costs have to
fail the lower threshold CL for triggering migration out of the city center to the
suburb.
4.4.2 Numerical Simulation
The analysis of the analytical solution provided above is limited, for it does not
allow for the derivation of the ﬁrst order conditions of the involved parameters in a
practicable form. This section, therefore, aims at contributing to a more complete
characterization of the deﬁned lower and upper thresholds by means of numerical
simulation. For this it is assumed that the discount rate is r = 0:1 and the rental
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Figure 4.2 Numerical simulation of the inﬂuence of uncertainty, , on the
commuting cost thresholds CL and CH , with parameters r = 0:1,
R = 1, and no growth rate ( = 0)
cost premium in the city center, R, takes the normalized value of 1. Furthermore,
moving costs  and ` are set to zero in the base case, to focus on the resulting
implications of changes in commuting cost uncertainty, , and commuting cost
growth, , on the threshold levels CL and CH given by the closed-form solutions
(4.1) and (4.2).7 Figure 4.2 highlights the eﬀect of various levels of commuting cost
uncertainty, , on both thresholds, with  assumed zero for simplicity.
In the face of higher uncertainty with respect to the future evolution of commut-
ing costs (), the lower threshold, CL, that must be underrun by actual commuting
costs for a positive decision to move to the suburb, is further reduced – tending
toward its limit at zero. On the other hand, the upper threshold CH , which must
be exceeded to trigger migration to the city center, is increased substantially. Both
these eﬀects describe a widening of the region of inertia—the distance between CL
and CH—in which individuals with similar cost structures postpone their decision
7 For the purpose of illustration, expectations on future costs of return migration may diﬀer
from the current levels of direct migration costs,  and `.
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to move from the city center to the suburb and vice versa. Overall, permanent
mobility in the region is therefore expected to be restrained.8 Starting with no un-
certainty ( = 0) and costless relocation between both residence choices (; ` = 0),
the upper and lower threshold meet in their common limit at R = 1, where the
region of inertia eventually vanishes. Allowing for positive moving costs alters the
lower limit of both thresholds and results in greater distance, hence a widening of
the region of inertia. In the numerical simulation  and ` are arbitrarily set to
a level of two for comparison. This likely resembles a rather low approximation
of the real cost relation between rental cost premia and moving costs in the sub-
urb–central city context, since it relates to a meager ﬁve-to-one ratio on present
value terms. Yet, the illustrative purpose is in the focus of this exercise. The
moving costs augment CH by the size of r, such that its limit at  = 0 becomes
R + r = 1:2 for the given parameter settings. Likewise, CL is scaled down by an
amount equal to r` and is now given by R r` = 0:8. Accordingly, relocation costs
of one ﬁfth the rental cost premium correspond to 20 per cent higher and lower,
respectively, Marshallian migration triggers in this example. This symmetry, how-
ever, disappears in the thresholds CL and CH if commuting cost uncertainty is
introduced. Moving costs lower the threshold CL increasingly less with higher un-
certainty, . In contrast, the inﬂuence of moving costs on the upper threshold
CH , relevant for a decision to move from the suburb to the city center, further
accentuates at higher levels of uncertainty. This clearly demonstrates the strong
eﬀect of commuting cost uncertainty on the evaluation of the involved costs , `
and R in the commuting–migration problem at hand.
The reason for this asymmetric eﬀect of commuting cost uncertainty on the
inﬂuence of moving costs in determining both thresholds is found in its alternative
interpretation as opportunity costs from immediate relocation. The individual’s
calculus demands that the cost savings realized from a change in residence (due
to reduced rental costs or ceasing commuting costs) need to balance the peculiar
costs of residential relocation. Since moving costs are one-time costs accrued in
the instance of migration, the individual expects that the capitalized potential
future periodical cost savings outweigh these costs. When taking the decision
the individual considers not only direct costs involved in the decision but also
possible opportunity costs arising from unfavorable developments in future periods
8 The term “permanent” mobility refers to the lasting relocation of residence, whereas, in com-
parison, “temporary” mobility means any form of territorial movement which does not represent
a permanent, or lasting, change of usual residence (Bell and Ward 2000), like commuting.
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after the decision has been made. Uncertainty about the outcome of these future
cost savings that are linked to the evolution of commuting costs, therefore, aﬀects
expected opportunity costs from immediate decision. The higher the uncertainty
about future commuting cost levels the stronger is the resulting inﬂuence on the
calculated opportunity costs.
In the case of the upper threshold, CH , the relevant term causing the exag-
gerating eﬀect of moving costs () with increasing uncertainty is /(   1) from
condition (4.1). This term is increasing in the uncertainty measure , so @
@
> 0,
and captures the opportunity costs inherent in the immediate decision to move
to the city center without waiting. Higher uncertainty, i. e. variability, not only
regards the upside potential in C but also means higher possibility of seeing lower
commuting cost levels in the future which would then draw the taken decision of
cityward migration eﬀectively incorrect. To avoid this regret and to insure against
bad outcomes the individual only moves if commuting costs are suﬃciently high.9
Conversely, it is true that the lower threshold (CL) is reduced with increasing
commuting cost uncertainty. The responsible term is /( + 1) in (4.2) which is
decreasing in , tending toward its limit at zero. Since it is linked multiplicative
to the moving costs for outward migration to the suburban residence, the inﬂuence
of these costs increasingly diminishes too with higher commuting cost uncertainty.
As a consequence, the consideration of the trade-oﬀ between moving costs on the
one side and the sum of rental cost reduction plus additional commuting costs
in the case of migration on the other side is faded into the background in the
personal calculation of the individual. In fact, the opportunity costs of immediate
relocation to the suburb due to the existing commuting cost uncertainty dominates
the further decrease of the required commuting cost threshold CL. For low levels of
uncertainty, therefore, additional moving costs lead to a stronger reduction in CL
than the same moving costs do at higher levels of uncertainty, where opportunity
costs are increasingly important.
Turning to the implication of expected commuting cost growth () on the respec-
tive thresholds CL and CH , Figure 4.3 draws a clear negative relationship between
a higher trend rate and both threshold levels. However, the strength of this eﬀect
is diﬀerent for CL and CH . Threshold CL is increasingly lowered as the growth
rate, , approaches its economically feasible level deﬁned by r, while to the other
9 Please refer to Bernanke (1983) for a profound elaboration of this so-called “bad news” prin-
ciple.
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Figure 4.3 Inﬂuence of commuting cost growth rate, , on thresholds CL and
CH , with parameters r = 0:1, R = 1, and  = 0:1)
end with a negative drift CL tends towards R = 1. Additional migration costs, `,
reduce the lower threshold further, though not below zero, since commuting costs
can only take positive values. Regarding the upper threshold, CH , the graph shows
that for positive values   r the threshold tends towards R as well, now as the
lower limit. A smaller or negative growth rate leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the
threshold CH that has to be overrun by actual commuting costs to trigger migra-
tion from the suburb to the city center. Consequently, the expectation of strongly
declining commuting costs in the case of living at the suburban residence reduces
the likeliness of relocation considerably. The individual is better oﬀ by staying and
to wait for lower future commuting costs, which make the suburban location more
favorable against the city center location. In summary, faster expected growth of
commuting costs, i. e. a reduction of both thresholds, represents a preference for
the city center: in-migration is carried out sooner and out-migration is deferred.
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4.5 Comparative Statics
Thus far, the analytical solution as well as its corresponding numerical simulation
were based on a closed-form delineation of the migration decision problem. The
reason for this approach is the impractical complexity of the system of equations
(4.11)–(4.14) whose resolution would provide the full solution for thresholds CL
and CH . In forming rational expectations about future states of the world, the
individual also allows for the possibility to return to his previous residence in the
future if commuting costs were to fall below or exceed the required threshold again.
But each time the individual changes his residence he incurs the moving costs
 or `, depending on the direction of the move. Using the closed-form solution
for analysis, however, results in the shortcoming of not capturing the inﬂuence
of future moving costs for return migration on the decision today. In order to
deliver a more adequate analysis of comparative statics regarding the eﬀects of 
and `, in particular, and the rental cost premium R on the optimal commuting
cost thresholds, this section draws on the method advanced by Dixit (1989) in his
study on ﬁrm entry and exit decisions under uncertainty. Accordingly, ﬁrst deﬁne
the “auxiliary” diﬀerence function
G(C) = V2(C)  V1(C); (4.1)
which represents the incremental value of cost reduction that the individual can
realize by living in the city center. A positive value measures by how much the
recurring costs of residing in the suburb exceed the costs of living in the city center.
By using equations (4.9) and (4.10) this becomes
G(C) = AC   BC   R
r
+
C
r   : (4.2)
The system of equations comprising the value-matching conditions (4.11) and (4.12)
and the smooth-pasting conditions (4.13) and (4.14) is subsequently evaluated at
the two thresholds CL and CH , describing the optimality conditions for moving to
the suburb and moving to the city center, respectively. By doing so, the following
conditions are derived
G(CL) =  `; G(CH) = ; G0(CL) = 0; G0(CH) = 0; G00(CL) > 0; G00(CH) < 0:
(4.3)
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The ﬁrst two conditions follow directly from the value-matching conditions (4.11)
and (4.12) and denote that at the lower (upper) threshold the incremental value
of cost reduction from changing residence to the suburb (city center) matches the
costs of moving there. The remaining four conditions depict that the lower (upper)
threshold is a minimum (maximum) of the deﬁned diﬀerence function, G(C).10
As a next step, all equations in (4.11)–(4.14) with their explicit representation
are totally diﬀerentiated, which for the value-matching conditions (4.11) and (4.12)
yields  
dA
dB
!
=
1

 
(CH   CL) dR/r   CL d   CH d`
(C H   C L ) dR/r   C L d  C H d`
!
; (4.4)
where  = CHC L   CLC H > 0. Diﬀerentiating the smooth-pasting conditions
(4.13) and (4.14) totally and rearranging provides the general condition
G00(C) dC = C  1 dA + C 1 dB; (4.5)
which is evaluated at CL and CH , and dA and dB are substituted with (4.4).
Relegating the detailed calculations to Appendix B, the separate eﬀects on the
threshold CL are given as
@CL
@
< 0 ;
@CL
@`
< 0 ;
@CL
@R
> 0: (4.6)
Both the direct up-front costs of leaving the city center as well as the indirect
costs associated with a possible return to the center at a later time have a decreas-
ing eﬀect on the lower threshold, CL. Therefore, higher moving costs in either
direction raise the barrier on out-migration due to higher compensating rental cost
reductions or likewise lower initial commuting costs. A rising rental cost markup
in the city center, however, increases the commuting cost threshold. As a result
it becomes more likely that current costs, C, fall short of the threshold level and
eventually trigger out-migration sooner.
Regarding the eﬀects of changes in costs on the upper threshold, CH , required
10 This can be seen by looking at the second derivative of G(C) with regard to C, given by
G00(C) = (+1)AC  2 ( 1)BC 2. The ﬁrst term on the RHS is clearly decreasing as
C increases with a limit at zero, while the second term increases with higher values of C and has
a limit at1. Evaluating this expression at the lower threshold (CL), it can be seen that the ﬁrst
term by deﬁnition is less than the second term, therefore resulting in G00(CL) > 0. Similarly, for
the upper threshold (CH) this yields G00(CH) < 0.
108
4. OPTIMAL MIGRATION DECISION UNDER COMMUTING COST UNCERTAINTY
for an optimal decision to move to the city center, comparative statics reveal
@CH
@
> 0 ;
@CH
@`
> 0 ;
@CH
@R
> 0: (4.7)
The upper threshold, CH , is raised both for increased direct costs associated with
relocating to the city center and for higher indirect moving costs for returning to the
suburb in a later period. This makes it less likely for actual commuting costs, C, to
exceed this elevated level and results in a postponement of the decision to migrate
to the city center. Thus, the individual is willing to remain in the commuting
mode and to bear equivalently higher commuting costs. As was the case for the
lower threshold, the rental cost markup, R, likewise increases the upper threshold.
Staying in the suburb and continuing commuting to the place of work, therefore,
becomes more beneﬁciary to the individual due to the comparatively inexpensive
rent outside the city center.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Results of the theoretical evaluation of commuting cost uncertainty on the optimal
decision regarding residential location and mobility mode choice prove the impor-
tance of considering uncertainty in the mobility decision process. It demonstrates
that the presence of uncertainty clearly inﬂuences the results. Higher uncertainty
about the evolution of commuting costs increases the number of residentially im-
mobile individuals. The decision about a relocation of residence is simply deferred
to a later point in time. This means that individuals initially living close to their
workplaces in the city center are inclined to stay there, while those initially resid-
ing in a remote community in the suburban or exurban area continue to bear the
necessary commuting costs. Either is possible even under the expectation of posi-
tive net beneﬁts from relocation to the alternative region. Under commuting cost
uncertainty, allowing for the ﬂexibility of revising one’s decision later on proves
to reduce the barrier of relocation in both directions. This additional option on
future return migration eases the opportunity costs of immediate migration. If
the individual takes this possibility into account in his initial decision he is more
encouraged to relocate than compared to a “once and for all” decision problem
without return option. Intuition is conﬁrmed in that higher costs of relocating lead
to a lower propensity to migrate in either direction. Particularly if residing in the
suburban location, this increases the willingness of the individual to tolerate higher
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commuting costs. Similarly, a higher rental cost mark-up in the urban center over
the surrounding area reduces the likelihood to relocate toward the place of work for
those living in the suburban location. In contrast, this mark-up on housing costs
promotes out-migration to the suburban area. The model explains some important
interrelations of residence and mobility mode choice in the presence of uncertainty
that should be regarded in the elaboration of residential mobility decisions at the
local and regional level.
Appendix
A Fundamental Quadratic
Using the general form C to replace Vi in the homogeneous part of (4.6) and (4.7)
yields the following quadratic equation
Q  1
2
2(   1) +    r = 0; (A.1)
with the roots  and  :
 =
2   2+p(2   2)2 + 82r
22
> 1 (A.2)
  = 
2   2 p(2   2)2 + 82r
22
< 0: (A.3)
B Comparative Statics
The following steps are adopted from Dixit (1989) and adjusted to the cost minimiz-
ing problem put forward within the migration decision context. From the system
of equations (4.11) to (4.14) total diﬀerentiation yields 
C H  CH
C L  CL
! 
dA
dB
!
=
 
dR/r + d
dR/r   d`
!
:
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Rearranging gives condition (4.4) from the text 
dA
dB
!
=
1

 
 CL CH
 C L C H
! 
dR/r + d
dR/r   d`
!
=
1

 
(CH   CL) dR/r   CL d   CH d`
(C H   C L ) dR/r   C L d  C H d`
!
;
which is substituted into (4.5) and ﬁrst evaluated at CL. This gives
G00(CL) dCL =
1


C  1L
h
(CH   CL) dR/r   CL d  CH d`
i
+ C 1L
h
(C H   C L ) dR/r   C L d  C H d`
i
:
(B.1)
Noting from (4.3) that G00(CL) > 0 the coeﬃcient of dCL on the LHS is positive.
Thus, the coeﬃcient of d on the RHS is
  1

( + )C  1L < 0: !
@CL
@
< 0 (B.2)
Similarly, the coeﬃcient of d` is
  1
CL
(C L C

H + C

LC
 
H ) < 0: !
@CL
@`
< 0 (B.3)
The coeﬃcient of dR is of the form
1
rCL

C L (C

H   CL) + CL(C H   C L )

=
C L
rCL

(z   1) + (z    1)

;
with z  CH/CL. Deﬁne the function
 (z) = (z   1) + (z    1):
Then  (1) = 0 and
 0(z) = (z   z )/z > 0; 8z > 1: ! @CL
@R
> 0 (B.4)
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Analogously, the diﬀerent coeﬃcients at the point CH can be obtained. C is re-
placed with CH in (4.5) which gives the following equation
G00(CH) dCH =
1


C  1H
h
(CH   CL) dR/r   CL d  CH d`
i
+ C 1H
h
(C H   C L ) dR/r   C L d  C H d`
i
:
(B.5)
Again, noting from (4.3) that G00(CH) < 0, the coeﬃcient of d is
1
CH
(C H C

L + C

HC
 
L ) > 0: !
@CH
@
> 0 (B.6)
Similarly, the coeﬃcient of d` is
1

( + )C  1H > 0: !
@CH
@`
> 0 (B.7)
The coeﬃcient of dR is
  1
rCH

C H (C

H   CL) + CH(C H   C L )

=   C
 
H
rCH

(z    1) + (z   1)

:
Deﬁne the function
 (z) = (z    1) + (z   1);
 0(z) = (z   z )/z > 0; 8z > 1: ! @CH
@R
> 0
(B.8)
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Outlook
The assessed migration theoretical topics in this dissertation represent a small
contribution to the large strand of migration theoretical treatises. Besides their
common consideration of economic uncertainty in diﬀerent forms they target spe-
ciﬁc research questions ranging from individual migration decision making under
changing levels of longevity, over the interrelated choice of residence location and
mode of mobility typical for local moves, to the investigation of joint household
migration behavior of a dual-income couple. There exist many more aspects that
could be included in those analyses. For example, with regard to the inﬂuence of
diﬀerent levels of longevity on individual migration decision making under uncer-
tainty, one could relax the assumption of an exogenous and time-invariant rate
of disease, presented in Chapter 2. This could allow for a problem description
in which the act of migration aﬀects the expected level of longevity through an
investment into a better health care infrastructure. Likewise, it could incorporate
the possibility of age-dependent rates of disease. In this scenario, the old would
face a higher probability of death in each period than the young. Intuitively, this
would further aggravate those results already obtained on the basis of the presented
analysis. In a similar fashion, one could introduce a hyperbolic discounting spec-
iﬁcation that describes impatient individuals who pay less attention to outcomes
in the far future. All of these approaches and possible extensions, however, come
at a high cost in the form of additional complexity of the model.
Children living in the household also inﬂuence long-term migration decision
making of two income earners. This could be included in the consideration of
Chapter 3 on household migration behavior. Unlike wage diﬀerential uncertainty of
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income earners in the household, children may face uncertainty about nonmonetary
factors such as forging new friendships and acceptance of peer group aﬃliation. In
addition, monetary aspects regarding regional diﬀerences in childcare or school
quality can aﬀect joint household migration.
In the commuting-migration framework in Chapter 4, costs for commuting be-
tween residence and workplace are the main determinant for relocation decisions of
the individual. In this regard, commuting cost subsidies in the form of tax reliefs
could serve as an insurance against cost uncertainty and, therefore, be taken into
account in this examination. Particularly due to the progressive income taxation
in most countries, high-income earners would beneﬁt relatively more from this
“insurance” and were inclined to move to the suburban area, thereby potentially
supporting gentriﬁcation processes and inﬂuencing the social structure in a region.
Partly linked to the analysis in Chapter 4, which also accounts for costs of
housing in the individual’s migration decision, the incidence of uncertainty on the
housing market could be of interest in the discussion. Especially for the group of
home owners, the tragic but suitable example of the U.S. shows how strong declines
in the price of homes can inﬂuence and restrain the residential mobility of people
who are now experiencing increased costs of relocating as a result of selling their
current home for much less than it was originally worth. Costs may be so high,
that relocation is not an option anymore. Uncertainty about the further evolution
of house prices could also in the case of only moderate losses additionally delay
individual or household migration.
The presented analyses were conducted with the assumption of a risk-neutral
migrant to stress the eﬀect of uncertainty on mobility decision making even in the
absence of peculiar risk avoiding attitudes of the individual or household. Risk-
averse behavior could, of course, be incorporated into a utility maximization frame-
work. For this, results are expected to conﬁrm and reinforce the derived ﬁndings
in this dissertation.
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